Soon after the Fiasco of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA's own Inspector General conducted an Internal investigation to determine exactly WHY it resulted in a Fiasco.

This internal investigation resulted in a 232 page report Blaming the CIA ONLY for the fiasco.

There were 25 copies of this I_G report which were Ordered Burned.

24 copies WERE Burned.

The lone remaining copy was "Secreted Away" for 38 Years.

I will start this page by posting a few pertinent pages from that report.

When time allows I will post every page of that I G Report.


From CIA website>>>   http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs.asp



That will give you a pretty good idea as to why General Cabell was Fired by JFK.



Here's what Alan Dulles said about the Report>>>


Here's McCone's Reply>>>

Inspector General's Report FEEDBACK

24 February 1998: National Security Archives has withdrawn the JPEG images of the CIA Cuban Operation documents and is in the process of preparing HTML versions. The 25 images of the pages transcribed below are offered here in Zipped format: http://jya.com/cia-co.zip (1.5MB)

23 February 1998
Source: National Security Archives images of CIA documents

Special thanks to the National Security Archives


JYA Note: the following documents are the opening memorandum and index and the concluding letters and memorandum addressing two CIA 1962 Top Secret critiques of the "Cuban Operation", more popularly known as the failed Bay of Pigs operation of April 1961. The first critique, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," by the CIA Inspector General, provided a detailed, highly critical assessment of CIA performance in the operation. The second, "An Analysis of the Cuban Operation," by the CIA Deputy Director (Plans), strongly disagreed with the IG survey. These declassified documents were obtained recently by the National Security Archives and are available at: http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchives

See related news report: http://jya.com/cia-pigs.htm

John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in 1962, replaced Allen Dulles, who was DCI during the Cuban Operation.

Richard Bissell was Deputy Director (Plans) or DD/P. Tracy Barnes was Bissell's associate.

Lyman Kirkpatrick was CIA Inspector General.

WH designates the Western Hemisphere Division. WH/4 was the branch set up to run the Cuban Operation.

The President was Dwight Eisenhower when the operation was initiated and John Kennedy when it was executed. The Attorney General was Robert Kennedy.






				 of the




                                     Part 1 of 2 Parts

16 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT       : Inspector General Survey of the Cuban Operation
                (dated October 1961)

    It is my understanding that you have requested information con-
cerning the distribution of the IG Survey of the Cuban Operation and
the DD/P comments on it. At the time the report was written it was
understood that copies of the report would be sent to the President's
Board and consequently 20 copies were made.  However, the only
distribution made of the report is as follows:

      Copy 1 - Mr. McCone - 21 November 1961

           2 - DCI (then Mr. Dulles) - 24 November

           3 - DDCI (then Gen. Cabell) - 24 November

           4 - DD/P (then Mr. Bissell) - 24 November

           5 - IG (Mr. Kirkpatrick)

           6 - On file in the office of Acting IG (Mr. McLean)

           7 - C/WH (Col King) - 24 November

           8 - Mr. Esterline (WH Division) via Col. King - 24 November

           9 - On file in my office

          10 - President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, via
               Mr. Earman at request of DCI, 18 January 1962

          11 through 20 - On file in my office

                                          Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

chrono [by hand; with check]
simling [by hand; illegible]



                        T O P  S E C R E T



     This document contains the items listed below and should 
not be broken up.  This is at the direction of Mr. John A. McCone,
Director of Central Intelligence.


  1. Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation; 
     October 1961.

  2. Memorandum of Transmittal of IG Survey of the Cuban Operation
     to Mr. John McCone from Inspector General;  20 November 1961.

  3. Memorandum of Transmittal of IG Survey of the Cuban Operation
     to DCI from Inspector General;  24 November 1961.

  4. DDCI Memorandum for the Record concerning restricted
     distribution of IG's Report on Cuba;  28 November 1961.

  5. Memorandum for the DCI from IG, subject:  Report on the Cuban
     Operation;  1 December 1961.

  6. Memorandum prepared by DDCI, subject:  The Inspector
     General's Survey of the Cuban Operation;  15 December 1961.

  7. An Analysis of the Cuban Operation by the Deputy Director
     (Plans), Central Intelligence Agency;  18 January 1962.

  8. Letter to Dr. James Killian, Jr., Chairman, President's
     Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, from DCI, transmitting
     the IG Survey and the DD/P Analysis of the Cuban Operation; 
     19 January 1962.

  9. Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans), from C. Tracy Barnes,
     subject:  Survey of the Cuban Operation;  19 January 1962.

 10. Memorandum fro Mr. C. Tracy Barnes from Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
     referencing Barnes' 19 January memorandum:  22 January 1962.

 11. Memorandum for DCI from DD(P) transmitting Mr. Barnes'     
     19 January memorandum;  27 January 1962.

                        T O P  S E C R E T
                                                          TS 173160

[XXXXXX indicates document redaction.]

                        T O P  S E C R E T

 12. Memorandum to Mr. Kirkpatrick from Messrs. XXXXXXX, XXXXXXX
     and XXXX (IG Staff officers), subject:  The IG's Survey and
     the DD/P's Analysis of the Cuban Operation;  26 January 1962.

 13. Memorandum for Mr. John McCone, DCI, from Allen W. Dulles,
     subject:  The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban
     Operation;  15 February 1962.

 14. DCI's letter of acknowledgement of Mr. Dulles' 15 February
     memorandum;  19 February 1962.

                        T O P  S E C R E T

[Some 400 intervening pages omitted]


		     T O P  S E C R E T

                                         19 January 1962

Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence
  Advisory Board
297 Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Dr. Killian:

     Attached is a copy of the CIA Inspector General's "Survey Of
Cuban Operations" together with comments thereon by General C.
P. Cabell, Deputy Director of CIA and "Analysis Of The Cuban
Operation" by Deputy Director (Plans).  This latter report is
intended as a comment on the Inspector General's report.

     As you readily understand, I am not in a position to render
a personal opinion concerning the validity of the IG's report or
the statements by the DDCI and the DDP because I was not in CIA
at the time.  However it is my personal opinion as a result of
examinations I have made of this operation after the fact that
both the report and the rebuttals are extreme.  I believe an
accurate appraisal of the Cuban effort and the reasons for failure
rest some place in between the two points of view expressed in
the reports.

     I believe it is safe to say the failure of the Cuban operation
was Government-wide and in this respect the Agency must bear its
full share (though not the entire) responsibility.

     For this reason I would recommend that your board, in review-
ing the Inspector General's Survey also review the comments and
analysis of the DDCI and the DD/P.

                                         Yours very truly

                                         /s/ John A. McCone

                                         John A.  McCone

  As stated

		     T O P  S E C R E T

[Tab] 9

[Balance of page blank]


                                             19 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR:  Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT       :  Survey of Cuban Operation

     1.  My work in support of your "Analysis of the Cuban
Operation" gave me an unusual opportunity to study with care
the document which caused the Analysis to be written, namely,
the "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation, October

     2.  My consideration of the Survey has forced me to reach
certain conclusions which I feel that I must record.  I do so
in writing because these conclusions are, in my opinion, of
sufficient significance to demand the discipline of a written
expression.  Moreover, I feel that those who disagree with me
should have the opportunity to direct any replies that they may
choose to make to specific identifiable comments.

     3.  I may say that my decision to write this memorandum
was reached with considerable reluctance and only after long
deliberation.  The deciding factor was my belief that the
suggestions for action in paragraph 6 below are worthwhile
and should be submitted.  They would have been meaningless
without the reasons set forth in earlier paragraphs.  The
views expressed are, needless to say, exclusively mine.

     4.  In my opinion the I.G. Survey is most unfortunate for
three reasons:

               a.  It is an incompetent job.  The authors
     never understood the problems with which they were deal-
     ing and failed to express their views with any precision
     or proper use of relevant facts.

               b.  It is biased.  Basically relevant evidence
     on vital issues was not only left out but never even
     mentioned.  The Survey undertook only to present those
     items which suggested failures or inadequacies.  These
     items, however, were not fully depicted so that a false
     picture was given.  Admittedly, an I.G. must expose fault
     but it is also his job to do accurately.

                        SECRET EYES ONLY



               c.  It is malicious, or, to put it alternatively,
     it is intentionally biased.  Admittedly, this is a serious
     charge and is, at best, merely a statement of opinion.  I
     can only say that I hold such opinion firmly.  In my view
     it could be supported solely on the basis of the Survey's
     total omission in many places of significantly relevant
     evidence.  Such omissions are so excessive and one-sided
     as to substantiate the conclusion that they must have been
     intentional.  In addition, however, I would like to mention
     four other points:

                   1)  The fact that the inspectors, in making
               their investigation, omitted any discussions
               of their findings with the senior officers
               responsible for the project.  Although, techni-
               cally, the I.G. can accurately state that he
               talked to the DD/P and the then A/DDP/A about
               the Survey, the fact is that these discussion[sic]
               were exceedingly brief and covered none of the
               real issues of the Survey.  The AC/DPD was not
               spoken to at all.  The Security Officer of WH/4
               was not spoken to at all.  Other senior officers,
               such as C/WH and C/WH/4, were never given an
               opportunity to express their views in relation
               to statements in the Survey.

                   2)  Some officers with whom the inspectors
               had discussions felt after they had a chance to
               see the Survey, that it did not impartially ex-
               press the information which they had provided
               and left out much of the relevant information
               given.  Moreover, some officers have reported
               that the attitude of the inspectors and their
               line of questioning indicated a desire to obtain
               facts or views to support judgments already
               formed.  Opinions contrary to these judgments
               were not only disregarded but resisted.

                   3)  The distribution of the final Survey
               was so peculiar and contrary to normal practice
               that it raises an inference of intended partiality.
               The method of distribution is known and will not
               be repeated here.  It might be added that there 

                        SECRET EYES ONLY



               were other facts with respect to the distribution	
               of the Survey worthy of mention.  C/WH/4 was
               called one day and asked if he wanted to read the
               Survey.  He said that he would like to do so but
               since both C/WH and DC/WH were away he could not
               leave since he was Acting Chief of the Division.
               Particularly, he could not meet the requirements
               of the offer which were that he would only have
               an hour from the time of the telephone call to
               see the Survey (including travel time) since it
               then had to be sent to the printer.  Why the
               urgency was so great is not clear.  As far as is
               known, only one individual outside of the I.G.
               Staff saw the Survey in final or substantially
               final form before it was distributed, namely, an
               officer who was the Chief of Operations for WH/4
               during the project.  Why he was selected instead
               of one of his superiors who was connected with the
               project is not known.

                   4)  Since this particular operation, without
               question, involved more political interest and
               dynamite than any in which the Agency has ever
               participated, there was every reason for following
               regular procedures meticulously.  In addition to
               the distribution point mentioned above, it seems
               relevant to wonder how Dr. Killian and the Attorney
               General knew of the Survey's existence so as to
               request a copy.

     5.  I should say that, whatever the appearance of the fore-
going, I have not been trying to I.G. the I.G.  The information
reported came to me unsolicited and in the normal course of my
work with you and your Analysis.  Maybe there is additional
evidence of importance, but I have not looked for it and do not
plan to do so.

     6.  The significance of the foregoing is to provide the
reasons for the main purpose of this memorandum, i.e., the sub-
mission of the following recommendations for action.

                        SECRET EYES ONLY



               a.  The DCI should resolve to his own satisfaction
     the conflicts on major issues between the I.G.'s Survey and
     your Analysis.  Since both these documents are internal to
     the Agency, there is no Agency position on the Cuban opera-
     tion unless the conflicts are resolved.  In view of the
     importance of and the continuing interest in the operation
     at high levels of the Government, an Agency position seems
     essential.  Such a position is also important for the
     future.  The operation is bound to be studied for various
     reasons and there should be an Agency position at least as
     to what happened, what were the mistakes and what were the
     lessons.  Moreover, the DCI, having assumed office after
     the operation was thoroughly finished, has every reason for
     wanting to have some definitive findings and conclusions.

               b.  If the DCI agrees with a. above each recipient
     of the Survey and Analysis (and it is understood that they
     will only be distributed together) should be advised of the
     fact that such an Agency position is being sought.  This
     might help to avoid independent conclusions outside of the
     Agency being reached first.

               c.  The following requirements should be imposed
     on all future I.G. surveys at least on any aspects of the
     DD/P area of responsibility.

                   1)  No survey shall be undertaken without
               specific written terms of reference approved by
               the DCI.

                   2)  The DD/P shall be satisfied that in each
               future survey covering any portion of his area of
               responsibility the I.G. or his stall will inter-
               view at least all officers having had responsibility
               for any part of the activity inspected by the
               I.G. and prior to the distribution of the survey
               the DD/P and each such officer will be given an
               opportunity to express his views on points in-
               cluded in the Survey.  Obviously the I.G. need not
               accept these views.  Such procedure, however, will
               save an enormous amount of time required to answer

                        SECRET EYES ONLY



               surveys such as the Cuban one which fail to present
               a full factual picture regardless of the conclu-
               sions reached.

     7.  I am addressing this memorandum to you as my immediate
superior.  I hope, however, that you will agree with my request
that the memorandum be passed to the DCI for his consideration.
I do not, of course, ask that you associate yourself with it or
any part of it merely because you transmit it.


                               C. TRACY BARNES

Original & 1 - DD/P

                        SECRET EYES ONLY

[Tab] 10

[Balance of page blank]


			S E C R E T

					22 January 1962


MEMORANDUM FOR:  Mr. C. Tracy Barnes

Dear Tracy:

     Thank you for your courtesy in sending me a copy of your
memorandum of 19 January concerning the Inspector General's
Survey of the Cuban Operation.  I do hope that Dick forwards
it to the DCI, and I am enclosing a copy of this note to you
in case you wish to send a copy to Dick.

     I have not had time to study your memorandum, or even in
fact do more than glance at the DD/P analysis in view of the
meeting with the President's Board all day Friday and the fact
that I am going to be away all this week.  However, I will make
the following comments.  Needless to say, I completely disagree
with your statement that it is an incompetent job.  I feel that
it is competent and I believe that the more than one file
cabinet drawer full of background documents will prove its
competence.  I do not believe that it is biased.  We made it
very clear at the start of the report that it would only deal
with inadequacies and failures and would not purport to be a
thorough analysis of the operation.

     Most of all I object most strongly to your third observa-
tion, namely that it is malicious and intentionally biased.  I
have asked the men who did this survey to review your memorandum
and comment on the reasons you believe it is biased.  I
should perhaps acknowledge that more time should have been spent
with you or Bissell, but inasmuch as this devolved on me, if
there is a fault, it is mine personally.  But to imply that for
some reason, unknown to me, that we would slant this report is
an unfair comment.  You apparently feel there was something
unusual in the distribution of the final report.  The only thing
unusual in it was that we had two Directors at the time, and
Mr. McCone having asked for it received it as he was leaving for
the West Coast on the day before Thanksgiving and everybody else
got their copies on the day after Thanksgiving.  Your concern
as to how the President's Board and the Attorney General knew of
the survey's existence can be answered very simply.  In 1956
the President's Board in writing advised all agencies that all

			S E C R E T


inspector general reports should be forwarded to them automat-
ically.  I don't believe it was a week after the Cuban operation
that the direct question came from that Board as to whether an
inspection was going to be done to which an affirmative reply
was given.  The Attorney General's source I do not know.

     Finally, as far as to what should be done next, you and Dick
should know that at the conclusion of my discussion with the
President's Board I urged that a group, or individual, who had
not in any way been associated with the operation be charged with
taking the Taylor Report, our report and your comments and all
background material and writing a truly national and detailed
report.  I believe that would be a far better solution than trying
to develop a CIA position, which really is not very practical
inasmuch as there were so many outside factors affecting this

                                               /s/ Kirk

                                         Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

			S E C R E T

[Tab] 11

[Balance of page blank]


			S E C R E T

					27 January 1962


MEMORANDUM FOR:  Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT       :  Mr. Barnes' Memorandum on the IG Survey of the
                 Cuban Operation

     1.  As you are aware, Mr. Tracy Barnes did a major part of
the work in preparing our comments on Mr. Kirkpatrick's Survey
of the Cuban Operation.  At the conclusion of the task, Mr. Barnes
wrote me the attached memorandum which I hereby pass on to you.

     2.  I may say that I am in agreement with Mr. Barnes that
the Survey, largely by reason of the omission of material relevant
to its conclusions, constitutes a highly biased document and that
the bias is of such a character that it must have been intentional.

     3.  I will be glad to discuss this with you is you so desire.

                                         /s/  Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

                                         RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
                                             Deputy Director

  1.  Barnes' Memo
  2.  IG Memo to Mr. Barnes

			S E C R E T

[Tab] 12

[Balance of page blank]


			S E C R E T

					26 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR:  Mr. Kirkpatrick

SUBJECT       :  The IG's Cuban Survey and the DD/P's
                 Analysis of the Cuban Operation

     1.  The scope of the IG Survey is briefly and clearly stated
in the Introduction.  The Survey's intent was to identify and
describe weaknesses within the Agency which contributed to the
final result and to make recommendations for their future avoidance.
The IG had no authority to conduct a survey of the machinery for
making decisions and policy at other levels of government.  This
field was covered by the group headed by Gen. Taylor.  The Survey
expressly avoided detailed analysis of the purely military phase
of the operation.

     2.  Much of the DD/P's Analysis is devoted, however to a
discussion of governmental decision-making and to a rehash of the
military operation.  It criticizes the Survey for insufficient
attention to these matters, putting the major blame for the opera-
tion's failure on factors beyond the control of the Agency.

     3.  The Analysis attempts to refute most of the weaknesses
described by the Survey.  The few which it admits were, it contends,
not significant to the final result.  It rejects the Survey's
statements that intelligence was inadequate and misused and that
staffing was inadequate.  It blames the failure of the air drops
on the Cuban reception crews and air crews.  It states that small
boat operations could not well have been handled in any other way.
And it states that other weaknesses were not important because
they were not the decisive reason for failure.

     4.  There is a fundamental difference of approach between the
two documents.  While the Analysis is preoccupied with interdepart-
mental policy-making and military strategy, the Survey is mainly
concerned with the failure to build up internal resistance in Cuba
through clandestine operations.  The Analysis fails to shed any
further significant light on this fundamental issue.

			S E C R E T


     5.  The Analysis shows a poorer grasp of what was going on
at the case-officer level than of events in policy-making circles.
This is apparent in a number of inaccuracies in the Analysis.  For
example, the discussion of activities in Miami is inaccurate and
misleading.  Conduct of training in Miami is defended although it
was not criticized by the Survey.  The 178 trainees alluded to in
the Analysis as trained in Miami were in fact trained in Guatemala.
The PM section in Miami was being built up beginning in November
1960, rather than being de-emphasized.  These and other inaccuracies
suggest that the Analysis should be read with caution where it
deals with events on the working level of the project.

     6.  The IG investigators centered their inquiry on certain
phases which are significant to the success or failure of any
operation and of the Agency's over-all mission itself.  They
cannot be ignored or argued away just because of policy decisions
made outside the Agency.




			S E C R E T

[Tab] 13

[Balance of page blank]


			T O P  S E C R E T

					     15 February 1962

                 Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:         The Inspector General's Survey of the
                 Cuban Operation

     1.  Upon receipt of the Inspector General's report of
October 1961, on the Cuban Operation, which reached my desk
prior to my resignation as Director of Central Intelligence,
I immediately transmitted a copy to the Deputy Director (Plans)
for his comment.  This was in line with the practice I had
consistently followed in dealing with the reports of the            
Inspector General: namely, the Office which is the subject
of the inspection is given an opportunity to comment on the
I.G. report before the Director determines the action to be
taken thereon.  The reply of the Deputy Director (Plans),
dated 18 January 1962, of which I have received a copy, was
submitted to you following my resignation.

     2.  Meanwhile, I have also received and considered the
comments of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
General Cabell.

     3.  I remain at your disposal for any comments you may
wish me to submit on any phases of this matter relating to
C.I.A. responsibilities.  Hence I will not submit detailed
written comment on the Inspector General's report.

     4.  At this time, however, I wish to make certain
general comments:

         a.  As a member of the Taylor Committee appointed
by the President, I participated fully in the work of his
Committee and joined in his Memorandum and oral reports to
the President on this subject.  While I do not now have a
copy of these documents, I made only one or two reservations
to the general conclusions and recommendations of these
reports.  I consider them to be sound and believe they should
be accepted as the best available Survey of this particular

			T O P  S E C R E T

T O P  S E C R E T

         b.  The Inspector General's report suffers from the
fact that his investigation was limited to the activities of
one segment of one agency, namely, the C.I.A.  Opinions based
on such a partial review fail to give the true story or to
provide a sound basis for the sweeping conclusions reached by

         c.  Judgments could not properly be rendered in this
matter without a full analysis, as was made by the Taylor
Committee, of actions of all the participating elements in
the operation and the influences brought to bear outside of
the Agency which affected the operation.  This applies partic-
ularly to the participation of the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to certain
elements of the Executive Department of the Government.

         d.  At no time during the preparation of his report
did the Inspector General request any information from me and
he makes certain serious errors in areas where my direct
responsibility was clearly involved.

     5.  Two major area of criticism in the I.G. report cover
(1) the operational arrangements for the organization, training,
transportation and deployment of the Brigade and, (2) the
relations of Agency personnel to the Cuban emigration and their
political organization.  As to these points, I submit the

         a.  First, while certain organizational matters, in
the light of developments, may be open to some criticism, the
Brigade with its entire complement of men and equipment reached
the landing area on schedule and under circumstances which
achieved complete surprise.  The situation in the landing area
was substantially as predicted.  The enemy battle order intelli-
gence was essentially correct.  The failure to get the ammunition
and supplies ashore was due to circumstances beyond the control
of the Brigade commander or its personnel.

         b.  Second, with respect to the organization of a Cuban
emigre political committee in support of the operations, I would
point out that prior to engaging in the operation a broad coalition
of Cuban leaders, and one acceptable to our State Department, was

These two important achievements covered major areas of C.I.A.

			T O P  S E C R E T

T O P  S E C R E T

     6.  As Director, I deemed it desirable and necessary in
view of my other duties to delegate certain responsibilities
within the Agency for the day-to-day management of the operation,
and on military matters and judgments I relied heavily on military
personnel assigned to C.I.A. and on Department of Defense personnel
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  However, I assumed throughout full
responsibility for the Agency's participation and actions and kept
currently advised of all important developments.  During the con-
cluding days of the operation, I was particularly influenced by
the judgments in Col. Hawkins dispatch, dated April 13, 1961,
relating to the high state of readiness of the Brigade (Annex A
to Chapter IV of DDP report).

     7. Whether or not the operation would have succeeded if
the Brigade had landed with its entire personnel and equipment
is a matter which can be debated and on which even today military
experts differ.  Certainly, the responsibility for failure does
not lie primarily in the main areas of criticism stressed in the
Inspector General's report.

     8.  Of course, there are lessons to be learned as pointed
out in the Taylor Reports.  These Reports, I believe, should be
taken as the main basis for any review of the Agency's actions
in support of the operation.

                                          /s/ Allen W. Dulles

                                         Allen W. Dulles

			T O P  S E C R E T

[Tab] 14

[Balance of page blank]


			S E C R E T

					19 February 1962

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

     I have received your memorandum of 15 February 1962

containing your comments on the Inspector General's Survey

of the Cuban Operation.  Copies of this memorandum, together

with the DD/P analysis of the survey, the comments made by

General Cabell, Mr. Kirkpatrick, and the personal views

expressed by Mr. Tracy Barnes, will be bound in the report --

and therefore will be known to anyone who might have occasion

to read it.



                                        John A. McCone

			S E C R E T





Here is the CIA link to the whole Inspector General's Report (232 pages)




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