BOGUS DEFECTOR
NODULE X7
OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY 1960 TO FEBRUARY 1961
For the most up-to-date version of this Nodule go to
http://ajweberman.com/noduleX7.pdf
JANUARY 4, 1960
OSWALD:
December 31, 1959. New Years Eve, I spend in the company of Rosa Agafoneva at the Hotel Berlin, she has the duty. I sit with her until past midnight, she gives me a small "Boratin" clown, for a New Years present she is very nice. I found out only recently she is married, has a small son who was born crippled, that this is why she is so strangly tender and compeling.
January 1, 1959 to January 4, 1960. No change in routine."
On January 4, 1960, OVIR granted OSWALD a stateless passport, which required him to report to the Soviet Passport and Visa Department three times a year:
January 4, 1960 I am called to passport office and finilly given a Soviet document not the Soviet citizenship as I so wanted, only a residence document, not even for fourigners but a paper called "for those without citizenship." still I am happy. The offial says they are sending me to the city of "Minsk". I ask "is that in Siberia? He only laughes; he also tells me they have arranged for me to recive some money through the Red Cross. To pay my hotel bill and expensis. I thank the gentelmen and leave later in the afternoon. I see Remma "she asks are you happy" "yes". [CIA 646-265]
The CIA was unable to determine if it was unusual for OSWALD to be allowed to remain in the USSR: "Not knowing how many would-be defectors have been turned back, it is impossible to say whether the acceptance of OSWALD and five others is unusual. Acceptance of KGB agents is certainly not out of the ordinary." [CIA Les Roades draft]
January 5, 1960. I got to Red Cross in Moscow for money with interruptor (a new one). I recive 5000. Rubles. A hugh sum!! Later in Minsk I am to earn 70 Rubles a month at the factory.
January 7, 1960. I leave Moscow by train for Minsk, Belorussia. My hotel bill was 2200. Ruble and the train ticket to Minsk 150 Rubles so I have a lot of money & hope. I wrote my Brother and my Mother letters in which I said "I do not wish to every contact you again." I am begining a new life and I don't want any part of the old."
January 7, 1960. Arrive in Minsk, met by 2 women Red Cross workers. We go to Hotel Minsk. [located at 11 Leninsky Prospect] I take room and meet Rosa and Stellina, who persons from Intourist in hotel who speak English. Stellina is in 40's, nice, married, young child. Rosa about 23, blond, attractive unmarried excellant English, we attract each other at once.
The Historic Diary:
January 8, 1960 I meet the city mayor, Comrade Shrapof, who welcomes me to Minsk promises me a rent free apartment "soon" and warns me about "uncultured persons" who sometimes insult foriengers. My interputer: Roman Detkof, Head For. Tech. Instit. next door.
JANUARY 10, 1960
“January 10, 1960. The day to myself. I walk through city, very nice." Norman Mailer reported that in Minsk OSWALD'S case was assigned to KGB Officer Igor Ivanovitch Guzmin. Igor Ivanovitch Guzmin told Norman Mailer that it had been decided on the highest levels after the suicide attempt to let him stay, even though his suicide attempt may have been staged. Igor Ivanovitch Guzmin assigned Stepan Vasilyevich Gregorieff to OSWALD. Hundreds of pages later Norman Mailer told his readers these names were pseudonyms. Why not say it at the outset? Norman Mailer determined that the KGB watched OSWALD on January 9, 1969, January 10, 1960, January 13, 1960 and January 30, 1960.
THE MINSK RADIO PLANT JANUARY 12, 1960
Minsk was a center of science and technology. OSWALD received a position in the experimental division of the Minsk radio plant, an apartment, and a subsidy from the Soviet Red Cross. The CIA: "During this period he was also helped financially by various Russians in Moscow, but Marina Oswald did not know the extent of their aid (nor did she indicate she knew their identities)." [CIA Chron. LHO in USSR 1.24.64]
January 12, 1960 I vist Minsk Radio Factory where I shall work. There I meet Argentinian immigrant Alexander Zeger. Born a Polish Jew. immi to Argen. in 1933 and back to Polish homeland (now part of Belo.) in 1955. Speaks English with Amer. accent he worked for Amer. Com. in Argen. He is Head of a Dept. A quialified engenien. in late 40's, mild mannered, likable. He seems to want to tell me somet. I show him my tempor. docu. and say soon I shall have Russ. citiz.
In 1938 Alexander Ziger emigrated from Poland to Argentina where he worked for an American company. This is assuming that "Amer. Com. in Argen" stands for "American Company." (Another possible interpretation is "American Committee." The Office of Inter-American Affairs was known in South America as the "American Committees.") Alexander Ziger returned to Poland in 1956 "homesick for his native land and taken in by their propaganda." The CIA stated: "Available records show that the ship Salta, when leaving Buenos Aires, Argentina, for Odessa, USSR, on July 1, 1956, carried repatriates back to the Soviet Union. Among them were Alexander Ziger, Soviet, age 44, engineer. Ana Ziger, Soviet, age 46...A report of 1957 refers to Alejandro Ziger, a Pole, and radio-telephonic expert, 44 years old, married to Ana Dmitruk, a Pole, 47 years old." [Draft of 518-219] The Zigers native land was by then part of the USSR. The Zigers ended up living in Minsk. In 1957 Ziger applied for an exit visa at the Argentine Embassy, Moscow. He was refused. OSWALD wrote:
...In Minsk the capital of belorussia the ministry of Interia [Inertia?] became responsible in 1960 for determining the eligibility of aplicants for hard to get exit visas too leave the USSR formaly the official progrative of Moscow alone but now that this state ministry in Moscow has "withered away" it becomes all the more difficule to get an exit visa since now one had to go to the area, city and republican state capital commites of beaurocrats and on top of all that a last finial O.K. has to come from increadibly the Moscow ministry of foreign affairs!! [WCE 25 p10]
The CIA identified Alexander Ziger's friend Anatoliy as Anatol Kholodov, after the Warren Report was released. A check of unspecified Agency files on November 18, 1964, revealed "no identifiable information on Kholodov." The Warren Commission believed the Zigers were susceptible to persecution because of their association with OSWALD. Like Rimma Sherakova, the name "Ziger" was changed when Life Magazine printed excerpts from OSWALD'S Historic Diary. Dr. Alfred Goldberg, who wrote much of the Warren Report, "indicated that some of OSWALD'S references to the Zigers had been toned down to protect them." In 1977, Alexander Ziger lived in Minsk. Alexander Ziger died in the early 1990's possibly in Israel. [Slawson: Rankin with I.D. Levine-Transmittal 2-6.2.64, transcript pp. 14-16; WC Inventory & Evidence 3-6 Slawson; WC Rankin Memo 10.6.64; CIA 947-927; Conversation with telephone operator, Minsk, USSR] Jews comprised a large proportion of Soviet dissidents at this time.
OSWALD may have in touch with dissident Russians working for the CIA while he was in the Soviet Union. The name Kozlova was found in his address book:
Vneshtory Bank
Bank of Foreign Trade
Moscow
Neglinnaya Ul. 12
Kozlova (woman's surname)
K-03400 (telephone number)
(792) (possible telephone extension)
The CIA:
TO: Files
FROM: M.D. Stevens
2. The following notation appears on 29 of Oswald’s address book (page 12 of the FBI memo).
Kozlova (woman’s surname)
K-03400 (telephone number)
(792) (possible telephone extension)
3. Security Indices contain information on a number of women with the name Kozlova, none of whom can be identified as being the individual in question; but any of whom might be.
(1) Olympiada Kozlova, #MS-16332, is the aunt of Nikolai Vasilievich Kozlov #51048 - SSD who is currently employed as an agent by this agency. CI/SIG has information on Kozlov which makes reference to various female relatives of his by the name of Kozlova. Olympiada Kozlova, a professor, is the Director of the Moscow Institute of Engineering and Economics. She is active politically, often travels abroad, and in November 1961, was scheduled to travel to Washington, D.C., with a scientific group. It should be possible to obtain this woman's telephone number for comparison with that listed in OSWALD'S address book under the name Kozlova.
(2) One 'Valentina Kozlova, NSC,' was observed to arrive at the Soviet Mission in Tokyo on June 11, 1956, at 10:45 a.m. and to depart at 12:07 p.m. She was not further identified in our information.
(3) One Lyubov Nikolaevna Kozlova, (MS 9995) was an interpreter in the USSR Embassy in London from 1950 to 1953, and in the U.N. in New York City in 1954. [CIA 487, 470, 1299-470].
The 1962 Moscow Telephone Directory lists the telephone number K-03400 for the Ministry of Finance of the USSR located at Neglinnaya Ul. 12. (The number next to it was an extension or room number at the Ministry). The same source also gives the address of the Vneshtorg Bank as Neglinnaya Ul. 12.
The CIA could not or did not want to trace the telephone extension and find out who it went to. My vote goes to Olympiada Kozlova. A bank and economics are involved and one of her relatives had an SSD number which meant he worked for the CIA with ANGLETON at CI/SIG. The reason this SSD number was withheld was because it provides another link to OSWALD and CIA. When the document was declassified in its entirety it turned out I was right.
OSWALD - WORKER - JANUARY 13, 1960 TO APRIL 31, 1960
Jan. 13, 1960 - March 16, 1960 I work as a "checker" metal worker, pay: 700 Rubles a month, work very easy, I am learning Russian quickly now. Everyone is friendly and kind. I meet many young Russian workers my own age. They have varied personalities. All wish to know about me even offer to hold a mass meeting so I can say. I refuse politly. At night I take Rosa to the thearter, movie or operas almost every day I'm living big and am very satisfied. I recive a check from the Red Cross every 5th of the month "to help." The check is 700 Rubles. Therefore every month I make about 1400 R. about the same as the director of the factory! Zeger obseres me during this time. I don't like: picture of Lenin which watchs from its place of honour and phy. Traning at 11.-11.10 each morning (complusery) for all. (Shades of H.G. Wells)
March 16, 1960. I receive a small flat one room kitchen-bath near the factory (8 min. walk) with splendid view from 2 balconies of the river. Almost rent free (60. Rub. A month) it is a Russians dream.
OSWALD'S upstairs neighbor, Maya Gertzovich, reported that in the spring of 1960 the KGB asked her to vacate her apartment for a weekend; she presumed they had planted a listening device in OSWALD'S ceiling.
March 17, 1960 to April 31, 1960 - work, I have lost contact with Rosa after my housemoving. I meet Pavil Golovacha. A younge man my age friendly, very intelligent, a exalant radio tehniction his father is Gen. Golovacha, commander of Northwestern Siberia. Twice hero of USSR in W.W. 2
Pavel P. Golovachev [Ul. Kalinina, 24 Apartment 31, Minsk, Bylorussian Republic 220012, C.I.S. tel (0172) 669-815 home and The Radio Factory (work) (0172) 331-883] was the son of General Golovachev. In one CIA Name List with Traces, by ANGLETON [CIA CSCI 3/781,172 also CSCI - 3/779,817], Pavel P. Golovachev was ignored in favor of his father. In another, he had traces in the CIA's Office of Security of the CIA. Norman Mailer reported that he was considered to be "of a dissident nature." In November 1991 and May 1992, Pavel P. Golovachev was interviewed by a Canadian film crew. He said that shortly after he met OSWALD, a KGB officer approached him at his home. The officer requested that Pavel P. Golovachev meet with him every few months in a Minsk park and report on OSWALD'S activities. Pavel P. Golovachev said he acquiesced, because he believed, "It was entirely possible OSWALD was a CIA spy." In a 1992 article in Izvestia, the current version of the KGB stated that Pavel P. Golovachev was blackmailed into informing on OSWALD. Pavel P. Golovachev added that he reported to Alexander Feydorovich Kostyukov, and that he told OSWALD about his KGB contact in the Summer of 1961. Nevertheless, Pavel P. Golovachev remained in contact with the KGB until OSWALD departed.
OSWALD: MARCH 1960
In March 1960 Marguerite Oswald wrote to the State Department and asked it to contact her son. A cable went to Moscow suggesting a message be relayed to OSWALD. The American Embassy replied to Washington that no action had been taken, because OSWALD could not be located. [DOS prim. ser. 0056; WCE 12C file 294 DOS; SCS 261.1122]
A State Department Operations Memorandum dated MARCH 23, 1960, read:
TO: American Embassy, Moscow
FROM: The Department of State
SUBJECT: CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORTS - LEE HARVEY OSWALD
Unless and until the Embassy comes into possession of information or evidence upon which to base the preparation of a certificate of loss of nationality in the name of LEE HARVEY OSWALD, there appears to be no further action possible in this case. An appropriate notice has been placed in the Passport Office's lookout card section in the event that Mr. OSWALD should apply for documentation at a post outside the Soviet Union.
PPT: B Waterman: Jn: March 25, 1960.
Reason for refusal: "May have been naturalized in the Soviet Union or otherwise have expatriated himself. Frances G. Knight. March 25, 1960.
A refusal sheet is prepared for insertion in the passport file when information is received which may affect the issuance of the passport. It is used primarily as a 'flag' and does not necessarily mean the person concerned should be denied passport facilities. It does indicate, however, that a lookout card for the named individual should have been prepared. The State Department reported: "The FEA card record shows as follows: March 13, 1960, case to BW (Bernice Waterman)...March 28, 1960, Refusal for Warning..."
The State Department reported:
The information from Moscow, beginning in October 1959, indicating that OSWALD desired to renounce his citizenship and to acquire Soviet citizenship, was sufficient basis for the preparation of a lookout card for use until the expatriation question was resolved. The passport file shows that a refusal sheet was prepared on March 25, 1960, at the same time an Operations Memorandum was drafted to the American Embassy at Moscow. The Operations Memo which was approved and mailed on March 28, 1960, stated in part: 'An appropriate notice has been placed in the lookout section of the Passport Office in the event that Mr. OSWALD should apply for documentation at a post outside the Soviet Union.' The refusal sheet should have led to the placement of a lookout card in the ordinary course of business. At that time, such cards were prepared in the Clearance Section of the Passport Office. A present review of the passport file tends to indicate that a lookout card may not have been prepared or filed. This opinion is based on the following grounds:
(1) No such card has been located.
(2) Under standard operating procedures in effect in March 1960, a file "130" should have been placed on the refusal sheet immediately preceding the name on the index line on the right margin of the sheet when the card had been made. No such file number appears on the sheet.
(3) The passport file contains a record stamp of a 'PT/RCL (Lookout Files)' search made on August 2, 1961, which reports 'No Lookout file record' located on that date.
There is no evidence or information contained in the file to indicate that any action was taken to remove from the lookout card file any card which may have been filed pursuant to the refusal sheet.
NOTES ON OSWALD'S FILE
The file shows refusal sheet prepared by Miss Waterman on March 25, 1960, - "May have been in the Soviet Union or otherwise expatriated himself." Immediately on top of this sheet is a File Request Form prepared by G. Masterton dated April 6, 1960, - PT/FEA. The Search Report on this form shows the following boxes checked
X Classified File
X File Attached
The Search Report is dated March 12, 1960.
The FEA card record shows as follows:
March 28, 1960, Refusal for Warning
April 6, 1960, Conference OM [Office Memo]
April 13, 1960, Same and case to BW
This sequence indicated that the file was sent to file after OM to Moscow was mailed. Then the file was returned to FEA on April 13, 1960, with search request form." [DOS FOIA 11-1-10004-10027; File Request Form G. Masterton April 11, 1960, - PT/FEA.Search Report dated April 12, 1960; NARA 11-1-10004-10027]
A lookout card is a small IBM card kept in a special file maintained in the Passport Office. Without a lookout card a refusal sheet is worthless because a lookout card is an index to numerous refusal sheets. It appears as if a lookout card was prepared for OSWALD then removed from OSWALD'S file. The employees concerned with the preparation of a lookout card on OSWALD were Bernice Waterman, Henry F. Kupiec and John T. White.
OSWALD: MAY 1, 1960
On the day that Francis Gary Powers was shot down, May 1, 1960, OSWALD attended a party at the home of the Zigers:
May Day came as my first holiday all factories ect. closer after spetacular military parage all workers parad past reviewed stand waving flags and pictures of Mr. K. ect. I follow Amer. custom of marking a holiday by sleeping in in morning. At night I vist with the Zegers daughters at an party thron by them about 40 people came many of Argentine origen we dance and play around and drink until 2 a.m. When party breaks up. Leonara Zeger oldest dau. 26 formally married, now divorced, a talanted singer. Anita Zeger so very gay, not so attractive but we hit it off. Her boy-friend Alfred is a Hungarian chap, silent and brooding, not at all like Anita. Zeger advises me to go back to U.S.A., its the first voice of dissention I have heard. I respect Zeger, he has seen the world. He say many and relats many things I do not know about the U.S.S.R. I begin to feel inside, its true!!
OSWALD applied for admission to Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. In May 1960 OSWALD was refused admission by the KGB:
Esteemed citizen HARVEY OSWALD! We ask you to pardon us for the delay in answering your application for studying at the University of the Friendship of Nations, named for Patrice Lumumba. It is evident to us that you desire to study at the University of Friendship of Nations, however, regretfully, we may not satisfy your request in view of the fact that the University was created exclusively for youth of underprivileged countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Concerning citizens of other countries, or stateless citizens, they may be accepted in any other institution of higher learning of the Soviet Union in accordance with existing regulations for them. P. Chikarev (Typewritten Signature) Voloshin (Handwritten signature).
CIA Traces on Voloshin:
1. As of July 1959, P.T. Voloshin was Deputy Chief of the Protocol Division of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR.
2. Pavel Trofimovich Voloshin, identified as a Soviet State Security officer since about 1940, was in the United States (visiting Los Angeles, California, as well as other American cities) with a Soviet dance group in July and August 1959. During September and October 1959 he visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City as "Chief Inspector of the Protocol Section of the Ministry of Culture." From July 1961 until January 1963 he was stationed at the Hague in the Netherlands as: "Inturist Representative to the Benelux countries." In view of a probable relationship between Patrice Lumumba Friendship University and the Ministry of Culture, Pavel Trofimovich Voloshin may be identical with the (fnu) Voloshin who signed for Chikarev.
The University of Friendship of Nations was established in February 1960. Patrice Lumumba was assassinated January 1961. In February 1961 it was re-named Patrice Lumumba University. The terrorist Carlos the Jackal studied at this university, along with guerrillas and revolutionaries from Latin America, Africa and Asia. Mahmoud Abbas was a graduate as was Ali Hoseyni Khāmenei supreme leader of Iran and one of the top ten enemies of the press and freedom of expression. OSWALD attempt to infiltrate Patrice Lumumba University was unsuccessful - so he began to take the necessary steps to return to the United States. [DOS Memo for files 11.17.59 Richard Snyder; WCE 72,32] On May 2, 1960, Marguerite Oswald was interviewed by FBI Special Agent John W. Fain. The title of this interview was, "Funds Transmitted to Residents of Russia." Marguerite Oswald had mailed LEE a money order for $25 on January 22, 1960, five months before FBI S.A. John W. Fain contacted her about it. She told S.A. John Fain that she was:
currently employed as a supply mother at the Methodist Orphans home in Waco, Texas, and that she had come to Fort Worth that day in as much as this was her day off...Mrs. OSWALD stated she has been very much upset and uneasy concerning her son LEE HARVEY OSWALD...She stated that following his discharge in September 1959, he came to Fort Worth for a visit of three days and thereafter left Fort Worth with the expressed intention of going to New Orleans, Louisiana. She stated that he indicated to her when he left Fort Worth that he planned to resume his employment with an import-export company at New Orleans...He had engaged in the import-export employment prior to his entry into the United States Marine Corps. She stated that he had mentioned something about his desire to travel and said something about the fact he might go to Cuba. Mrs. OSWALD stated that shortly after LEE arrived in New Orleans she received the following letter postmarked at New Orleans 'Dear Mother: Well I have booked passage on a ship to Europe. I would have had to sooner or later, and I think it is best that I do it now. Just remember above all else that my values are very different from Robert's or yours. It is difficult to tell you how I feel. Just remember this is what I must do. I did not tell you about my plans because you could hardly expected to understand. Lee.' Mrs. Oswald stated she was very much shocked and surprised later to learn that he had gone to Moscow, Russia. She stated she has no idea how he got there but she does know that he had saved up about $1,600 from his service in the Marines. She stated that he did not previously discuss with her any intention to go to Moscow. She stated he had never shown any proclivities for the ideologies of Communism. She stated that he had never expressed any sympathy for Russia or the Communistic system. She stated that he was always a studious type of individual and that he read books that were considered 'deep.' Mrs. Oswald stated that she would not have been surprised to learn that LEE had gone to South America or Cuba, but that it had never entered her mind that he might go to Russia or that he might try to become a citizen there...She stated she was greatly surprised and disappointed that he had taken this action. She stated that she has suffered a great deal of embarrassment as a result of inquiries from newspaper reporters concerning LEE.
Robert Oswald was also interviewed. He told the FBI that he "had never known LEE HARVEY OSWALD to have any sympathy for or connection with Communism before this occurred." On May 25, 190 J. Edgar Hoover sent a copy of this interview to Richard Helms. The CIA's Records Integration Group routed it to CI/SIG. The CIA reclassified this document from Confidential to Secret on May 25, 1960. [WCD 692] On May 25, 1960, CIA's Plans component generated an OSWALD index card that listed him as a Soviet citizen living in Moscow:
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
SEX M DOB OCTOBER 18, 1939 074-500 DBF -49478
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA May 25, 1960 P7
CIT USSR
MOSCOW, USSR
Ex-U.S. Marine, who upon his discharge from the Marine Corps., September 1959 traveled to USSR to renounce his U.S. Citizenship.
The number 074-500 was a CIA file entitled "USSR Miscellaneous" and consisted of 43 CIA documents from 1948 to 1977. [Allen v. DOD 003387 1519; CIA 2-524] Why was this card filed under this category? Why wasn’t a 201 File opened?
MARGUERITE: MY SON HAS BEEN DOUBLED
The FBI reported that on or about January 26, 1961, Marguerite Oswald appeared at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. and advised that she had come to Washington to see what could be done to help her son.
Mrs. Oswald said she had come to Washington to see what further could be done to help her son, indicating that she did not feel that the Department had done as much as it should in his case. She also said she thought there was some possibility that her son had in fact gone to the Soviet Union as a United States secret agent, and if this were true she wished the appropriate authorities to know that she was destitute and should receive some compensation. Mrs. Oswald was assured that there was no evidence to suggest that her son had gone to the Soviet Union as an agent, and that she should dismiss any such idea.
Marguerite Oswald spoke with D. E. Boster, Edward J. Hickey and D. E. Boster. In May 1992 the CIA Historical Review Committee released the CIA's copy of the State Department's "Memorandum of Conversation" of this meeting. The CIA copy was stamped "Limited Use - For Background Only. Pro anus [illegible] thru OCR required for any use [illegible] CIA." In 1993 Boster stated: "At this point I don't remember precisely what she said but it certainly was that she suspected that at least that he might be an agent. I thought this was just totally crazy. Frankly, I don't think she knew what she was talking about." No matter what D. E. Boster told Marguerite Oswald she remained convinced her son was a CIA Agent. In early November 1963 Marguerite Oswald, a registered nurse, told a patient that her son was "a U.S. Government employee or agent." [FBI DL 89-43-1283, DL 89-43 11.22.63 Brown & Brown; CIA 261, 1122; OSWALD DOS File 1-2661, 1.26.61 serial 0075]
The Warren Commission noted that "Mrs. Oswald had introduced a statement to the effect that she suspected her son to be a CIA Agent." The Warren Commission asked Richard Helms, and David E. Murphy, if OSWALD had been a CIA agent: "Mr. Helms replied that he had not been. Mr. Willens then asked if there were any way of proving this. Mr. Helms remarked that in him and David E. Murphy, Chief, Soviet Russia Division, the Commission had the two Clandestine Service Officers who certainly would know whether or not OSWALD had been a CIA agent in the Soviet Union. He then said the Commission would have to take his word for the fact that OSWALD had not been an agent." [CIA 256] D.E. Boster had no idea OSWALD worked secretly for ANGLETON. David E. Murphy was unaware of OSWALD'S connection to ANGLETON. Richard Helms may or may not have known.
In June 1960 Marguerite Oswald told the FBI the actions of her son were so uncharacteristic, she believed he might have been kidnapped while on the way to Europe to attend Albert Schweitzer College, and that an impostor could be using his identification. To substantiate her theory, she cited a letter from the college inquiring why he had not shown up for the fall semester. On June 3, 1960, J. Edgar Hoover sent a memorandum to the State Department: "There is a possibility that an impostor is using OSWALD'S birth certificate." J. Edgar Hoover wanted State Department documents on OSWALD. When OSWALD returned to the United States, OSWALD was asked if he had brought his birth certificate with him to Russia. He told the FBI he had not.
Marguerite Oswald was a hostile witness when she testified before the Warren Commission. In November 1966 J. Edgar Hoover recommended that the name of Marguerite Oswald be placed on the Protective Research List of the United States Secret Service "because background is potentially dangerous; Subversive; Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior." Marguerite Oswald died on January 18, 1981, at age 73.
Davis Eugene Boster, (September 14, 1920 - July 7, 2005) of the Soviet Division of the Department of State, responded to J. Edgar Hoover. D. E. Boster was born on September 14, 1920. From 1939 to 1942 he worked as a newspaper reporter. He was in the U.S. Navy from 1942 to 1947. D. E. Boster was contacted in June 1993. He said that the Navy had trained him in the Russian language from 1946 to 1947, but he was never with the Office of Naval Intelligence. He became Attaché at the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, in July 1947. In 1949 he returned to Washington, became a Foreign Affairs Analyst and an International Relations Officer at State Department Headquarters and by January 1958, he was Special Assistant to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In 1959 he was working as a Sovietologist for the Soviet Section (SOV), and was the Officer in Charge of Bilateral Political Relations, Office of Soviet Union Affairs. In the early 1960's, D. E. Boster was transferred to the American Embassy, Mexico City. He remained at this post until January 1964, when he went back to Washington to work in the Office of Inter-American Affairs. D. E. Boster informed J. Edgar Hoover that the State Department had no information on an OSWALD impostor. In 1993 D.E. Boster had no recollection of this correspondence.
J. Edgar Hoover cabled the Paris Legal Attaché and ordered him to investigate the possibility that OSWALD had been kidnapped. On July 27, 1960, September 27, 1960, October 12, 1960, and November 3, 1960, the FBI received information on OSWALD. These cables from the Paris Legal Attaché were highly deleted because they involved liaison with foreign police agencies. Other cables stated, "OSWALD was not in attendance at Albert Schweitzer College in Churwalden, Switzerland," and that there was no information on an OSWALD impostor. [FBI List A 105-82555 WFO; DOS serial 0070-7.11.60; FBI 105-82555-8,5-11.3.60, 9-9.27.60, 10-10.12.60; WCD 834 p9]
Marguerite Oswald's speculations stemmed from the fact that she knew her son LEE better than anyone else in the world. She had lived with him for 16 years on a day-to-day basis; she knew he was not a Communist. She knew that something was happening but she wasn't sure what it was. Hoover could not understand how someone who was supposed to go to Albert Schweitzer College ended up defecting in Moscow and took the OSWALD imposter theory seriously. On June 18, 1960, OSWALD was issued a hunting license. Combined with it was a registration of hunting weapons that listed a single-barreled 16-gauge shotgun belonging to OSWALD. Had OSWALD been allowed to purchase this weapon because he had furnished the KGB with information? Had he told the KGB he feared reprisals from the CIA, even in the Soviet Union? Marina Oswald recalled only one occasion when he went hunting. Pistols and rifles were prohibited by Soviet law. OSWALD reportedly was irritated because the Soviet Government did not allow him to own a pistol. [NYT 11.27.63] Peter Wronski reported that OSWALD told his girlfriend Ella German [Ella German Prohorchik Uritskovo Ul, 4, Apt 108, Minsk, Bylorussian Republic 220050 C.I.S. Tel. (0172) 333 018] that he was hunted in Moscow by Soviet agents. Ella German:
Alec said to me that he came to live in Minsk because it was more out of the way - in Moscow there was too much attention being paid to him. He said that in Moscow he was sort of 'famous' when he first arrived and that people from the U.S. Embassy tried to hunt him down to kill him. I didn't believe that Alec returned to the U.S. When people told me that I insisted, 'No, that could never be.' Because he had always told me that he was afraid to return to the United States because it was 'bang-bang' for him if he ever went back.
Ella German told Norman Mailer the same thing:
Once, after they first started going out, he was quite upset. It was when news came to Minsk that an American U-2 had been shot down over Soviet territory, and its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, had been captured. LEE asked her 'What do you think, Ella? Can it damage me because I'm American?' She told him not to worry personally, because no one can say you are responsible. She tried to calm him down and talked to him nicely. She wasn't really sure, but she did want to support him. It was their most emotional moment yet. LEE told Ella that when he lived in Moscow he was afraid of Americans more than Russians. In fact, he told her, the Soviet authorities had sent him to Minsk because he would be safe there. He even said, 'Here in Minsk I'm invisible. But when I came to Moscow I was really outstanding.' Americans had been very interested in him, he told her, and had been hunting him and wanted to kill him. She thought maybe he had offered some information to obtain a Soviet citizenship, information Americans didn't want given out. He said, 'If I go back to America, they'll kill me.' It made him more interesting, but she didn't believe it was real. She just thought they were passing remarks. [New Yorker 4.10.95]
OSWALD AND THE U-2 DUMP SPRING 1960
Evidence suggested that sometime in the spring of 1960 OSWALD gave the Soviets the information they needed in order to shoot down the CIA's U-2 spy plane, which was developed by Deputy Director/Plans Richard Bissell. OSWALD wrote: "After death of Stalin and peace reaction, then anti-Stalin reaction. A peace movement leading up to the Paris conference. The U-2 incident and its aftermath." In order to do this, OSWALD would have had to made contact with a Russian Intelligence Service.
OSWALD'S KGB POSSIBLE CONNECTIONS: SPRING OF 1960
ROSA KUZNETSOVA
7/18 Moscow, K31 (?), Ul. Zhdanova
(above is an address)
Minsk Ul. Karla Marksa No. 35
Kon. Narokhsov. (? Tel. 206311
Comrade Dyadev Room 279
(Illegible)
20575 Sharapov
Minsk
House No. 4 Apt. 24
Ul. Kalinina
Kuznetsova, Rosa
Intor. Hotel “Mink”
92-463
House 30 Apt 8
Ul. Kola Miskneva
Nel Norodovskvim
122 In of Foreign Languages
These entries for "Rosa" were in OSWALD'S address book:
(1) Kuznetsova, Rosa Inter. Hotel Minsk 9-2-463.
(2) Kuznetsova, Rosa Inter Hotel Minsk 9-2-463 House 30 Apt. 8 Ul. Kola Miskneva (?).
(3) Rosa House 130 Apt. 8.
(4) Rosa House 13 Apt. 8 Karla Oginkneta (Liebknecht?) Street (?).
(5) Rosa Karl Liebnecht Street 130, apartment 8. Telephone 9-2-463.
The CIA: "Traces: None on Kuznetsova or her address. The Minsk Telephone Directory gives 9-2-462 as the number of Inturist, Minsk Hotel. 9-24-463 is not listed." On January 28, 1964, a CIA staff employee, presumably from Counter-Intelligence, generated this document:
Rosa Kuznetsova, former wife of Augustin Trueba (Calvo), may be identical with the Rosa Kuznetsova who was shown in the address book as being with Intourist at the Hotel Minsk."
In 1993 the CIA released this document:
TO: Chief/Research Branch/OS/SRS
FROM: M. D. Stevens
SUBJECT: LEE HARVEY OSWALD
Address Book
Rosa Kuznetsova
2. According to information in a July 27, 1960, IRD report on a May 1960 interview with Augustin Trueba (Calvo), #110 066 Rosa Kuznetsova is the first wife of Augustin Trueba and at that time (May 1960) was living in Moscow with their daughter Ludmilla Kuznetsova.
3. Augustin Trueba was described as a 36-year-old married male who had been repatriated to Spain from the USSR in December 1956 after having left Spain to go to the Soviet Union in 1939 and having remained there. In October 1959 he walked into the Office of the Labor Attaché of the U.S. Embassy, Spain, and offered information about his work in the Soviet Union; he eventually was recruited to supply positive information. He was given the pseudonym of Sergei Petrovich Ivanov.
4. Augustin Trueba's polygraph in May 1960 reflected that he was withholding information regarding: helping or working for Soviet Intelligence and being sent to Spain by the Soviets, signing an agreement to work for Soviet Intelligence, information about Communist and Komsomol membership and other factors; and that he had discussed his CIA work with his wife and others. During his IRD interview, which was conducted in Spain, Augustin Trueba discussed the possible effect on his former wife, Rosa Kuznetsova, and their daughter should his association with CIA be discovered by the Soviets amd commented that he had caused his daughter enough trouble, suffering and punishment, in that she did not know who her father was and had not had the benefit of his guidance, etc. since he had left his wife when his daughter was quite young. He mentioned that on his way from “Magadan to Spain” (time not stated) he stopped in Moscow and while there visited Rosa Kuznetsova’s residence. She was not there, he said, but his daughter opened the door and talked with him while he waited for her to return. (It is not clear whether or not she did return while he was there. This could probably be resolved by asking Mr. Stoiaken who conducted the interrogation). He said that his daughter did not recognize him and did not know him to be her father. According to Trueba he did not correspond with his former wife or their child or with anyone in the USSR. His current wife, Felicia Calvo, he said, was corresponding with her sister who lived near Moscow. According to Trueba, he met Rosa Kuznetsova sometime in 1945 and married her later that year or in early 1946; He stated that at the time she work for GIK as an audio technician. The child he said was born November 20, 1946. He left her some time in 1947 and as he recalled he received a divorce from her in October 1947. He got a divorce he said, because she became physically unattractive to him and because he heard rumors that she had been having an affair with some other man at her place of employment. After giving a long detailed story regarding the divorce, its costs etc. TRUEBA admitted that he did not in fact receive a divorce and that there was only a separation. He added that his present wife had met Rosa Kuznetsova sometime during the period 1950 /1954 while both were attending the Moscow Juridical Institute. He said, in fact, that his present wife had also met his daughter, Ludmilla Kuznetsova, and that during the period they were awaiting repatriation to Spain, Ludmilla spent quite a bit of time with him and his present wife. During the IRD interview Augustin Trueba, who admitted that he had lied on various accounts, became uncooperative and bluntly refused to cooperate further. (Information concerning Rosa Kuznetsova is contained on pages 3, 6 and 7 of the July 27, 1960 IRD report. See copy attached.) Signed M. D. Stevens.
The IRD (Information Research Development) arm of British Intelligence used Media and 'Academic' fronts, often with the CIA, such as Encounter Magazine (1953, exposed as CIA front 1967). Trueba must have been a high value intellectual but I can find no traces on him except that Agustin Trueba Calvo was born in Santa ??? in 1923 and his wife Felisa was ... Trueba' s brother was shot by the Spanish Fascists and his mother spent 13... [Homage to Spanish Exiles Voices of the Spanish Civil War Nancy MacDonald]
On January 31, 1964, Birch D. O’Neal, Chief, CI-SIG signed a Memorandum for the Record in response to the document about Rosa Kuznetsova having been married to Augustin Trueba. Based on the description of Rosa Kuznetsova furnished by the Historic Diary, - lived in Minsk, blonde, 23, O’Neal concluded the two Rosa Kuznetsovas were not identical. After O’Neal spoke with Raymond Rocca, the latter ceased to conjecture:
The possibility of these two individuals being identical was discussed with Raymond G. Rocca of CI Staff and he expressed the opinion that based on his knowledge of the case it appeared quite clear to him that the Rosa Kuznetsova concerning whom entries were made in the address book was identical with the Rosa Kuznetsova referred to in the diary.
People with the same name are not necessarily the same person, however, the CIA found no traces in Minsk of a tourist guide, or anyone else named Rosa Kuznetsova, nor could it verify that 130 Karl Liebnecht Street was a valid Minsk address. How could CIA explain this away? OSWALD wrote: "I study russian elemantry and advanced grammas from text books with a English speaking Russian intourist teacher by the name of Rosa Agafonava, Minsk January to May 1960." The Warren Commission remarked: "Reference to 'Rosa Agafanova' probably should be to 'Rosa Kuznetsova'." [CIA 458, 1306-471, 1304-473, 1545-458 rel. 5.18.82; WR p833 fn 116 WCE 93 p340] Eric Titovitz, who knew OSWALD at this time, reported Rosa Kuznetsova died in January 1992 in Minsk. Eric Titovitz became a neurosurgeon and professor.
SHARAPOV
OSWALD'S address book same page as the entry for Rosa Kuznetsova:
7/18 Moscow K31 (?) Ul. Zhdanova
(above is an address)
Minks Ul. Karla Marksa No. 35
Kon. Narokhsov (?Tel 206311)
Comrade Dyadev Rom 279
(Illegible)
20575 Sharapov
Minsk
House No. 4. Apt
Minsk House No. 4. Apt 24
Ul. Kalinina
Kuznetsova, Rosa
Intor. (Intourist?) Hotel “Minsk”
92-463
House 30, Apt. 8
Ul. Kola Miskneva (?)
Nel Norodovskvim
112 In (Institute) of Foreign Languages
20575 Sharapov
Minsk House
No. 4, Apt. 24
UL. Kalinina.
From (deleted) To: Chief Research Branch SRS: According to the diary on January 8, 1960 OSWALD was met by the Mayor of Minsk Shrapov, who welcomed him to the city. The name SHARAPOV and the phone number 20575 were found on pages 45 and 81 of the address book, and the notation Comrade Sharapov 20525" was on a paper found in OSWALD'S possession by New Orleans Police in 1963.
Traces:
1. Vasili Ivanovich Shrapov has been Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Minsk City Council since June 1954.
2. The 1963 Minsk Telephone Directory lists the following office under the number 20575: The Receptionist of the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the City Council of Worker's Deputies. Address: Karla Marksa 12.
Minsk House No. 4, Apt. 24 UL. Kalinina was OSWALD'S address in Minsk. Warren Commission presumed "Shrapov" and "Sharapov" were identical. The CIA ran traces on Sharapov:
TO: Chief, Research Branch/SRS
FROM: M. D. Stevens
SUBJECT: LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE (Address Book)
C. Sharapov could conceivably have referred to one of several persons by that name in Security Indices:
(1) Lt. Col. Nikolai Georgeiyevich Sharapov, who is described as an Russian Intelligence Service career officer, is an old time Chekist with interrogation experience. In 1942 he was chief of a small counter-espionage section in the Second Directorate of the NKVD [the predecessor to the KGB]. In 1942 he held the rank of Captain and sometime after February 1954 became the Chief of the Seventh Chief Directorate Section of the MVD [the domestic counterpart of the KGB]. He is said to have participated in the arrest of Beria. Nikolai Georgeiyevich Sharapov was born about 1909, was married, and as of 1954 had a 13-year-old son. He also had daughters, aged seven and three, by a mistress, Olga Khokhlova. It should be noted that Nikolai Georgeiyevich Sharapov has a son about OSWALD'S age. In a February 24, 1955 CIA information report, 'KGB Organizations, Functions and Personalities,' Nikolai Georgeiyevich Sharapov was listed as the KGB (X Directorate) Independent Section, Surveillance Section (NN), Sub-Section Chief.
(2) According to the 1930 testimony of E. Y. Belitskiy aka Yefim Belitskiy, the father of Boris Yefimovich Belitskiy, #175069-SSD, one P. I. Sharapov was at one time a director of the All-Russian Textile Syndicate in New York City, as he (E. Y. Belitskiy) also had been. The Syndicate, he said, was actually part of the Soviet Government and was controlled as such.
See attachment regarding Boris Y. Belitskiy.
(3) According to information furnished to the FBI in 1948 by Mikhail Ivanovich SAMARIN (aka Mr. Gregory) AI 116, one Lt. General Andrei Rodionovich SHARAPOV of the Soviet Military Staff Committee at the United Nations (as well as Lt. General Alexander Filippovich) was involved in Soviet espionage. According to SAMARIN he obtained this information during a discussion he had with Eugene Vasilievich GLAKHOV of the Soviet U.N. Delegation in about June 1948. According to SAMARIN, General Sharapov took over all the duties of General VASILIEV, Head of the First Department of Soviet Intelligence in the United States, when he later departed – apparently shortly before June 1948. [CIA 1296-469]
The document in the foregoing appeared contained the notation: “THIS IS OFFICE OF SECURITY INFO. MR. BRUCE SOLEY (SOLIE) OF SECURITY TOLD BIRCH O’NEAL C/CI/SIG THAT IS CAN BE RETAINED IN DD/P FILES. AED MARCH 17, 1964.
ATTACHMENT
According to several sources, Belitskiy is an associate of Aline Mosby, whose name appeared in OSWALD'S address book...She is also mentioned in CI/SIG's cover memorandum dated January 10, 1964.
According to Joseph Doyle SR/2/CE, #56948 SD & SSD, in September 1958, Aline Mosby was in direct contact with Boris Y. Belitskiy, a Russian official at the Brussels World's Fair, and "was the center of a great deal of activity for (him). Doyle stated that Belitskiy, who was the head of the British Division of Radio Moscow had been an interpreter for the Russians at the Brussels World Fair. He previously had been in the United States with his father who was with AMTORG in the late 1920's/ early 1930's. Joseph Doyle said that Belitskiy attended school in New York City and that the family returned to Russia in 1936 or 1937.
With further reference to Mosby Doyle noted that there was a direct relationship between Mosby, Koch (Carl Henry Koch #50001) and Volkoff (George Volkoff #152385 -SSD) - all of whom had been of interest with reference to Belitskiy.
Other whom Mosby knew included Alexander Dolberg, #165651 - SSD, to whom she was introduced by McKinney H. Russell #83853 - SSD, still another who was of interest in connection with Belitskiy. CI/SIG was advised in late 1958 regarding the above individuals and informed that CI/OA was also interested in them.
According to information furnished by Fitzgerald Curtis Smith, #176178 - SSD, during a debriefing in June 1959, Boris Y. Beitskiy, whom Smith knew in Moscow was in great fear of being purged "as was his father, a Russian Jew, who had once lived in New York." According to Smith, Belitskiy knew and trust no citizens in Moscow other than himself (Smith) and Aline Mosby, UPI correspondent in Moscow. Smith said Belitskiy met Aline Mosby at the Brussels World Fair in the summer of 1958, at the same time he met Smith. Smith said he subsequently contacted Belitskiy in Moscow in December 1958, through NBC Correspondent Irvine R. Levine.
Another who knows, or has known, Aline Mosby is former Agency employee George Winters, #55769. Winters stated in an interview in November / December 1960, when discussing Americans in Moscow who lived beyond their means, that newspaper man Harry Shapiro was a very heavy loser at poker – to the extent that “one got the impression that he was on the Soviet budget.” Shapiro, he said, had a Russian wife who was more aggressive than he. Winters added that newspaper woman Aline Mosby was in Shapiro’s office; and commented that she “stuck mostly to the foreign circuit rather than the Embassy circuit.” She said that she had been in the hospital on several occasions during the previous year, so that “one didn’t see too much of her” and added that according to gossip one hospitalization was occasioned by an abortion.
Another newspaperwoman in Moscow, whom Winters mentioned, was Priscilla Johnson #71589-DL. She has been mentioned in newspaper as one who recalled having come in contact with LEE HARVEY OSWALD in Moscow, where she interviewed (or talked) with him. Her name, like Mosby’s, was listed in his address book under her last name only.
Mosby was born on July 27, 1922 in Missoula, Montana; and graduated from the University of Montana in 1943. She was employed by United Press International in Seattle, Washington, from 1943 to 1945, and was Hollywood Correspondent for UP from 1945 to 1957. According to the UP Bureau Manager at Los Angeles, she resigned voluntarily in 1957 and her employment was satisfactory. According to confidential informant R-1, during an Agency investigation in the fall of 1958, she was dropped by UP when she was subpoenaed in connection with legal suits against Confidential Magazine, for which she had done re-write without the knowledge of UP. She went to the Brussels World's Fair as a stringer of the North American Newspaper Alliance. She was considered loyal by her associates during the above period; but was described as the co-existence type who associates with the Russians - plays footsie with the Russians. No informant questioned her loyalty
In January 1960, Mosby reportedly was introduced on the Dave Garroway show, “Today” as NBC News’ Correspondent; but in a State Department dispatch of December 12, 1960, which listed “Western Correspondents in Moscow” she was named as representing UPI.
According to House Un-American Activities Committee records, Aline Mosby did a motion picture type article for the Daily Worker in 1947; wrote an article for the Daily Worker at Laguna Beach, California, in 1947; and contributed a column to the Daily Worker on November 23, 1956.
M. D. Stevens
Was OSWALD referring to the Mayor of Minsk or was he trying to hide his contact with a someone else named Sharapov? Was Lt. General Andrei Rodionovich Sharapov a high-level KGB contact of OSWALD'S? Was he the man who OSWALD gave the information the Sovs needed to shoot down the U-2? Peter Deryabin revealed that Lt. Col. Nikolai Georgeiyevich Sharapov was "Colonel Sharapov who used to work at one time in the Counter-Intelligence Directorate of the KGB as the chief (or deputy) of one of the CIA Sections." [CIA 1007-951; 469]. When the CIA first released this document it withheld the Attachment on Mosby then eight and one-half blank pages followed, although two of them contained the handwritten date, March 9, 1954. [CIA 1296-469] Scott Malone: "Mosby was a commie-humper."
7/18 Moscow K31 (?) Ul. Zhdanova
(above is an address)
Minks Ul. Karla Marksa No. 35
Kon. Narokhsov (?Tel 206311)
Comrade Dyadev Rom 279
(Illegible)
20575 Sharapov
Minsk
House No. 4. Apt
Minsk House No. 4. Apt 24
Ul. Kalinina
Kuznetsova, Rosa
Intor. (Intourist?) Hotel “Minsk”
92-463
House 30, Apt. 8
Ul. Kola Miskneva (?)
Nel Norodovskvim
112 In (Institute) of Foreign Languages
On the same page with the names of the other suspected intelligence agents the name Dyadev appeared. The CIA:
Page 45 of the address book lists "Dyadev, room 279, Kon. Narokhsov (?) Tele. 26311," and a paper found in OSWALD'S possession in 1963 by New Orleans Police contained a reference to "Comrade Dyadev 279 Kon. Na Rokhsov (?). Traces: None on Dyadev. Phone number 26311 is listed in the 1963 Minsk phone directory as that of A. A. Chubb, Leninskiy Prospect 16, apartment 67.
The CIA:
Tel. number 26311, listed on page 45 of the address book, appears to be connected with DYADEV, (fnu) q.v. According to the 1963 Minsk telephone directory, this number is assigned to A. A. Chub of 16 Leninsky Prospect, apartment 67." Note: The KGB and MVD offices are at 15 and 17 Leninsky Prospect, Minsk. Traces: None.
Dyadev. Traces: As of 1954 a (fnu) Dyadev was reported to have been Deputy Minister of the Food Production Industry of the BSSR.
According to the Warren Commission "Vera Golevna (?) Alizberg" was listed as "German teacher consrv."
TO: The Record Date August 14, 1970.
From: Edna Mendoza
SUBJECT: OSWALD, Lee Harvey
Address Book - FBI Report December 31, 1963.
On page 11 of the above FBI report, showing listings in Subject address book on page 27 there appears the name "Alizberg, Vera V...." followed by a notation "illegible."
The files of OS contain no information identifiable with the name as listed above. In view of Subject's poor spelling, as evidenced in the address book, a possibility exists that the name was written phonetically. A possible correct spelling might be "Eliasberg" or "Eliazberg."
The following was found in the files of OS/Security Reseach Staff regarding Vera ELIASBERG.
Vera ELIASBERG #350923, was previously known as Vera FRANKE, or Erna Vera FRANKE. As Erna Franke she was listed in the “German Wanted List” for 1936 – 1938 with birth date indicated as December 21, 1910, at Leningrad in a section captioned Address Unknown.
As Erna FRANKE she was listed in the German Security Handbook of the USSR as follows:
Erna FRANKE 21.12.10 Leningrad Stenotypist in RSHA A 2 (a category described as “open terrorist attacks and forgery.”)
A reliable confidential informant of SRS has advised that Erna FRANKE was born in Russia of Jewish parents, who moved to Germany when she was a child. She was a member of the New Beginner group in Germany during the early 1930’s and as a result of her underground work she was arrested with others of the group and placed in a concentration camp. She escaped to Paris in 1935 and continued to work with Paul Hagan. She made her way to Spain or Portugal and eventually entered the United States at New York. In 1941 she was married to George Eliasberg, whom she had known in Germany at the time of their arrest by the Gestapo, although Eliasberg had been permitted to travel to Palestine, from which he later emigrated to the U.S. See additional information on Vera Eliasberg in file of her husband, George Eliasberg #341773 [CIA 1319-487]
Hagan worked with the OSS during WW II on the shadow war against Hitler. This from an anti-immigration website:
Soviet agents, front groups, and infiltration and espionage techniques composed a broad strategy to undermine the United States. Immigrants as well as traitorous natives played a role in the communist threat. For instance, German refugee Karl Frank, alias Paul Hagen, was investigated by the FBI in 1945. His internal security case confirmed that Hagen was a communist and active in a communist front group, New Beginning.
According to Herbert Romerstein who studied the Venona Files:
One [unsolved murder] involves the disappearance, in Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War, of Mark Rein, son of the exiled Russian Menshevik Rafail Abramovich. Rein was associated with Scandinavian social democracy when he vanished in wartime Catalonia. His case is one of a short list of unsolved atrocities alleged against the Soviet secret police on Spanish Republican territory. According to Romerstein, Rein may have been betrayed to Stalin's agents by a German leftist named Paul Hagen. A footnote discloses that sources on the Rein affair may be found in the German Communist Party Archives.
Most of this document was withheld until 1998 when it was “Released in Full” except for the component from which it originated. It was not a Warren Commission document. It indicated that OSWALD was in touch with a hardcore experienced KGB agent.
Perhaps the most intriguing document regarding OSWALD’s CIA connections is one dated April 1964 that deals with events as late as 1972 and may be predated by its author JAMES ANGLETON. It contains names that do not appear in the FBI Report (the Name List with Traces) that it refers to:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD April 8, 1964
SUBJECT: Lee Harvey OSWALD
ADDRESS BOOK
FBI REPORT 12/31/63
Reference is made to previous memoranda concerning items found listed in Subject’s address book. The following additional information was noted from the files of OS:
MEMORANDUM TO FILES:
The following is the result of Office of Security file reviews on names #36 - #40:
#36 DAMMAN, Nansi (Nancy) USA
Otkryt s (open from) 11.2.71
According to the Biographic Register, Nancy DAMMAN, an employee of the State Department, was born on May 8, 1919 in Illinois. She has been assigned to several posts in the Far East and is currently in Manila.
#37 DZHONSON, Vil’yam 1907 USA
(JOHNSON, William)
William HE. JOHNSON
#289 217
#401625BB
Born September 10, 1907 in Washington, D.C.; from 1934 to 1939 did teaching a research in Europe, primarily in the USSR. JOHNSON was frequently mentioned in the Daily Worker and contributed articles to that publication on many occasions. During 1941 to 1947, JOHNSON and his wife were connected with cited organizations. Many of the close associates of Subject and his wife have been reported as members of the Communist Party or Communist sympathizers. It was alleged that Subject’s wife was a CP member. From 1943 to 1946, JOHNSON was Chief, Russia Political Section, US Military Intelligence; from 1947 to 1955, Carnegie Institute of Technology; and from 1955 at the University of Pittsburg. JOHNSON was doing research in the USSR / Poland / Czechoslovakia / Yugoslavia under Department of State sponsorship for five months and for six months in 1966/67; travelled in the USSR / Poland / Czechoslovakia / Yugoslavia under sponsorship Department of Education doing research. On November 12, 1953 JOHNSON was disapproved for any use by CIA; and in March 1967 was on interest to Domestic Contacts Section but should be approached with extreme caution and not be exposed to classified material.
#38 DZHONSON, Pristsilla 1928 USA
(JOHNSON, PRISCILLA)
#71589
Born July 19, 1928 in Glenn Cove, New York. JOHNSON knew Lee Harvey OSWALD in the USSR and also did some research work for John Kennedy in 1953. Lived in USSR 1958-1960 as reporter for NANA but her visa was cancelled when she wrote an unfavorable article about MIKOYAN. JOHNSON did translation for SVETLANA. JOHNSON was of interest to the Agency in 1953 but interest was cancelled because of extensive investigation required of friends; of interest in 1958 but interest again cancelled; of interest to SB (Soviet Bloc) in May 1963 for debriefing concerning her contacts in Soviet Union; now Priscilla Johnson McMILLAN.
#39 DZHONS, U. Persona Non Grata USA
No Record
#40 DZHEKOB, R. Persona Non Grata USA
Richard C. JACOB, #291 610, was born May 24, 1936 in Altoona, Pennsylvania. JACOB was a CIA employee from 1960 to 1969. He was p.n.g.’d as a result of the PENKOVSKY case. Clearance was issued for him for use as a spotter-assessor in March 1972. Is now a stock broker in New York City.
Nancy Dammann spent 17 years with USAID as a Communications Media Advisor in countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Richard C. Jacob, was a twenty-four-year-old CIA case officer from Egg Harbor, New Jersey, listed on the embassy rolls as an "archivist" who was assigned the task of picked up some intelligence information from Colonel Penkovsky at a dead drop: "The message has to be in a matchbox," Case Officer Paul Garbler stated, "Hold it in your hand until you get out on the street, and if you're jumped, drop it, try to drop it in the gutter, the sewer if you can. Don't have it." Jacob nodded, and Garbler went on, "They'll try to sweat you. Don't admit anything about clearing a drop. Demand to call the embassy." When Jacob arrived at the Pushkin Street drop, the KGB was waiting. He had walked straight into a trap, just as Garbler had feared. [Molehunt David Wise] No traces on the others, other than their names appeared on a Soviet visa blacklist. At this time this document is a conundrum for me. OSWALD'S KGB File (No. 31451) contained no indication that he supplied information to the Soviets.
There is one more interesting detail in his records. KGB insists, that it is not mentioned in the papers even once of the Soviet intelligence officials ever interrogating OSWALD. It is very strange because the fact that OSWALD arrived in the Soviet Union, and his further behavior, must have (and it did) caused strong suspicions of the KGB: it was not every day that American tourists in 1959 kept asking for political asylum so persistently...The KGB officials assure that he wasn't recruited by them. Though it is impossible to check this fact out, the thick file of records on OSWALD can be good proof that he had nothing to do with the KGB. Six volumes - this is too much for a file of a person who is working for the KGB. Usually they would keep a thin and absolutely secret folder.
OSWALD's KGB file indicated that OSWALD was never interviewed by the KGB. This in itself was strange. If a secret folder existed that linked OSWALD to the U-2 dump it would have been destroyed after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. As of 1995 there was no KGB record that indicated OSWALD had any connection with the KGB, however, the KGB was a covert action arm of a totalitarian power. It did not keep records on everyone it killed or everyone who contacted it. Perhaps there were no written records to be destroyed.
On August 6, 1959, The New York Times reported: "Officials said that while the [recent] talks between President Eisenhower and the Soviet leader could possibly improve the atmosphere for a summit meeting, they were not to be regarded as automatically preliminary to a conference of heads of government." On September 26, 1959, Nikita Khrushchev and Dwight Eisenhower met at Camp David, Maryland. "The Spirit of Camp David" signified a break in the Cold War. While the two heads of state were discussing Berlin, John McCone, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, was meeting with his counterpart to discuss the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Vice President NIXON accompanied McCone to Camp David. On September 27, 1959 President Eisenhower took Premier Khrushchev to his Gettysburg farm for private talks. Khrushchev was given a 21 gun salute when he left, and French Prime Minister Charles DeGaulle was hopeful that a summit conference was near. A U.S.-Soviet Atom pact was foreseen. Discussions over nuclear cooperation had been underway for several months. At Camp David, a summit conference was scheduled for May 16, 1960, in Paris. President Eisenhower would then visit the Soviet Union. ANGLETON knew that there was going to be a summit conference as early as August 1959. OSWALD was dispatched to the Soviet Union in September 1959 to sabotage the summit conference and destroy the understanding between American and the Soviet Union that had come to be known as détente. ANGLETON believed: "Détente is a sham, a tactic." After he resigned from the CIA, ANGLETON told friends that he was done in by Henry Kissinger in retaliation for his outspoken doubts about the U.S. policy of détente with Russia and China. [Newsweek 1.6.75] Evidence suggested he was determined to prevent American/Soviet relations from warming up. In 1946 he wrote: "In practice a certain overlapping of Counter-Espionage and SI (positive intelligence) functions exists, particularly in this turbulent period before the peace conference when most secret political activities of foreign powers are conducted through intelligence service's contacts and networks." [The Secrets War NARA p237] ANGLETON gave OSWALD the info he needed to shoot down the U-2 spy plane then had OSWALD give the Soviets the information just before the summit, so that the summit would be destroyed. The national security of the United States would be undamaged by the sacrifice of the U-2. CORONA SPY SATELLITE:
By August 1960 the CIA had reconnaissance satellites in operation - such as the Discovery or Corona Spy satellites - which rendered the U-2 almost obsolete. These first spy satellites were launched after President Eisenhower approved the plan in February 1958. The Corona vehicle took photographs with a constant rotating stereo panoramic camera system and loaded the exposed photographic film on to recovery were de-orbited and recovered by Air Force C-119 aircraft while floating to earth on a parachute. The first attempt to launch a rocket designed to carry the Corona ended in failure on January 21, 1959. After numerous failures the first truly successful Corona mission to place on August 19, 1959. On August 31, 1959, President Eisenhower established the Office of Missile and Satellite Systems within the office of the Secretary of the Air Force. This became the cover for the National Reconnaissance Office. By December 10, 1959, the resolution of the Corona's camera was approaching that of the U-2. The Space Imaging Division of Lockheed, Martin-Marietta reported: "The first film capsule recovered from Corona yielded more data than all of the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union combined. And even from its earliest days, Corona was collecting imagery at a spacial resolution of roughly two meters." [Ambrose Eisenhower, Simon & Schuster p515; http://www.spaceimage.com/hom/corona.html] ANGLETON believed that President Eisenhower would enter into treaties and make concessions to the Soviets that would be far more dangerous than losing a U-2. William K. Harvey wrote: "JIM A. - contradestruct from U-2." As the Summit approached, President Eisenhower considered grounding the U-2 spy plane.
THE KGB: UNAWARE OF THE U-2 IN 1956
The U-2 began flights over Russia in 1956. On July 10, 1956, the USSR sent a note to the Department of State of the United States protesting violations of Soviet airspace by a "twin engine medium bomber" on July 4, 1956, July 5, 1956, and July 9, 1956.The CIA reported:
Summary of Initial Missions
In the period from June 20, 1956, to July 10, 1956, the Soviet Bloc air defense system was subjected to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven occurring within a period of only eight days. It must be remembered that (deleted) provides the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet system. This is important because it is clear from (deleted as of 2010). However, some tentative conclusions may be drawn from these initial flights as follows:
1. In spite of the fact that these missions come as a surprise, none of them went undetected. This is clear evidence that their radar coverage extends above (deleted as of 2010) feet.
2. By July 5, 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware of the purpose of the missions and was taking counter-action. One positive action was the stand down of civil flights while the mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a second action which is believed related is the moving of the MIG-19 aircraft into East Germany and Poland on July 7, 1956. Also MIG-19’s were moved into Hungary at about this time.
3. The performance of the Soviet System on the July 5 mission, 2014, was indeed curious. While the action evident from (deleted deleted as of 2010) is not clear an explanation which appears to fit the known facts is offered as follows: As a result of the previous missions, the Soviets had concluded the essential facts concerning the missions i. e., that they were for reconnaissance, that they flew about (deleted) feet, and that a penetration as deep as Moscow was possible. They probably surmised that the July 5 mission was headed for Moscow when the track appeared on a northeasterly heading.
4. By July 9, 1956 in addition to the evident recognition of the great height of the mission flights, tracking was better and in general the performance of the warning system was much improved.
5. The next day July 10, 1956 proved that the air defense warning system is deployed in depth. (deleted as of 2010).
6. The first eight missions proved (deleted as of 2010).
7. Confusion and track loss seemed to be related. (deleted as of 2010).
8. The question of radar for height finding. [CIA SC-02164-58]
On March 2, 1958, the Soviet detected a violation of their airspace by a "military jet aircraft." In March 1958 Model Airplane News published a story about the U-2, complete with drawings. The article observed: "An unconfirmed rumor says that U-2's are flying across the Iron Curtain taking aerial photographs." On April 21, 1958 the Soviets identified the aircraft as a Lockheed U-2 type. Soviet Aviation, the official newspaper of the Red Air Force, subsequently published articles about the U-2. On April 21, 1958, the Soviets issued a press release accusing an "American military reconnaissance aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan" of having violated Russian airspace. U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers reported that in the fall of 1958:
There was no longer any doubt they knew about the overflights. Our evidence of this was of the most conclusive kind. Although none of the pilots had actually seen them, electronic equipment on returning U-2's indicated the Russian were now sending up rockets attempting to bring us down. At our altitude we weren't too worried about MIGs, but we were beginning to be concerned about SAMs, surface-to-air missiles. By this time a few of the unknowns were disappearing from the U-2 overflights. We now knew that the Russians were radar tracking at least some of our flights; it was possible that they had been doing so from the start. Equipment on board recorded their signals; from their strength it was possible to tell whether they were "painting," this is tracking the flight. However this could only be determined after returning to base and studying transcriptions. There was still no way, while in flight, to know for sure.
We also knew that SAM's were being fired at us, that some were uncomfortably close to our altitude. But we knew too that the Russians had a control problem in their guidance system. Because of the speed of the missile, and extremely thin atmosphere, it was impossible to make a correction. This did not eliminate the possibility of a lucky hit. In our navigation we were careful to ensure our routes circumvented known SAM bring us down.
The press reported that a U-2 landed in a Japanese rice paddy in September 1959. Knowing the Soviets were aware of the U-2 and were intent on shooting one down, President Eisenhower considered suspending the flights. He told his intelligence advisors during a February 2, 1960, meeting, "If one of these aircraft is lost when we are engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it would be put on display in Moscow and ruin my effectiveness." The CIA was insistent that the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union be continued, even expanded, because they brought back invaluable data. President Eisenhower agreed to additional flights, but only at the rate of one a month. Francis Gary Powers recalled: "After a long pause, two flights were scheduled for the same month, April 1960."
THE SOVIETS ALMOST SHOOT DOWN A U-2
On April 9, 1960, the Russians tracked the U-2 by radar and made several attempts to down it with SAMs. They were getting closer. Why? Had the Soviet made any technological advances in radar that allowed them to defeat the primitive electronic warfare devices that made the U-2 impossible to shoot down? Or had they made advances in rocketry? The Soviets already had rockets that could reach the cruising altitude of the U-2; 68,000 feet. Were the SAMs too inaccurate even with this new hypothetical factor? For whatever reason, the U-2 returned to its base intact.
President Eisenhower authorized Richard Bissell to fly any day before May 1, 1960. Every day for the next two weeks the USSR was under a cloud cover and the mission had to be postponed. The U-2 needed near-perfect weather to get its photographs. On May 1, 1960, the weather cleared. That morning, CIA Plans contract employee Francis Gary Powers took off from an airfield in Adana, Turkey and headed for Bodo, Norway, his flight route taking him directly over the Soviet Union. While flying over Sverdlovsk, a Soviet SAM exploded several hundred feet away from the aircraft, knocking it out of the sky. The U-2 aircraft was equipped with a self-destruction device. Francis Gary Powers bailed out without pressing the plane's destruct button and survived.
I reached for the destruct switches, opening the safety covers, had my hand over them, and then changed my mind, deciding I had better see if I could get into position to use the ejection seat first. Under normal circumstances, there is only a small amount of clearance in ejecting. Thrown forward as I was, if I used the ejection seat the metal canopy overheard would cut off both my legs. I tried to pull my legs back, I couldn't...The ejection seat wasn't the only way to leave the plane. I could climb out. So intent I had been on one solution I had forgotten the other. Reaching up, not far, because I had been thrown upward as well as forward, with only the seat belt holding me down, I unlocked and released the canopy. It sailed into space. The plane was still spinning. I glanced at the altimeter. It had passed 34,000 feet and was unwinding very fast. Again I thought of the destruct switches but decided to release my seat belt first, before activating the unit. Seventy seconds is not a very long time. Immediately the centrifugal force threw me halfway out of the aircraft.
An intact destructor unit was recovered from the aircraft. At the show trial of Francis Gary Powers, an aeronautics expert testified that "it was impossible to establish the lag of the explosion since no timing mechanism was found in the wreckage." The CIA reported:
1. Frank Powers aircraft was equipped with a destructor unit made by Beckman and Whitley, Inc. Model Number G-175-10. Procedure for activating the device was a two step function. The pilot had to activate the system by throwing one switch, then commence the timing sequence by throwing a second. A 2 ½ pound charge of cyclonite would be ignited 60 seconds after the second switch was thrown. (In a statement before Congress, Powers indicated that the timing mechanism was set for a 70 second delay.)
2. The purpose of the destruction unit was to destroy the camera in the equipment bay. Because of the equipment bay's location underneath the cockpit, potential serious injury could occur to the pilot should the device fire while he was in the aircraft; hence the two step activation procedure was established to minimize accidental ignition.
3. The Russians, in displaying the U-2 wreckage, showed the destructor unit made by Beckman. Their inference was that it was a remote control destructor unit, and this point was noted in the translation of the transcript of Power's trial published by Translation World Publishers of Chicago in October 1960.
Powers feared that the 70 seconds before the plane exploded was nonexistent and that he would be blown to bits along with it. Francis Gary Powers was taken prisoner by the Russians who found a poison pin on his person that he was to use to commit suicide. Norman Mailer reported that the KGB watched OSWALD on May 1, 1960, and on May 2, 1960. The next reports cited by Norman Mailer were dated July 2, 1960, and July 3, 1960. Nothing even remotely suspicious was uncovered.
THE RUSSIAN'S RESPONSE
Premier Khrushchev made a speech to the Soviets on May 5, 1960, in which he reported his Air Force had downed an American spy plane, but made no mention that Francis Gary Powers had been captured and the wreckage of the plane found. The speech suggested an element in the American Government was at work without the President's knowledge: "Even KGB often carries on activities I do not know about." In a later statement the Soviet Government claimed the "flight had been sent to wreck the Summit talks...the CIA knew Powers would be shot down, thus setting the stage for the Summit's collapse." At first, the State Department insisted the Russians had shot down one of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's U-2 meteorological research planes. On May 7, 1960, Premier Khrushchev reported to the Supreme Soviet that "we have plane parts and we also have the pilot." The Eisenhower Administration was caught red-handed in a lie. Khrushchev would announce he was about to attack the U-2's bases. President Eisenhower canceled his trip to the USSR. On May 14, 1960, President Eisenhower flew to the Summit Conference in Paris. Premier Khrushchev demanded an apology for the overflights, and President Eisenhower promised him that no further flights would be sent over Russia. The Summit meeting collapsed, over before it had even started and détente with it. The Soviets had previously failed to shoot down the U-2 for two reasons: It carried a granger and flew at an altitude of over 60,000 feet.
FACTOR ONE: THE GRANGER
Powers:
As a defense against air-to-air missiles, those fired from another aircraft, a new piece of equipment called a 'granger' was installed in the tail. As explained to us, should an aircraft lock onto a U-2 with his radar and launch a missile, the granger would send out a faulty signal to break the radar lock. Whether it actually did this or not we had no way of knowing, since we had never been threatened by aircraft.
The Soviets reported:
Expert findings on the tape recorder and its tape have shown that the signals recorded by Powers came from surface radar systems insuring the anti-aircraft defense of the Soviet Union. Special equipment had been installed in Power's aircraft to counteract and interfere with interception radar stations and fighter plane direction.Experts have established that the U-2 aircraft was equipped with a special radar scrambler to create interference for radar stations intercepting and directing fighter aircraft.
DID THE GRANGER WORK AGAINST GROUND LAUNCHED MISSILES?
Francis Gary Powers believed the granger protected the U-2 only from air-to-air missiles and not surface-to-air (SAM) missiles:
Francis Gary Powers said that a special device to jam radar and signals given by fighter planes and rockets was activated on the plane before his May 1, 1960 take-off, and throughout his flight over the Soviet Union. In reply to a question by a people's assessor, Powers explained that he meant air-to-air rockets.
When Francis Gary Powers was captured by the Soviets, "there followed an attempt to make me verify that the granger was supposed to deflect SAM missiles as well as air-to-air missiles."
FACTOR TWO: 68,000 FEET CRUISING ALTITUDE
Francis Gary Powers told his KGB interrogators his flight was terminated "at maximum altitude for the plane, 68,000 feet." In his book OPERATION OVERFLIGHT, Francis Gary Powers claimed 68,000 feet was a figure invented to protect his fellow pilots in the event the flights resumed. According to Francis Gary Powers,
I was stuck with the 68,000 foot figure. However, maybe I could use that advantageously. If given the chance, I decided to stress that I had been hit at "maximum altitude, 68,000 feet, hoping the CIA would realize by "maximum altitude" I meant I was flying exactly where I was supposed to when the explosion occurred. For me to say I was flying at my "assigned altitude" would imply the plane could fly higher, which was true. If I could get that message across, the trial, for all its propaganda value, would have served one positive purpose. It could be the means for saving lives of other pilots. I knew by May 7, 1960, the day on which Khrushchev announced my capture and details of my flight, my interrogators had bought my story, believed I was telling the truth, even to altitude, Khrushchev use of 20,000 meters (65,600 feet) being the closest approximation to the 68,000 feet figure I had used. It was a dangerous gamble. It was possible their intelligence had already ferreted out the exact altitude. I was inclined to doubt this: this was one of the most closely guarded secrets of the U-2. Even more dangerous were their radar plots. Everything depended on their accuracy, or rather, lack of it. Previously we had felt their height finding was inaccurate at the altitudes at which we were flying. If we were wrong, they would quickly pinpoint the lie...I withheld the most important information in my possession.
Francis Gary Powers stated that when the KGB had scientists extrapolate his altitude from various radar readings, they happened to verify his arbitrary figure:
As they read the figures, I began to disbelieve them. Surely this was some cruel hoax, designed to throw me off guard. No one could be so lucky. Not only was their height-finding radar off...some were actually at 68,000!
During the show trial of Francis Gary Powers in Moscow in August 1960, the Soviets insisted they shot down the U-2 at its cruising altitude of 68,000 feet. Francis Gary Powers was asked repeatedly, "At what altitude was your aircraft struck?" and he answered, "It was the maximum altitude, 68,000 feet." Major Voronov, whose rocket unit shot down the U-2, testified: "As the plane entered the firing range at an altitude of 68,000 feet one rocket was fired and its explosion destroyed the target." In 1978 the CIA claimed: "The Soviets knew perhaps even more accurately than even the U-2 altimeters showed, what the height was." [CIA OLC #78-2469 - SD Breckinridge meeting with HSCA investigators] The key to shooting down the U-2 was not so much in defeating its granger as it was having accurate information as to its cruising altitude. Francis Gary Powers tried to cover up the fact that he gave the Soviets accurate information about the altitude of the U-2. Francis Gary Powers had been instructed that "if captured be cooperative and try to answer questions to which the Soviets appeared already to have knowledge." Powers did not know it, but the Soviets already had knowledge of the altitude of the U-2 from OSWALD. OSWALD had learned it at Atsugi or from ANGLETON. (The Soviets thought he had learned it while stationed at Atsugi). ANGLETON had sabotaged the Summit and changed history.
The back flyleaf of OSWALD'S address book contained the words “New Hite Special" however Angleton transcribed it as “From Mrs. Hail N. White Special.”
OSWALD'S friend, Michael Paine, commented:
I could well believe that he would give some information. That he'd like to be valuable to the Russians. He didn't feel a loyalty to the United States. He wanted to change the system here. If he had some information he thought he could sell, he might have done it. That's enough explanation. If he gave the Russians the information to sabotage the summit, it would have had to happen at the right instance. OSWALD wasn't what you called a 'world class' person. If I were recruiting somebody to do that, I would like someone with a little more mental acumen. He wasn't stupid, but neither was he smart. If I were trying to find someone for a role like that, I wouldn't have picked LEE.
This researcher told Michael Paine that the most unrecognizable spy is the most dangerous. Michael Paine agreed, "Yeah, I'll go along with that. But OSWALD was pipsqueak." HEMMING told this researcher:
He wasn't a world class operator. He was just involved in world class deals. What are you going to do? Put a Rudolph Abel in on the U-2 dump? OSWALD'S in there because he was a turkey fucking patsy. Most of us are in there because we were on the turkey fucking way. When it's all over, it really don't make a difference, does it?
Marina Oswald told this researcher in 1994:
Maybe he supplied them with false information, and somebody else give the real information. Maybe they want to make a patsy out of him? I think somebody else sabotage U-2 plane, not LEE HARVEY OSWALD.
RICHARD E. SNYDER MEETS WITH
FRANCIS GARY POWERS FAMILY
EVIDENCE OF ANGLETON'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE U-2 DUMP
The U-2 was downed. Had the Soviets made advancements in their radar capabilities? Or had the CIA been penetrated? Or had a leak emanated from elsewhere? Logic dictated that CI/SIG and the Office of Security would lead the investigation into the U-2 flap, and that any honest CIA investigation would have had OSWALD as a suspect. The FBI reported:
No one knows what he told the Soviets about American radar. We know that when he tried to renounce his American citizenship in Moscow he stated he had volunteered to give the Soviets any information he had concerning the Marine Corps, intimating he might know something special. Later when he was applying in Moscow to reenter the United States, he said he had not given the Soviets any information about the Marines, but this was self-serving. He indicated to our Agents in an interview in 1962 that he never gave the Soviets information concerning his Marine Corps specialty in radar. [FBI 105082555-5640] ‘
OSWALD informed Richard E. Snyder that he had offered the Soviets radar information "including the specialty that he possessed." Edward Freers included this in his report on OSWALD that he cabled to Washington. As a result, State Department Headquarters sent the FBI a report on OSWALD, and the Bureau opened an inactive file on him. As stated, the same report was sent to the Office of Security of the CIA.
THE UNASKED QUESTIONS
In May 1960 the questions that ANGLETON and CI Staff should have asked were: "Has there been a report of anyone with access to the U-2's altitude offering this information to the Soviets?" ANGLETON could access his defector files in 1960; by that year all CIA files had been microfilmed and placed in an IBM computer specially-designed for CI. It was a machine records system. When a CIA agent wanted a particular item, he fed in 25 key words about the subject. The computer found the correct microfilmed document and photographed it with ultraviolet light. The tiny photograph was then projected on an Intellofax viewing machine; the whole thing took five seconds. The CIA microfilmed Richard E. Snyder's initial dispatch concerning OSWALD. Once it located OSWALD'S threat about radar, the next question to ask would have been, "Did he have access to the altitude of the U-2?" A simple check with the Navy would have indicated that, as a radar operator at Atsugi, he very well might have. Edward Petty reported that there was no CI/SIG file about the U-2 incident, yet after Francis Gary Powers returned to the U.S. a CIA Counter-Intelligence Officer was a witness at a Board of Inquiry hearing into the U-2 Affair. Why was there was no investigation by CI/SIG and ANGLETON? After the Kennedy assassination CI/SIG commented: "CIA does not investigate U.S. citizens abroad unless we are specifically requested to do so by some other government security agency. No such request was made in this case." [First Draft of Initial Report on OSWALD case Attachment to TX-1889] ANGLETON would never had waited for a green like from the investigative agency the CIA termed ODENVY before initiating and investigation, even of his own grandmother. HEMMING asked this researcher:
Where was damage control? The Soviets couldn't obtain this intelligence information, this means someone handed it to them. OS, and one other element, had across the board need-to-know about everything. Who's the top guy who can go anywhere and stick his nose into anything he wants to? ANGLETON. He would have insisted, 'We just got our damage control estimate. We just got our assessment. I don't think it's complete. I want to know about anyone on the periphery, mechanic, guard. I want everybody's name who saw the U-2, heard its sounds.' An enormous undertaking. Under that process people would have been on the lists who worked the radar sites. The trail leads right back to somebody who intentionally dumped the U-2, tried to cover it up.
OSWALD'S ACCESS TO U-2 INFORMATION
EUGENE J. HOBBS
FROM: S/A Berlin March 10, 1964
TO: OSI
SUBJECT: Eugene J. Hobbs, HMC, USN, Incident Report
At 12:40 p.m. this date Hobbs who serves as hospital corpsman in the USS Stone County (LST-1141) (San Diego based) visited the Pearl Harbor Branch Office to report information which he thought might be of interest to us, as follows.
Hobbs was stationed at the dispensary at Atsugi, Japan, NAS from 1956 to December 1957 or January 1956. According to a Life Magazine story recently printed, LEE HARVEY OSWALD, alleged assassin of our late President, was also stationed there at the same time. The magazine continued that OSWALD visited Russia in 1959. Atsugi is a closed base and at the time, was the base for the Joint Technical Advisory Group, which maintained and flew recon U-2 flights. Hobbs noted that one year after OSWALD visited Russia, Powers was captured. Hobbs stated it was gossip around the base that the U-2's were making reconnaissance flights over Russia. Sometime during 1957, a Naval Commander came into the dispensary and talked to some of the HMC's at the Master of Arms shack. The Commander stated he wanted an HMC to volunteer to join a group he was commanding which will be stationed in Bangkok and will make reconnaissance flights over China. One of the HMC's, name unknown, a short blonde headed Chief, eventually went with the unit to Bangkok and was there three months. The Commander stated that the flights would be the same as the ones the U-2's are making over Russia. Since it was common knowledge around the base that the U-2's were being utilized for recon flights, Hobbs now believes that OSWALD could have given that information to Russia. Stone County will be in this area for approximately two more months. [FBI 105-82555-3262]
THE FBI EXAMINES OSWALD'S MILITARY RECORD
The Navy sent Hobb's report to the FBI:
A review of OSWALD'S Marine Corps files discloses that in 1957 and 1958 he was stationed in Japan and had the address of Marine Air Control Squadron 1, Marine Air Group 11, First Marine Air Wing, FMF c/o FPO San Francisco, California. His weapons firing record discloses that in May 1958 he fired two courses on two different days at NAS, Atsugi, Japan.
One of OSWALD'S Marine Corps associates has advised that in August 1957 he and OSWALD were part of a 120 man overseas draft and OSWALD went to a Marine Corps base at Atsugi, Japan. Another of his former Marine Corps associates has stated that OSWALD was stationed at Atsugi, Japan, sometime in 1957 and 1958. Still another of OSWALD'S Marine Corps associates recalled that they left the United States on August 15, 1957, for Japan and OSWALD was assigned to Marine Air Control Squadron 1, Atsugi, Japan. In January 1958 this Squadron was at Cubi Point, Philippine Islands. This individual remembered that the gear of the Squadron was housed there in an airplane hanger which he says he now knows was the hanger for the U-2 airplane. A former Marine Corp Officer [also confirmed OSWALD'S presence at Atsugi].
As you know, OSWALD was discharged from the Marine Corps in September 1959, and shortly thereafter went to Russia, arriving there in October 1959. You may well wish to analyze Hobbs' information in the enclosure as well as that set forth above and conduct such further inquiry as you deem appropriate to determine what data about the U-2 program may have been available to OSWALD was a result of his Marine Corps assignments abroad. This Bureau would appreciate being advised of the results of your analysis and inquiry.
NOTE FOR SAC, DALLAS:
There is enclosed one copy of referenced ONI memo. This is being furnished for your information.
NOTE:
Letter is classified Confidential because it contains information about the U-2 program, including some from the enclosure which was so classified. Former Marines furnishing information about OSWALD'S assignments abroad were Owen Delanovich, Donald Peter Camarata, Donald Patrick Powers and William K. Trail. Since the U-2 program was primarily managed by the CIA, it is the proper Agency to handle this. Of course, even if it turns out OSWALD was assigned to a base from which U-2 airplanes were flying reconnaissance missions in 1957 and 1958 and could have had knowledge of this, which he may have given the Soviets when he went to Russia in October 1959, it is believed the Russians were aware of the U-2 flights several years before. Nevertheless, it should be run out. It is not felt it would be worthwhile to re-interview Hobbs since he possessed no direct information about OSWALD and since the information he furnished regarding the base at Atsugi was from 'gossip' he heard while stationed there. [FBI 105-82555-3262]
Owen Dejanovich, who became a professional football player, was contacted in 1993. He said he was with OSWALD at El Toro, Jacksonville and Biloxi, Mississippi, but not at Atsugi. The only other thing he would say was "I gave the FBI no information about the U-2." Owen Dejanovich told Frontline a different story:
There was a small business section across one bridge. We were allowed, as Americans, to go into that sector of the residential portion of Iwakuni. The other sector was considered to be communist, Japanese communists and it was an off-limits area.
Owen Dejanovich claimed OSWALD made pro-Communist remarks and was seen with a beautiful White Russian. Why didn't he report the presence of a subversive in the ranks of the Marine Corps to his commanding officer?
JOHN E. DONOVAN'S FAKE U-2 REPORT
ANGLETON ASSURES FBI OSWALD HAD NO ACCESS TO U-2 DATA
ANGLETON or members of his Staff drafted a reply to the FBI inquiry regarding OSWALD'S access to information regarding the U-2 and had Richard Helms sign it. [CSCI - 3/781,351] It assured the FBI OSWALD had no access to information on the U-2:
2. The Atsugi Naval Air Station is located approximately 35 miles south and west of Tokyo, Japan. At the time in question, Atsugi was a closed base in the sense that American and indigenous personnel entering the Station were required to possess official identification cards. Within the Station the flight line areas were restricted, as is the case of all such Stations, and certain hanger areas were further restricted for the performance of classified functions.
3. The Joint Technical Advisory Group occupied an area within the Station, consisting of 20 to 25 individual residences, two dormitories, an office area, a power plant, several Butler-type warehouses, and a club building used for recreation and a bachelor officer's mess. The Joint Technical Advisory Group area was not closed, but it was located about 400 yards from the main Station area and there was no occasion for the regularly assigned Station personnel to visit the Joint Technical Advisory Group area. The club was open only to Joint Technical Advisory Group personnel and their guests. Two of the living quarters were occupied by the Navy Commanding officer and his deputy because the quarters of Joint Technical Advisory Group were of better quality than the housing accommodations provided at the Station.
4. Joint Technical Advisory Group air activities were conducted from a classified hanger area at one end of the flight line. OSWALD did not have access to this area. Prior to the time in question, the Joint Technical Advisory Group had been publicized by Radio Peking as being a headquarters for American intelligence activity. For this reason, and because the Joint Technical Advisory Group was obviously not part of the Naval Station complement, there were rumors and gossip regarding the unit and its activities regarding the unit and its activities. This condition was regarded as normal under such circumstances. Being there at that time, OSWALD could have heard such gossip; however, there is no information to indicate, nor is there reason to believe, that he obtained factual knowledge regarding the Joint Technical Advisory Group and its mission. (For your information, an incident involving the landing of a U-2 in a rice paddy in Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan, was reported in the press and aroused some public interest. That incident, however, occurred in December 1959, which was some time after OSWALD left Japan).
5. There were no Navy personnel assigned to the Joint Technical Advisory Group. Moreover, the Joint Technical Advisory Group did not participate in, or transfer any of its activities to a Station in Bangkok. Regarding the statement by Hobbs that a Navy Commander was recruiting Navy Personnel for an assignment in Bangkok, it is noted that the Navy at that time was conducting certain air reconnaissance activity from Atsugi using other types of aircraft.
6. The following should be considered with respect to your source's assertions that OSWALD'S squadron was in Cubi Point, Philippines Islands, in January 1958 where it kept its gear in what the source now knows to have been a hanger for a U-2 airplane; and that the squadron was back in Atsugi, Japan in May 1958. The term "U-2" was not known publicly and did not gain worldwide notoriety until the ill-fated Powers mission some two years later. Therefore it is highly unlikely that the term "U-2" would have meant anything to OSWALD, even if he had heard it and had been able to identify the term with any aircraft at Cubi Point, at Atsugi or anywhere else.
7. To summarize: There is no evidence or indication that OSWALD had any association with or access to, the Joint Technical Advisory Group operation or its program in Japan. This applies also to information regarding the U-2 or its mission. Even if OSWALD has seen a U-2 aircraft at Atsugi or elsewhere, this fact would not have been considered unusual nor have constituted a breach of security. Limited public exposure of the craft itself -- but not of its nomenclature or mission -- was accepted as a necessary risk. It is most unlikely that OSWALD had the necessary prerequisites to differentiate between the U-2 and other aircraft engaged in classified missions which were similarly visible at Atsugi at the same time. [FBI 105-82555-3831]
The CIA assumed that OSWALD had some sort of physical contact with the U-2. The CIA admitted he was within close proximity of the Joint Technical Advisory Group at Atsugi. The CIA, however, did not address itself to the possibility that OSWALD became aware of the U-2 as a blip on a radar screen. But even if OSWALD did not have this contact he could have gotten the information he needed from ANGLETON and told the Russians it was from his experience as a radar operator. Not only was there evidence that OSWALD was aware of the U-2 at Atsugi, there was evidence that OSWALD observed Powers at Vladimis Prison.
EVIDENCE: THE LETTER TO ROBERT EDWARD OSWALD
OSWALD'S Historic Diary noted:
January 15, 1962 to February 15, 1962. Days of cold Russian winter. But we feel fine. Marina is supposed to have baby on March 1, 1962. Feb 15, 1962. Dawn. Marina wakes me up. Its her time. At 9:00 a.m. we arrive at the hospital. I leave her in care of nurses and leave to go to work. 10:00 a.m. Marina has a baby girl. When I vist hospital at 500 after work, I am given news. We both wanted a boy. Marina feels well, baby girl, O.K. February 23, 1962. Marina leaves hospital I see June for first time.
On February 15, 1962, OSWALD wrote this to Robert Edward Oswald, as see above: "I heard over the Voice of America that they released Francis Gary Powers the U-2 spy plane fellow. that's big news where you are, I suppose. He seemed to be a nice, bright, American-type fellow, when I saw him in Moscow."
The CIA commented:
The only period during which it would have been reasonably possible for OSWALD to have seen Francis Gary Powers in Moscow in person was between August 17, 1960 and August 19, 1960, when Francis Gary Powers was in Moscow, undergoing trial. There are no other indications that OSWALD was in Moscow after January 1960, so OSWALD'S statements remain unclarified.
If OSWALD did, in fact, see Francis Gary Powers during the trial, why had he waited almost 18 months before writing to his brother about it? Why hadn't OSWALD mentioned attending the Francis Gary Powers trial in his Historic Diary? [CIA 285] OSWALD'S remarked "he seemed to be a nice bright American-type fellow." This indicated OSWALD had observed Powers personally.
OSWALD WROTE LETTER AFTER POWERS VISITED MOSCOW
Another CIA document revealed:
Francis Gary Powers was in Moscow from May 1, 1960, to September 9, 1960, and again for less than a day on February 8, 1962, and February 9, 1962, just before his release. [OSWALD'S letter was postmarked February 15, 1962.] The most likely time for OSWALD to have seen Powers in person would have been during the period August 17, 1960 to August 19, 1960 when Powers was on public view during his trial and in the course of being transported to and from trial sessions. On February 8, 1962, Francis Gary Powers was brought into Moscow without publicity, and departed early the next morning. Since OSWALD is not known to have been in Moscow in August 1960, or February 1962, his statement that he saw Powers may have referred to a television or newsreel appearance. [CIA 285 2.15.62]
A third CIA document noted:
Francis Gary Powers was in Moscow...for less than a day on February 8, 1962 to February 9, 1962, just before his release. If OSWALD did see him and is not making up this story, or referring to a television appearance, he must have made another trip to Moscow which is completely unknown to us. The period from May 2 to May 19 the more likely, since Powers was not on public view (illegible) to and from trial sessions, whereas in February 1962 he [Powers] entered the city without fanfare and departed very early that next morning.
In another CIA document it was detailed:
February 8, 1962: At about 1:00 p.m., Powers arrived in Moscow from Vladimis Prison by train en route to his release. He was taken for the night to the prison in which he had been held in 1960. February 9, 1962: Powers left the prison in the early morning for an airfield (apparently a military field) whence he departed Moscow for Berlin and the U.S.
When Powers was first arrested he "noticed a cover over the outside of the peephole to my cell. The guards could look in whenever they chose; I couldn't look out." [Overflight pg. 107]
How did OSWALD know that Francis Gary Powers stopped in Moscow before he left the Soviet Union in February 1962? Marina Oswald told this researcher: "Number one, he would hear it on the Voice of America. LEE did not make secret journey if I was married to him. Only time, was I married to him then? February 1962. He did not make any secret journeys then. He was home everyday. Cause our daughter was born on February 15, 1962. So we stayed close everyday. He did not make secret journey to Moscow. I was in the hospital for a week until the 23rd. So I do not know, I cannot guess, if I wasn't home I cannot verify that. LEE was restricted to travel." Had KGB agents arranged for OSWALD to make a secret trip to Moscow to see the pilot he almost killed because he had supplied the information needed to shot down a U-2? Did OSWALD observe Powers through one-way glass in Vladimis Prison? The KGB knew OSWALD was going to re-defect, and wanted OSWALD to observe that Francis Gary Powers had been well-treated. They did not want OSWALD to denounce the Soviet Union after he left. Other re-defectors were forced to sign statements that they would not engage in anti-Soviet propaganda. [HSCA V12 p441; CIA 285, 300; Powers, B. Spy Wife Pyramid Books; Sanche de Gramont The Secret War Since WWII Putnam 1962 Ch. 9] Richard E. Snyder commented on this letter:
I can't imagine how he possibly could have...The only thing that comes to mind is that it this was a lot of hot air. No one from the Embassy ever saw Francis Gary Powers. They never let us have any contact with him. The only people who saw him at the time were his mother, father and wife. I don't think the lawyer got to see him.
EVIDENCE OF THE U-2 DUMP: OSWALD'S FEAR OF PROSECUTION
In February 1961 OSWALD wrote to the American Embassy, Moscow, about repatriation:
Dear Sir; since I have not received a reply to my letter of 1960, I am writing again asking that you consider my request for the return of my American passport. I desire to return to the United States that is if we could come to some agreement concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings against me. If so then I would be free to ask the Russian authorities to allow me to leave. If I could show them my American passport I am of the opinion they would give me an exit visa. They have at no time insisted that I take Russian citizenship.
With each subsequent letter to the Embassy, he reiterated this fear and demanded "full guarantees that I shall not, under any circumstances, be persecuted for any act pertaining to this case."
May 1961
In regard to your letter of March 24. I understand the reasons for the necessity of a personal interview at the Embassy, however, I wish to make it clear that I am asking not only for the right to return to the United States, but also for full guarantees that I shall not, under any circumstances, be persecuted for any act pertaining to this case. I made that clear from my first letter, although nothing has been said, even vaguely, concerning this in my correspondence with the Embassy. Unless you honestly think this condition can be met, I see no reason for continuance of our correspondence, instead I shall endeavor to use my relatives in the United States, to see about getting something done in Washington.
He repeated the theme to his brother on May 31, 1961, and wrote:
I can’t say wether I will ever get back to the States of not, if I can get the government to drop charges against me, and get the Russians to let me out with my then maybe I’ll be seeing you again. But" you know it is not simple for either of those two things. I am in touch with the American Embassy in Moscow so if anything comes up I’ll know.
In his next letter to Robert Edward Oswald, June 26, 1961 he wrote: "I assume the government must have a few charge's against me, since my coming here like that is illigle. But I really don't know exacly what charges."
On July 11, 1961 Snyder wrote this about his interview with OSWALD:
Oswald indicated some anxiety as to whether, should he return to the United States, he would face possible lengthy imprisonment for his act of remaining in the Soviet Union. Oswald was told informally that the Embassy did not perceive, on the basis of information in its possession, on what grounds he might be subject to conviction leading to punishment of such severity as he apparently had in mind. It was clearly stated to him, however, that the Embassy could give him no assurance as to whether upon his desired return to the United States he might be liable for prosecution for offenses committed in violation of laws of the United States or any of its States. Oswald said he understood this, He had simply felt that in his own interest he could not go back to the United States if it meant returning to a number of years in prison, and had delayed approaching the Soviet authorities concerning departing from the Soviet Union until he “had this end of the thing straightened out.”
In yet another letter he wrote in January 1962 he asked his brother: "You once said that you asked around about weather or not the U.S. government had any charges against me, you said at that time 'no', maybe you should ask around again, its possible now that the government knows I'm coming and will have something waiting." [ltr. 1.30.62]
BORIS KLOSSON
When OSWALD was interviewed at the American Embassy, Moscow, on July 11, 1961, Boris Klosson (born January 21, 1919; died 1990) questioned him about the statement "which he had made to the interviewing officer at the time of his first appearance at the Embassy on October 31, 1959, to the effect that he would willingly make available to the Soviet Union such information as he had acquired as a radar operator in the Marine Corps." OSWALD stated:
…he was never in fact subjected to any questioning or briefing by Soviet authorities concerning his life experiences prior to entering the Soviet Union and never provided such information to any Soviet organization. He stated he doubted in fact that he would have given such information if requested despite his statements made at the Embassy. OSWALD indicated some anxiety as to whether, should he return to the United States, he would face possible lengthy imprisonment for his act of remaining in the Soviet Union. OSWALD was told informally that the Embassy did not perceive, on the basis of the information in its possession, on what grounds he might be subject to conviction leading to punishment of such severity as he apparently had in mind. It was clearly stated to him, however, that the Embassy could give him no assurance as to whether upon his desire to return to the United States he might be liable to prosecution for offenses committed in violation of laws of the United States or any of its States. OSWALD said he understood this. He had simply felt that in his own interest he could not go back to the United States if it meant returning to a number of years in prison, and had delayed approaching Soviet authorities concerning departing from the Soviet Union until he "had this end of the thing straightened out. [WR p75; DOS 5.26.61 Ex. 19 294j; ltr. Lee to Robert 5.31.61, 6.26.61; For. Service Dispatch 7.11.61 - Klosson]
In 1943 the name and address of Boris Hansen Klosson appeared in the address book of Louise Morley, a suspected Soviet intelligence agent. During this time, Boris Klosson was attending a Russian language course "at a school being handled by the Office of Naval Intelligence." Boris Klosson survived the McCarthy era and in 1954 was State Department, Deputy Chief, Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe. In 1956 Boris Klosson became a Political Officer at the American Embassy, Moscow. He was not listed in Who's Who in the CIA. On September 8, 1964, Yuri Nosenko reviewed the entire Moscow Diplomatic List for 1959: "Klosson, Boris H. Source has reported earlier concerning Klosson; that he was considered to have been the CIA resident. The case officer working against him was Valentin Mikraylov."
OSWALD was afraid he was going to be prosecuted for giving the Soviets the information they needed to shoot down the U-2. OSWALD had been given a little speech by ANGLETON that the CIA would not come to his aid if his deed were exposed. It would deny any connection with him. OSWALD thought Justice Department might go after OSWALD because it was unaware of his connection to ANGLETON and the Central Intelligence Agency.
EVIDENCE: APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL OF PASSPORT
THE STATE DEPARTMENT
THE HAVES and HAVE-NOTS
On July 10, 1961, while he was at the American Embassy, Moscow, OSWALD signed an Application for Renewal of Passport which contained a printed statement whereby, by crossing out either the word 'have' or the words 'have not,' the applicant could indicate whether he had committed one or more or the disloyal or possibly expatriating acts listed. The printed statement also provided that if the applicant indicates that he committed one or more of these acts, a supplementary statement under oath explaining the circumstances is to be attached to the application. By crossing out the appropriate words, LEE HARVEY OSWALD stated under oath that he had committed one or more of the disloyal or possibly expatriating acts listed on the application.
RICHARD E. SNYDER
The Warren Commission questioned Richard E. Snyder about this:
Coleman: This is the application for the passport renewal which OSWALD signed -
Dulles: For the American passport to return to the United States?
Snyder: It says, "I have - have not - been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state; taken an oath or made an affirmation or other declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; entered or served in the armed forces of a foreign state; accepted, served in or performed the duties of, any office, post or employment under the government of foreign state or political subdivision thereof; voted in a political election in a foreign state or participated in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; made a formal renunciation of nationality, either in the United States or before or before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state; been convicted by court martial of deserting the military, air or navel service of the United States in time of war or of committing any act of treason against, or of attempting by force to overthrow, or of bearing arms against the United States; or departed or remained outside the jurisdiction of the United States for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the military, air or naval forces of the United States. If any of the above acts are or conditions are applicable to the applicant's case, or to the case of any person included in this application, a supplementary statement under oath should be attached and made a part hereof."
Coleman: Mr. Snyder, as I read the application, what you did was to cross out the "have not" which means that OSWALD was stating that he had done one of those acts which you have read, is that correct?
Snyder: This is what it would mean.
Coleman: Which one of the various acts that you have read was it your impression that OSWALD was admitting that he had done?
Snyder: Well, there are two possibilities here. One possibility is that the crossing out of "have not" is a clerical error, and that he did not intend to do this.
Coleman: How could that be a possibility? Don't you pretty much negate that possibility by the fact that you did require him to fill out the questionnaire which only has to be filled out if he admits he has done one of the various acts?
Snyder: No; the questionnaire is filled out routinely in Moscow in any kind of problem case.
Coleman: Even though the citizen has done none of the acts which are set forth in the passport renewal application?
Snyder: Yes; well I say in a problem case. I don't mean an American citizen coming in to get his passport renewed, on whom there is no presumption of any problem at all. But a person who has resided in the Soviet Union -
Coleman: Is it your testimony this is only a typographical error?
Snyder: This is one possibility. The other possibility is that he may have said, "I have taken an oath or made an affirmation or formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state." He had, on several occasions, you know, stated that his allegiance was to the Soviet Union. He may have put this down - that is he may have said "have," having that act in mind, knowing that I knew it, and that there was no need to attempt to hide the fact. This is possible.
Coleman: Do you now recall what reaction you had in mind when you received the application that had been crossed out in such a way that indicated that he was admitting that he had done one of the various acts which are set forth on the form?
Snyder: No, I don't. Of course what I would have been concerned with at the time in more detail really is the questionnaire, which is an expansion of this paragraph and is much more meaningful. So I would have been concerned both with what he said on the questionnaire and with the facts of his case whether he thought he committed one of these acts is not material to the fact of whether he had committed it or whether he lost his citizenship thereby. At any rate, my attention would have been directed to the expanded questionnaire in which he had to fill out individual paragraphs concerning each one of these things, and to a determination of the facts in the case.
Dulles: Do recall whether or not that striking out was noted at the time the passport application or extension was considered?
Snyder: I do not Mr. Dulles, no.
THE WARREN REPORT
The renewal application contained a printed statement which set forth, in the disjunctive, a series of acts, which, if committed by the applicant, would either automatically disqualify him from receiving a passport on the ground that he had lost his American citizenship, or would raise a question whether he might be so disqualified. The printed statement was preceded by two phrases, 'have' and 'have not,' the first phrase being printed directly above the second. One carbon copy of the application indicates OSWALD signed the document after the second phrase, 'have not' had been typed over, thereby apparently admitting that he had committed one of more of the acts which would a least raise a question as to whether he had expatriated himself. Snyder was not able to remember with certainty to which of the acts listed on the statement OSWALD'S mark was intended to refer, but believed it may have been 'swearing allegiance to a foreign state.' He points out the strike out of 'have not' may also have been a clerical error. On the actual signed copy of the application kept in the files of the Moscow Embassy, which is not a carbon copy of the copy sent to the State Department, the strike out is slightly above the 'have;' therefore, since the 'have' is itself printed above the 'have not,' the strikeout may have been intended to obliterate the 'have.' In any event, OSWALD filled out the supplementary questionnaire which was required to be completed if the applicant admitted he had performed one or more of the expatriating acts. He signed the questionnaire under oath.
POSNER
Some question why Snyder approved OSWALD based upon his answers on the carbon copy of the questionnaire. At the bottom of the form, four acts were listed that would indicate a person had forfeited his American citizenship. All were prohibitions related to actions in a foreign state, including swearing allegiance, serving in the armed forces or government, or voting in an election. Next to these prohibitions were the words have or have not. On OSWALD's form, have not was apparently stricken, indicating he had committed one or more of the prescribed (sic) acts. In approving OSWALD, therefore, it appeared that Snyder had bent the rules. The real explanation is more mundane - a typing error. On the original, the strikeout is between the have and have not, and only on the carbon is it directly over the have not (WC Vol. V, pp. 359 -360). But in any case, Snyder had OSWALD fill out a supplementary questionnaire and his more detailed answers showed that he had not violated any of the disqualifications.
THE WARREN REPORT V. POSNER
The Warren Report: "On the actual signed copy of the application kept in the files of the Moscow Embassy, which is not a carbon copy of the copy sent to the State Department, the strike out is slightly above the 'have;' therefore, since the 'have' is itself printed above the 'have not,' the strikeout may have been intended to obliterate the 'have.'"
Posner: "On the original, the strikeout is between the have and have not, and only on the carbon is it directly over the have not."
This is Warren Commission Exhibit CE 947.
OSWALD believed he went to Russia on a mission approved by the CIA and committed "treason" at the behest of that Agency. OSWALD believed he, in one sense, had committed treason, but in another sense he had performed a patriotic act on behalf of his country. OSWALD had expressed fear that he would be prosecuted in the United States for acts connected with his defection. The section that OSWALD had in mind dealt with treason, not his declaration of allegiance to the Soviet Union: OSWALD knew that he had never formally renounced his American citizenship in front of a State Department Consular official nor had he filled out the State Department's official form which was required in these cases, so that he could not be disqualified from renewing his passport because of having made "a formal renunciation of nationality, either in the United States or before or before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state." Snyder thought OSWALD'S having told him he had committed an act which would disqualify him from renewing his passport had to do with OSWALD'S informal pledge of loyalty to the Soviet Union - a statement that clearly fell within the bounds of free speech. Snyder knew that OSWALD never returned to the Embassy to sign the formal renunciation papers. He knew that OSWALD knew this too. Then why didn't Snyder make it a point to ask OSWALD which act OSWALD believed he had committed so he could make a notation of it on the form?
By the time OSWALD filled out the questionnaire he realized if he wished to return to the United States he would have to explain to Snyder about his CIA connections or he would have to commit perjury. His response to this question changed. This should have further alerted Snyder.
As to where the XXX's were on the original form versus the carbon - this was irrelevant because Snyder was typing up the form as he was asking OSWALD the various questions. It was not OSWALD who typed the form. And Snyder heard OSWALD say "have" and Snyder typed it in and then Snyder asked OSWALD to fill out a supplementary questionnaire, because he heard the word "have" and remembered it no matter where the XXX's were on the application.
Richard E. Snyder commented,
Defection is really a loaded word. Any American citizen can leave his country for any other country. You do not need anyone's permission. There's no crime committed there. I presume he just didn't know. He may have had reason in his own mind to be worried about the statement that he would make available to the Soviets what he learned of radar. That I could imagine. It may have disturbed him that he didn't know what the law was and he might have imagined that he would be held for it.
It was suggested to Richard E. Snyder that the only way he would be worried was if, in fact, he had given the Soviets secret information. He commented: "Yes, but I have no idea what the law is on that."
EVIDENCE: OSWALD'S RUSSIAN DICTIONARY
The Miami Herald reported: "The only possession of LEE HARVEY OSWALD not confiscated by government agents at the John F. Kennedy assassination was an English, Russian dictionary in which numerous words were marked or copied including a phrase meaning "to hit or kill at a distance." It hasn't been checked out for microdots, or anything," said former sheriff's chief Deputy John Cullins. He was given the book by OSWALD'S widow, Marina Porter. Marina confirmed the dictionary belonged to her late husband and that the handwriting and markings in the book were his. She said she could not understand why government agents did not notice it when they descended upon the couple’s residence after the assassination. She said she did not look in the book or notice the emphasized or hand-written practice words until Cullins asked her to translate them. Among the emphasized words were "radar" and "range" "eject" and "razor." "Radar locator" is written in OSWALD'S handwriting and a definition of "range" is underlined before being rewritten in Russian. The Russian phrase, Marina said, means: "To beat, hit kill at a definite distance." Another translation means to kill or slaughter, like an animal. Cullins said, "I think it was a resume or information on his part that he was preparing to give up to someone who spoke or read Russian. I see no other reason he would look things up in English and practice them in Russian." [Miami Herald 8.9.81] Marina Oswald told this researcher in 1994: "I gave the dictionary to John Cullins who tried to make money off the whole thing. This was the only time he was friend."
EVIDENCE: OSWALD'S CRYPTIC NOTE
During OSWALD'S voyage to the United States in 1962, he made the following notation:
as for the fee of $_________I was supposed to recive for this________I refuse it. I made pretense to except it only because otherwise I would have been considered a crack pot and not allowed to appear to express my views. after all who would refuse money?!?
OSWALD deliberately left the blank spaces, indicated by pen strokes. The first blank was difficult to fill in. How much money OSWALD received was a mystery; however, the dollar sign indicated the payment had not been made in rubles. Since OSWALD'S Red Cross subsidy was paid to him in rubles, this paragraph referred to another payment. OSWALD:
Whene I first went to Russia I the winter of 1959 my funds were very limited, so after a certain time, after the Russians had assured themselfs that I was really the naive american who beliyved in communism, they arranged for me to recive a certain amount of money every month. OK it came technically through the Red Cross as finical help to a Roos polical immigrate but it was arranged by the M.V.D.. I told myself it was simply because I was broke and everybody knew it. I accepted the money because I was hungry and there were several inches of snow on the ground in Moscow at the time but what it really was payment for my denuciation of the U.S. in Moscow in November 1956 and a clear promise that for as long as I lived in the USSR life would be very good I didn't relize all this, of course, for almost two years. [WCE 25]
The second blank made sense when the word "information" was placed in it. [WCE 25 p2B p122 of Vol.] Note that when Yuri Nosenko first approached the American Embassy, Geneva, he offered to sell information to the CIA for 900 Swiss francs. Later he admitted inventing this story; "He said he feared that an offer to give away information would be rejected as a provocation..." [Wise, Molehunt p68] Marina Oswald told this interviewer: "Maybe he make blank line because he forget amount."
EVIDENCE: POWERS BELIEVED OSWALD WAS RESPONSIBLE
In 1970 Francis Gary Powers wrote in Overflight that he believed OSWALD'S defection was related to his being shot down: "OSWALD'S familiarity with MPS 16 height-finding radar gear and radio codes (the latter were changed following his defection) are mentioned in the testimony of John E. Donovan a former first lieutenant assigned to the same El Toro radar unit as OSWALD on page 298 of Volume 8 of the Warren Commission Hearings. According to Donovan:
OSWALD has access to the location of all bases in the west coast area, all radio frequencies for all squadrons, all tactical call signs, and the relative strength of all squadrons, number and type of aircraft in each squadron, who was the commanding officer, the authentification code of entering and exiting the ADIZ, which stands for Air Defense Identification Zone. He knew the range of our radar. He knew the range of our radio. And he knew the range of the surrounding unit's radio and radar. OSWALD'S conversation with Snyder is mentioned at least three times in the Warren Report: "OSWALD told [Snyder] that he had already offered a Soviet official what he had learned as a radar operator in the Marines. [Overflight pg. 358]
The FBI reported: "News media report Powers has theorized LEE HARVEY OSWALD gave the Soviets radar secrets and information as to U-2's altitude capacity."
EVIDENCE: VLADIMIR SEMICHASTNY
Vladimir Semichastny told Frontline: "There were conversations, but this was such outdated information, the kind we say the sparrows have already chirped to the entire world, and now OSWALD tells us about it. Not the kind of information that would interest such a high level organization such as ours." Scott Malone confirmed that this information dealt with the U-2, but claimed that OSWALD supplied it after the U-2 had been shot down. Vladimir Semichastny: "We already had better sources of information. We had the plane and the pilot." [Interview with W. S. Malone]
FRANCIS GARY POWERS’ RELEASE
Francis Gary Powers was given a ten-year prison sentence by the Soviets. The name of the prosecutor at Powers' trial was Roman Andreyevich Rudenko. The name Aleksandr Rudenchek was found in OSWALD'S address book with the notation, teacher, next to it. Francis Gary Powers could have received the death penalty. He was well treated in prison. Eventually, former OSS General Counsel James B. Donovan (died January 20, 1970), who had defended GRU Colonel Rudolph Abel, arranged for Francis Gary Powers to be exchanged for Rudolph Abel. Rudolf Abel had been an illegal agent stationed in the United States. ANGLETON had helped develop the trail that led to Rudolf Abel. This was a poor trade for America - a master spy exchanged for a mere CIA contractual employee. United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy opposed the trade. He anticipated that when Francis Gary Powers returned to the United States he would be tried for treason. Francis Gary Powers' behavior in the Soviet Union became the focus of much criticism. The CIA set up a board of inquiry headed by retired Federal Appeals Court Judge E. Barrett Prettyman. In the summer of 1962 James B. Donovan and E. Barrett Prettyman negotiated with the Castro Government for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. Hearings were held in CIA Headquarters, and Francis Gary Powers was cleared of any wrongdoing.
The only evidence received by the Board which directly conflicted with Powers' account was part of a report based on (deleted). Some of these (deleted) indicated that the Soviets thought the flight of the U-2 had continued at the same altitude beyond the point where Francis Gary Powers claimed it fell, that it then descended to a lower altitude, and then it charged its course by turning in a broad circle back to the neighborhood of Sverdlovsk and disappeared from the observation of the trackers sine 35 minutes later. The activities which culminate in a (deleted). In the course of the presentation of the evidence to the Board the obvious possibility of confusion and error was pointed out; indeed at least one dramatic incident of error due to confusion was explained to the Board in detail. Of course this operation of the American intelligence system is invaluable. But the Board is of the opinion that it cannot make a flat assumption of accuracy in these (Deleted) so as to invalidate all other evidence concerning the occurrence of the incident. It is the conclusion of the Board that the evidence establishes overwhelmingly that Power's account was a truthful account.
Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, personally congratulated Francis Gary Powers. Francis Gary Powers divorced his wife, who had once been the Subject of a complaint by Richard Bissell, and he married a CIA psychologist. He was hired as a test pilot for Lockheed Aviation, which produced the U-2. In June 1977 an attempt was made by this researcher to locate Francis Gary Powers.
THE DEATH OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS
On August 1, 1977, Francis Gary Powers was killed when the traffic helicopter he was flying for a Los Angeles radio station ran out of fuel. The New York Times reported: "The 47 year old aviator, who had survived the downing of his U-2 over the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk on May 1, 1960, died when he Bell Jet Ranger helicopter crashed near a Little League baseball field in the San Fernando Valley suburb of Encino. George Spears, a cameraman for the television station KNBC, also died. The initial indications were that the helicopter had run out of fuel. James Turner, an official of the Federal Aviation Administration control tower at Van Nuys had received a message from an unidentified helicopter pilot at 12:36. The pilot said he was low on fuel and was granted approval for an expedited, direct approach to the airport. Francis Gary Powers crashed at 12:38 p.m. An official of KNBC checked in by radio with his supervisors at the station at about 12:25 p.m. said he was returning to Van Nys for fuel and asked what his next assignment would be. He was told he would probably be assigned to cover another brush fire near Los Angeles this afternoon. Station officials said he mentioned nothing about being short of fuel. One witness told a fireman that the tail rotor of the helicopter fell off before the crash, but this was not immediately confirmed." Powers had worked for KNBC for nine months. The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the crash, and determined that it was a case of too long a flight with too little fuel, because it found the tank and fuel lines totally empty. The National Transportation Safety Board never examined the instruments (which were largely intact) to determine whether the readings they registered to Francis Gary Powers were accurate. [NTSB Powers Rep.; NYT 8.2.77; Ross & Wise Inv. Gov. p226]
There was something suspicious about the death of Francis Gary Powers. For someone who criss-crossed the Soviet Union numerous times to die in a helicopter crash of this nature strains my credulity.
YURI NOSENKO, OSWALD AND THE U-2
In 1964 Yuri Nosenko was asked: "Wouldn't you have connected OSWALD'S coming from Finland with Anatoliy Golitsyn?"
A. No, no. It is not unusual.
Q. Why didn't the KGB fully debrief OSWALD on the U.S. Marine Corps, and particularly such things as American radar installations in Japan?
A. I think they didn't even know that he had been in Japan.
Q. Why didn't they find out? Ask him?
A. Nobody will go to speak to a person who is not normal. The KGB is frightened.
Q. What do you mean, frightened? That is the job of the KGB.
A. I don't mean frightened that way. The KGB is frightened because to talk to somebody like this, to get involved with him, will result in a big headache
Q. Didn't anybody ever sit down with this man and get his full biographic data? Ask him to write his life history, every place he ever lived, worked, everything he has done. If he was in the military service, when, what, where, everything?
A. Never. Nobody did.
Q. I can't believe it...This man could have spent five years of his life working for American intelligence. Maybe all the time he was in the Marines he was working with intelligence. And the KGB wouldn't know about it?
A. It wasn't done. He was never spoken to by any KGB officer in Moscow or Minsk.
The HSCA asked Yuri Nosenko: “Would the Soviet Union be interested in someone who was in the military and worked with radar equipment?"
A. It depends. If he was a corporal, private, no big interest. If he was an officer maybe they be interested.
Q. The fact that he worked with the equipment wouldn't be enough; they would want to know what his rank was?
A. No sir, it is not enough because they had sources.
Q. And in 1959 would the Soviet Union have been interested in someone who served as a radar operator on an air base where the U-2's took off and landed?
A. Yes, sir, it would be very interested.
Q. Is it your testimony that LEE HARVEY OSWALD, who had been a radar operator, and had worked on base from where the U-2 took off and landed, that he wasn't even interesting enough for the KGB to speak to him, to find out if he knew any of this information?
A. Mr. Klein, I understand your position, but we didn't know he had any connection with the U-2 flights. That is one thing.
The HSCA questioned Soviet Russia Division Chief, David Murphy, about Yuri Nosenko:
I did not believe that it would be possible for the Soviet Intelligence Services to have remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959 in Moscow of a former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an active U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange.
Defector Peter Deryabin opined:
It is evident in the supplementary materials that even in his early meetings with U.S. Embassy personnel, OSWALD was ready to give any information on the Marines, etc. (including some 'special' type of information) to the Soviets; then why does the [CIA's] chronology apparently try to whitewash OSWALD by saying: 'When asked about his statement on October 1959 to the effect that he would willingly make available to the USSR that he had acquired as a radar operator for the Marine Corps, OSWALD replied that he had never been questioned and doubted he would have given such information if asked...It is the opinion of the undersigned that this whole paper was written in OSWALD'S defense.
THE NOSENKO INCUBUS
One of the most puzzling mysteries surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy revolved around the question of Yuri Nosenko's defection and bona fides. A CIA Staff member commented: “Once Nosenko is exposed as a KGB plant there will arise the danger that his information will be mirror read." Edward Petty:
The only time OSWALD became of really serious interest to CI/SIG was after the assassination. Nosenko came over claiming that he had seen the KGB's OSWALD file. He came over at precisely the right time, he defected within about 60 days of the Kennedy assassination. And so here you have a really fascinating coincidence; a KGBnik coming in with precisely the information needed about OSWALD at that particular time.
Yuri Nosenko claimed OSWALD had no connection or contact with the KGB. Had Nosenko been dispatched by Moscow to cover up OSWALD'S contact with the KGB during the U-2 dump? Or was he bona fide and telling what he knew about OSWALD? Was he bona fide and lying about OSWALD? Or, as Edward Petty suggested, was he exposed to limited information on OSWALD then spooked into defecting?
GENEVA
Yuri Nosenko was born in the USSR in 1927, to Bolshevik parents. His father would become Nikita Khrushchev's Minister of Shipbuilding. Yuri Nosenko was a dedicated Communist. At age 18 he entered the International Relations Institute in Moscow. Upon graduation in 1951, he claimed he joined Soviet Naval Intelligence. By 1953 he was a KGB agent. On June 5, 1962, while serving as a KGB Security Officer in Geneva, Yuri Nosenko approached the CIA for money and agreed to act as an agent-in-place. The CIA:
A current review of [Nosenko's] statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962 indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of Nosenko...Nosenko, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many statements which, in retrospect, were impossible and the investigation of which could only have raised certain questions concerning Nosenko:
(A) Nosenko claimed he personally was with Oleg M. Gribanov, Chief of SCD, during the recruitment pitch to (deleted). This was a lie and an interview with (deleted) with display of photograph would have disclosed that Nosenko did not participate.
(B) Nosenko was involved in the recruitment approach to Russell Langelle. This was a lie and Langelle was available for interview.
(C) Nosenko said he recruited (deleted) in Bulgaria. Actually Nosenko never met (deleted)."
NOSENKO VERSUS GOLITSYN
The CIA went on to list four other examples of Nosenko's lies, then stated: "In 1962 to 1963 a number of similarities were noted between information furnished by Nosenko and information which had been furnished by Anatoliy Golitsyn prior to June 1962. These similarities were quite striking and gave rise to certain suspicions of Nosenko because he provided information which the KGB already considered compromised as a result of the defection of Anatoliy Golitsyn. Certain of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of Nosenko being a dispatched agent. (A) Both furnished information in regard to (deleted)." The CIA supplied four more examples of KGB operations compromised by Anatoliy Golitsyn and mentioned by Nosenko. One of these dealt with the audio operations against the American Embassy. Anatoliy Golitsyn had previously supplied the CIA with this information.
Certain information supplied by Yuri Nosenko conflicted with information supplied by Anatoliy Golitsyn. For example, Anatoliy Golitsyn mentioned the attempted recruitment of an American Embassy, Moscow, code clerk during a train ride to Helsinki: "Yuri Nosenko, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the November 1960 trip of Kosolapov to and from Helsinki. His lack of knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities such as his trip to Cuba in November to December 1960."
Yuri Nosenko returned to the USSR, but being in the Second Chief Directorate, he said he knew the degree of coverage there was in Moscow and refused to have contact with the CIA there. He was sent back to Geneva in January 1964 for another disarmament conference. There, he told the CIA he wanted to defect to the West because he had received a recall telegram from Moscow. He later retracted this, and said that he invented it, because he was afraid the CIA would not let him defect. [Nosenko interview with Posner] Edward Petty: "I think Bagley got him to admit that he never got such a telegram."
YURI NOSENKO'S 1964 OSWALD STORY
Yuri Nosenko told the CIA he had helped manage the 1959 OSWALD defection case, when he was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department and that OSWALD'S visa application in Helsinki was handled by Pereletov who had been in "the KGB's 2nd Department in Leningrad, and there he was dealing with tourists." Yuri Nosenko then stated: “KGB had no interest in OSWALD...OSWALD was regarded as mentally unstable." This was based on a report furnished to him and his associate Krupnov (Kim Georgiyevich) by Rimma Sherakova "who was an agent or operational contact of his." Yuri Nosenko mentioned Chelnokov, Gribanov, Bobkov, Sergey Mikhaylovich and Konstantin Nikitovich in connection with the OSWALD case. Yuri Nosenko:
There was no personal interview of OSWALD by KGB and no further attempt to establish his bona fides...No consideration was given to his possible KGB operational potential...There was, of course, the consideration that OSWALD might be an American Intelligence Agent, but no unusual measures were taken to investigate this possibility...without referral to higher authority, I decreed OSWALD should not be allowed to stay in Soviet Union.
Yuri Nosenko implied that the request was not referred to the "CPSU or to any other Soviet Government agency." Yuri Nosenko stated that OSWALD had been advised at 9:00 a.m. on the morning of his suicide attempt that he would have to leave Russia:
Then he slashes his wrist at 10:00 a.m. The people at the hotel broke down the door to OSWALD'S hotel room and found him bleeding to death. And it is decided this kind of man would not be used by American intelligence. The KGB washed its hands of him...The KGB didn't want him in the Soviet Union and considered OSWALD as being not completely normal and not really very intelligent...After the suicide attempt, there was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because he was not an interesting person and was not normal...he was such a low level person that it was not thought that he would have information of value.
Then the Soviet authorities decided to allow him to stay. The KGB had no choice. They must look on him. We didn't ask the 1st Department or the FCD because he is not an interesting person and is not normal. There were no microphones in any of OSWALD'S hotel rooms. It was not felt that he was of sufficient importance to justify the use of such techniques against him...We were getting no information. There were no such reports in the file...there was no record in the file that OSWALD had ever offered to give information on the U.S. Marine Corps or any matters to the Soviets...There was no physical or technical surveillance of OSWALD while he lived in Minsk. The OSWALD'S mail was monitored, but revealed nothing of interest." After the assassination, Yuri Nosenko, still in Moscow, was read a summary of OSWALD'S KGB file that concluded with the statement that in Minsk the KGB had attempted "to influence OSWALD in the right direction.
Yuri Nosenko had also been present when OSWALD'S September 1963 request for a visa to the Soviet Union was denied, along with Turalin, Alekseyev, Chelnokov and Kovalenko. After the assassination, all KGB files from Minsk about OSWALD were flown to Moscow where it was discovered by Yuri Nosenko that the Minsk KGB had not taken any action with respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from headquarters. Yuri Nosenko claimed repeatedly that the KGB had no contact with OSWALD whatsoever. OSWALD was never questioned about his past nor asked to write an autobiography.
THE CASE FOR YURI NOSENKO BEING DISPATCHED
TENNENT BAGLEY
In the U.S., Yuri Nosenko was handled by Tennent Harrington Bagley who discovered lies in Yuri Nosenko's story. Tennent Bagley was born in Annapolis, Maryland, on November 11, 1925, and came from a prominent Navy family. He served in World War II for three years in the U.S. Marine Corps then attended the University of Geneva, Switzerland, where he received a doctorate in political science. He served in the CIA from 1950 on, where he specialized in Soviet operations. After serving as a Case Officer in Austria, he was assigned to Switzerland in 1960. He'd known ANGLETON since 1961. From 1960 to 1962 Tennent Bagley was Deputy Chief, Soviet Russia, Clandestine Activities Section. Tennent Bagley, 37, held this position at the time of Yuri Nosenko's first Agency-contact in Geneva in 1962. In 1962 he became head of a section responsible for counter-intelligence against the Soviet intelligence services. In 1965 or 1966, he became Deputy Chief, Soviet Russia Division. He went to Europe as Brussels Chief of Station in 1967, and retired there in 1972. The HSCA called him as a witness. Tennent Bagley was convinced Yuri Nosenko was bogus for the following reasons:
(1) The CIA was unbelievably lucky to have found him. Tennent Bagley added, "the key word in that last sentence is 'unbelievably.'"
(2) There were contradictions in Yuri Nosenko's testimony that could not be explained by Yuri Nosenko's personality flaws or memory. According to Tennent Bagley, when he reviewed OSWALD'S KGB file, "Nosenko was already a willing secret collaborator of the CIA. Therefore he must have been alert when dealing with this matter of such obvious importance to the United States and to his own country...Nosenko told us some of these events only 10 weeks after they happened, so there wasn't time for them to become dim in his memory."
(3) "Ten years removed from this case I can still remember at least 20 clear cases of Nosenko's lying about KGB activity and about the career which gave him authority to tell of it..."
(4) The cases Nosenko revealed for the first time were useless.
Tennent Bagley believed that the KGB had interviewed OSWALD:
(5) Here was a young American, LEE HARVEY OSWALD, just out of the Marine Corps, already inside the USSR and going to great lengths to stay there and become a citizen. The KGB never bothered to talk to him, not even once, not even to get an idea whether he might be a CIA plant. Can this be true? Could we all be wrong in what we've heard about rigid Soviet security precautions and about their strict procedures and disciplines...? Of course not.
(6) Yuri Nosenko gave the CIA the location of several microphones in the American Embassy, Moscow. Tennent Bagley stated Anatoliy Golitsyn had given CIA the same information six months previous. Yuri Nosenko produced a list of microphones in the American Embassy, Moscow, from 1960 to 1961. He said, at great risk, he kept this document in a KGB safe he shared with two subordinates. Yuri Nosenko never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of this list until 1964, when he produced it for the CIA in Geneva.
Anatoliy Golitsyn had provided, in the first months after his defection, information that led to: "the final uncovering of Kim Philby; to the first detection of several important penetrations of European governments; and pointers to serious penetrations of the United States Government.
Tennent Bagley stated that Yuri Nosenko's information had all been previously compromised, citing the case of William John Vassall, an exposed KGB agent in the British Admiralty. Yuri Nosenko:
The KGB has now (1962) an agent in a high government position in London who provides most valuable information, some from NATO intelligence service conferences. The agent was recruited in Moscow in 1956 or 1957 on the basis of a homosexual compromise. After leaving Moscow he became an assistant to the Minister, or something like that, in the Admiralty. Yuri Nosenko learned of the agent's existence, not his identity. Anatoliy Golitsyn had earlier provided a lead to a KGB agent who was the source of Admiralty documents which Anatoliy Golitsyn had reviewed in KGB Headquarters. On the basis of that lead, British security authorities on June 11, 1962, passed to CIA a list of 20 suspects, including William John Vassall.
The Chief of Soviet Research, Counter-Intelligence, commented:
Yuri Nosenko is a KGB plant and may be publicly exposed as such sometime. The Agency's greatest contribution to the resolution of the questions at hand would be to break Yuri Nosenko and get the full story of how and why he was told to tell the story he did about OSWALD. [CIA FOIA 02911 7.28.64]
Tennent Bagley described himself as the principal opponent of Yuri Nosenko. The CIA produced "some penciled jotting...left carelessly in a highly secret file folder" in Tennent Bagley's handwriting which suggested "liquidation, drugging, or confinement in mental institutions" as means of breaking Yuri Nosenko. Tennent Bagley: "The fact that 'liquidation' was included revealed that they [the notes] were theoretical." In a lengthy, top secret report released in 1994, [CIA TS No. 197124] Tennent Bagley stated:
Yuri Nosenko did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed. Yuri Nosenko did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed. Yuri Nosenko did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953 to 1955 period as he claimed. During the period 1955 to 1960 he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, American/British Commonwealth Section. Yuri Nosenko was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961 to 1962. The contradictions in Yuri Nosenko's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. Given the conclusion that Nosenko is not a bona fide defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he has given..." Reasonable explanations advanced for Nosenko's misrepresentations ranged from "swindler posing as former KGB agent" to "mental case" to "dispatched KGB agent."
Tennent Bagley: "Nosenko is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to information, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that Nosenko was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all these anomalies, none of them renders it untenable."
ANGLETON believed Nosenko was dispatched. He knew Nosenko was lying about OSWALD'S KGB connection, because he had used OSWALD in the U-2 dump, and he knew the KGB officers with whom OSWALD had contact. ANGLETON stated: "This agency has no information that would corroborate or disprove Nosenko's statements regarding OSWALD." [CIA Memo: ANGLETON to Hoover 4.28.64] Other CIA staffers, who were unaware of OSWALD'S connection to ANGLETON, concluded, for different reasons, that if Yuri Nosenko was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpose or mission…
…the nature of which has been, and continues to be, unknown...The theory has also been considered that Nosenko could have been dispatched to confuse and divert American Intelligence and thus protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United States Government, particularly the CIA. This is a theory which has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information that high-level KGB penetrations do, or do not, exist.
PRIMARY FACTORS INDICATING NOSKENO DISPATCHED
Yuri Nosenko was a liar. Yuri Nosenko admitted lying about needing money and about the recall cable. Yuri Nosenko claimed he was a KGB Lieutenant Colonel. The CIA could not verify this. In 1992 Yuri Nosenko told Gerald Posner that "his appointment was still in the process of being approved, yet his travel document did say he was a lieutenant colonel." [Case Closed, p39]
Oleg Nechiporenko named different people than Yuri Nosenko in relation to OSWALD in 1959: Aleksandr Perepelitsyn, V. Vysotin. He also said different people handled OSWALD'S September 1963, visa request: Dryakhlov, Vlasov, Bannikov. Yuri Nosenko said OSWALD had no KGB contact, Oleg Nechiporenko said he did. Nonetheless, Oleg Nechiporenko stated that Yuri Nosenko was genuine, and the KGB had sentenced him to death.
Yuri Nosenko had the time of OSWALD'S suicide wrong. Yuri Nosenko said OSWALD'S hotel room was not bugged. Not only was it bugged, there was a camera in it. Yuri Nosenko said there was no technical surveillance on OSWALD in Minsk. There was, as reported by his neighbor. In fact, a 1992 Izvestia article entitled, KGB File No. 31451, stated that OSWALD was under constant surveillance. The article went on to say that OSWALD was suspected of seeking out people with access to secret information, and so was put in touch with people who pretended to have this access. He was lured into anti-Soviet conversations. When he went hunting, KGB agents followed him. OSWALD was drugged and watched by 20 agents. Yet Gerald Posner wrote that this article "both supplements and confirms the information from Yuri Nosenko."
ADDITIONAL CONTRADICTIONS
Yuri Nosenko stated that although the KGB recognized that OSWALD may have been an American agent, no unusual measures were taken to check on this possibility, since it already had been decided not to let him stay in the USSR. Was the KGB only interested in spies who stayed in the USSR for more than a week? Yuri Nosenko said the KGB did not consider recruiting Marina Oswald to report on OSWALD "because she was his wife and it was considered dangerous to recruit a wife to report on her husband." The KGB would recruit children to spy on their parents.
Yuri Nosenko repeatedly referred to the KGB's recognition that OSWALD was not normal as the reason for the KGB's failure to take various steps which it could normally be expected to take against a foreigner like OSWALD. In other words, a lack of normality, and the KGB's recognition of it, provided the peg for the whole story of the KGB's handling of OSWALD. Yuri Nosenko stated Marina Oswald had no difficulty leaving the country, because she was married to an American. This reasoning seems to overlook the fact that OSWALD had already declared his intention (through mail to the U.S. Embassy) to leave the USSR before he married her. If this fact were known to the KGB, as presumably it was, Marina Oswald's marriage request would have been closely scrutinized. [CIA Memo Wigren to C/SR 7.8.64]
Reporter Sam Jaffe was one of the American citizens wrongly exposed by Yuri Nosenko. Samuel Adason Jaffe was born in San Francisco. He served in the Merchant Marine in World War II and then the Navy Reserves. He was a Marine combat correspondent in Korea during the war there. He attended the University of California at Berkeley, Columbia University, and the New School for Social Research. He worked for the old International News Service in San Francisco. He worked briefly for the U.N. in the early 1950's and then joined Life Magazine, where he was a reporter from 1952 to 1955. In 1955, as a freelancer, he covered a conference of Third World countries at Bandung, Indonesia, and interviewed the late Chou En-lai of China. As a correspondent for CBS from 1955 to 1961 he covered the United Nations and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's visit to this country in 1959. Victor Marchetti wrote:
In 1955 Sam Jaffe applied for a job with CBS news. While he was waiting for his application to be processed, a CIA official who Jaffe identifies himself as Jerry Rubins visited his house in California and told him, 'If you are willing to work for us, you are going to Moscow' with CBS. Jaffe was flabbergasted, since he did not even know at that point if CBS would hire him, and he assumes that someone at CBS was in on the arrangement or otherwise the Agency would never had known he had applied for work. Moreover, it would have been highly unusual to send a new young reporter to such an important overseas post. Rubins told Jaffe that the Agency was willing to release 'certain top secret information to you in order that you try and obtain certain information for us.' Jaffe refused and was later hired by CBS for a domestic assignment. [Cult, page 335]
In 1960 Jaffe went to Moscow for CBS to cover the trial of Francis Gary Powers. In 1961 Jaffe joined ABC and went to Moscow to open its first bureau there. He was among the first to report the ouster of Khrushchev from politics on the night of October 14, 1964. In 1965 he was expelled from the Soviet Union because of a report ABC carried from Washington saying that another shake up in the Soviet leadership was imminent. By then Jaffe had already been assigned to take over ABC's Hong Kong Bureau. As the war in Vietnam deepened he was sent there and for his coverage he won a prize from the overseas press club. In 1968 he was reassigned to the United States and moved to Washington. The following year he resigned from ABC.
In the 1950's and 1960's Jaffe had a brilliant run as a newspaper and broadcast journalist, however, in 1969 allegations circulated regarding Jaffe's connection with the KGB based on information supplied by Nosenko. The FBI reported:
1. Sam Jaffe’s relationship with the Agency predates his assignment to Moscow as an ABC correspondent. During the period 1958 to 1960 while in New York, Jaffe was an FBI confidential informant on his Soviet contacts. In addition, he had several meetings with the Domestic Contacts Division New York office. While in Moscow with ABC, Jaffe felt he was the Subject of a KGB recruitment attempt in 1962. He recounted his story to the Regional Security Officer at the American Embassy, Moscow, copies of which went to both the CIA and FBI. Jaffe covered the trial of Gary Powers for the ABC Television Network, and flew on the same plane from New York to Moscow with Barbara Powers' party. Prior to that trip, he was briefed by a CIA psychologist on ways to observe Power's behavior and demeanor. Jaffe was mever “ordered” to cover the Powers’ trial, but simply acting as an enterprising newspaperman befriending Barbara Powers while her party was enroute and in the Soviet Union.
2. During the latter part of his time in Moscow, Jaffe was in contact with a KGB Officer, Kuvkov, and this relationship is a matter of record with the FBI. Jaffe has given his version of his dealings with the KGB in a lengthy interview with the FBI in 1969. Yuri Nosenko provided information on Jaffe's relationship with the KGB in 1964. However, as time went on, further debriefings of Yuri Nosenko indicated Yuri Nosenko was not as sure about Jaffe's relationship as he had been originally. By 1968 Yuri Nosenko was positive only that Kuvkov had been in touch with Jaffe, but Yuri Nosenko was not certain that Jaffe was a paid witting KGB agent.
4. During Jaffe’s tour in Hong Kong and subsequently in Washington, he was in touch with CIA officers. He provided good information on a (deleted 24 as of 2010) and he was helpful to the Agency in reporting on a (deleted 11) organization, (deleted 08 as of 2010). All (deleted 28 as of 2010) contact with Jaffe ended in 1971.
5. Central to Jaffe’s charges about CIA, which he has made public many times, is Jaffe’s belief that the CIA passed derogatory information about him to his employers. Attached is a November 24, 1975 letter from Mr. Colby to Jaffe which states categorically that no information in the CIA files had ever been passed outside of official channels. In addition to this letter Jaffe has been reassured on this point verbally on at least four other occasions. The CIA is positive that Jaffe's recall from Hong Kong in 1968, and subsequent dismissal by ABC, are not related to any action taken by the CIA.
6. In discussions with Jaffe he frequently recounts a conversation he had with Mr. (deleted 06, 08 as of 2010) in Hong Kong. According to Jaffe (deleted as of 2010) told him he had a “security problem” but this problem would clear up in due course. A close check of our files cannot elucidate what (deleted as of 2010) was talking about. It is possible of course that (deleted as of 2010) was alluding to the Nosenko allegations as (deleted as of 2010) were given much of the Nosenko debriefings. The record is unclear on this point. However, based on information available to this Agency, we feel we have tried to pacify Jaffe with the statement contained in the Colby letter that we have no evidence he has ever been an agent of any foreign intelligence service.
Sam Jaffe said that the CIA attempted to get him to act as an agent and obtain information from Chinese Communist contacts. Mr. Jaffe said that while he was stationed in Hong Kong he was prepared to make contact with a Chinese official for the CIA, but he said that ABC recalled him from his assignment before the contact could be made. [NYT 2.9.76] Sam Jaffe wanted to locate Yuri Nosenko and confront him. He contacted John Gittinger and Chief, CI/R&A, Leonard McCoy. Sam Jaffe was told the KGB wanted to kill Yuri Nosenko and a meeting was impossible. [CIA Dempsey Memo on Jaffe 12.8.75] Jaffe had regular conversations with ANGLETON. Covert Action reported:
Apparently, ANGLETON had come to befriend Jaffe because of his conviction that he was the target of a KGB defamation attempt. A Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, interrogated ruthlessly by ANGLETON, hinted that Jaffe was a KGB agent. Since ANGELTON was convinced that Nosenko was a KGB double agent sent to sow disinformation and confusion, Jaffe had to be okay. [CA No. 29 (Winter 1988)]
YURI NOSENKO'S OTHER INFORMATION DID NOT CHECK OUT
Yuri Nosenko claimed with certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964 with two exceptions:
The first was that of Sergeant Dayle W. Smith who served in Moscow from April 1951 to July 1953. Smith agreed to work for the KGB abroad, but not in the U.S., however, when Smith returned home, he was approached by the KGB. Smith worked for the KGB in the U.S. until September 1962. After denying involvement with the KGB in interviews with the FBI in 1964 and 1965, Smith admitted that he had been approached by the KGB in Moscow in late 1953, that he had been offered a large sum of cash and gems in exchange for classified information concerning Embassy cipher systems and that he had provided the KGB with a mock code machine rotor. The KGB officer who compromised Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, Reino Hayhanen, who defected in Paris in May 1957, also provided information leading to the arrest of Smith.
The second exception concerned a counter-intelligence officer at the American Embassy who had been sleeping with his KGB Agent Russian housemaid. Yuri Nosenko said the KGB subsequently sent him pornographic photo montages. The KGB concluded that the American would not succumb to ordinary blackmail and consequently the maid was instructed to confess to him that she had been recruited by the KGB against her will and would be arrested if she did not fulfill her KGB tasks. The American agreed to help her. This man met with Gribanov on one occasion, then went to Ambassador Bohlen. Anatoliy Golitsyn had already provided the CIA with a similar story. Yuri Nosenko consistently asserted that, had there been other recruitments, he would have learned some of the details. He discounted the fact that he was not always in the First Department, which was responsible for Embassy recruitment.
THE CASE FOR YURI NOSENKO BEING BONA FIDE
In 1976 John L. Hart was brought out of retirement to conduct a study of the Yuri Nosenko case. Hart testified before the HSCA in 1978. That year, Leonard McCoy, AC/CI, released this statement:
Yuri Nosenko was probably the most valuable source of counter-intelligence information that the U.S. Government has ever had....He identified some 2,000 KGB officers and 300 Soviets who were acting as KGB agents. He provided information on 238 Americans in whom the KGB had displayed some interest, including many who had been recruited. For example, one of his identifications led to the trial, and a sentence of 25 years, for U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson. Nosenko also provided information on some 200 foreign nationals in 36 countries in whom the KGB had taken an active interest...the British were able, on the basis of Nosenko's information, to identify William John Vassall, a high official of the British Admiralty, as a KGB agent, and sentence him to 18 years.
Gerald Posner was granted an interview with Yuri Nosenko. Yuri Nosenko explained that his appearance in Geneva in January 1964 was arbitrary: "Disarmament negotiations were postponed twice in 1963. 'If there had been a meeting as scheduled in the Spring of 1963, I would have defected then...'"
Many other defectors said Yuri Nosenko was bona fide including, Fedora, who worked in the Soviet Union's Mission to the United Nations. Gerald Posner listed nine other similar defectors who believed Yuri Nosenko was authentic, but failed to state how they knew this, and where they made their statements. Additionally, questions have been raised regarding some of these men:
(1) Yuri Loginov (1961). Yuri Loginov was a KGBnik who went to the American Embassy, Helsinki, in 1961 and offered to act as an agent-in-place. He did so for six years, undetected by the Soviets. In 1967 he was arrested by the South Africans for spying on behalf of the Soviet Union. ANGLETON betrayed him because his case officer, Richard Kovitch, was suspected of being a mole, due to ambiguous information supplied by Anatoliy Golitsyn. Yuri Loginov was sent back to the Soviet Union in a spy trade. His fate there remains unclear.
(2) Igor Kochnov (1966).
(3) Obscure Soviet trade delegate Oleg Lyalin, 34, who defected to Britain early September 1971. He was 27 years old when he had knowledge of Yuri Nosenko. As a result of his defection, 90 Soviet delegates were PNGed from London. Oleg Lyalin revealed the Soviet's intent to sabotage military installations. He was a double-agent for six months before he defected. Oleg Lyalin was a bona fide defector - he blew too many other agents cover not to be so.
(4) Rudolph Albert Herrmann studied in East Germany then went to the United States in 1968. He was rolled over in 1977.
(5) Ilya Grigorevich Dzhirkvelov was a KGB officer with a history of alcoholism. He worked in the Soviet media from 1958 to 1965. He defected after a car accident in 1980.
(6) Vladimir Andreyevich Kuzichkin joined the KGB in 1975. He was a senior KGB officer in Tehran, who defected to the British, in June 1982. Vladimir Kuzichkin produced a list of Soviet agents in Iran. Many of them were executed.
(7) Viktor Gundarev (1985).
(8) Vitaliy Yurchenko (1985). Vitaliy Yurchenko was a senior intelligence official who defected to the West in 1985, and redefected in November 1985. Before he returned to the United States he said he had been kidnapped, drugged and tortured by the CIA. Yurchenko provided information to the CIA on Edward Lee Howard, a CIA officer who worked for the KGB. Howard fled the United States after he was exposed by Yurchenko. This indicates that Yurchenko was a bona fide defector. Yurchenko passed the CIA's lie detector tests. Yurchenko probably re-defected after his lover refused to defect with him. [NYT 11.8.85] Just who this lover was is unclear. The New York Times reported: "The woman in Toronto, Svetlana Dedkov, 48 years old, fell to her death from the 27th floor of a 35-story apartment building in the Toronto suburb of Etobicoke. Her husband, Boris Dedkov, worked for Stan-Canada, a Soviet machine tool trading company in Toronto." The Canadian police stated that they found a suicide note. Her suicide took place the morning after the defector said he was going home. The New York Times reported: "The sources here linked Mr. Yurchenko to a Soviet diplomat's wife in Ottawa, who they would not identify. One official said that he heard that the Soviet Embassy might have flown her back to Moscow on Thursday to get her out of the way...After defecting, officials said, Yurchenko visited a woman in Canada with whom he had been involved with while stationed at the Soviet Embassy here from 1975 to 1980. But she sent him away, the Americans, said." [NYT 11.6.85] The Canadian government would not confirm or deny that Yurchenko visited Canada. What is Vitaliy Yurchenko doing in Russia today? Where did Yurchenko release the information that Nosenko was bona fide.
(9) Oleg Gordievskiy, 46, a Soviet Consul in London, was U.K. KGB Chief. He defected in September, 1985. Twenty-five Soviet nationals were expelled as a result of his collaboration with the British. Oleg Gordievskiy joined the KGB in 1962, where he worked in Department S of First Directorate, which concerned itself with illegals in the West. Oleg Gordievskiy claimed that the Soviet Union believed the United States was going to attack in early 1981. Former CIA/DD George Carver labeled this disinformation. Twenty five Soviet nationals are a lot of people to burn in any operation. Gordievskiy was bona fide. Again it was not stated where Gordievskiy said Nosenko was bona fide.
Many respected authors like David Wise and Tom Mangold were convinced Yuri Nosenko was genuine. Edward Petty: "The Bureau, as far as I know, considered him to have been a really good source. He was real, as far as being a Second Chief Directorate officer." The CIA:
If Yuri Nosenko was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962 contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks or statements would have not been of a nature that would have caused any suspicion in regard to the bona fides of Yuri Nosenko." The CIA explained why Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko furnished the same information: they were both in the same section of the KGB. The CIA explained Yuri Nosenko's lack of knowledge concerning the trip that Kosolapov made to Helsinki in November 1960: "It cannot be interpreted as evidence Yuri Nosenko was dispatched by the KGB since, if he had been, he would have been briefed on the trip, as this was an event the KGB knew Golitsyn was aware of.
THE MIDDLE GROUND
Did Yuri Nosenko lie because he had been exposed to false or limited information, then allowed to, or was spooked into, defecting? Edward Petty: "The facts and timing with respect to Yuri Nosenko's defection and his provision to the CIA of information about OSWALD in the Soviet Union make it virtually certain that the KGB knew that he was going to defect, and expected him to provide the CIA with the extent of his knowledge concerning OSWALD. Various information, including much of Yuri Nosenko's own conduct, has subsequently provided the basis to accept that Yuri Nosenko is personally genuine. There is no other conclusion but that the KGB allowed him, or motivated him, to defect without his realizing that to have been the case. Just such a technique had been used successfully by the KGB in the Goleniewski case only four years earlier."
"SNIPER"
In March 1958 "Sniper" (Michael Goleniewski, a renegade Polish Intelligence officer) contacted the U.S. Embassy in Bern, Switzerland, by mail and offered information about communist espionage activities. Howard Roman studied the contents of the letters and determined that they were written by a German speaking Pole. The information was evaluated in Project BEVISION. "Sniper" led the CIA to KGBniks Gordon Lonsdale (Russian Colon Molody) and George Blake, who had compromised the Berlin Tunnel. He exposed an Israeli citizen named Israel Beers as a KGB mole. "Sniper" defected in December 1960. Evidence existed that the KGB had false information planted on him before his defection, then spooked him into defecting. Michael Goleniewski remembered having been told by a KGBnik that Stafan Bandera, an anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist living in Munich, had been murdered on the night of October 15, 1959, by the man with whom he was having supper, German intelligence service (BND) agent Heinz Danko Herre. The CIA later learned Heinz Danko Herre was innocent:
The Legal Attaché in Bonn in June 1962, reviewed information furnished to the Germans by Bogdan Stashinsky, which indicated that he was recruited by the KGB in 1952...in 1958 he was told that because he had proved himself, he would be given an important mission against Ukrainian émigré groups in the West. This mission turned out to be the assassination of Dr. Lev Rebet and Stafan Bandera, émigré leaders in Munich. He murdered Lev Rebet in 1958 and Stafan Bandera in 1959...by spaying poison in his victim's face which made death appear to be from a heart attack." [FBI 62-109090-NR 1.24.64 Sullivan to Branigan]
The Soviets had deliberately planted the Heinz Danko Herre story on Michael Goleniewski to make trouble between the CIA and BND. Michael Goleniewski was told that Henry Kissinger had been recruited by the Soviets in the aftermath of World War II. No evidence of this has surfaced to date. Edward Petty:
The Soviets had details of the Goleniewski case as it was going on. They therefore had a clear-cut penetration. A penetration of that level had also to know the Nosenko case. Ergo, if you accept that hypothesis, then they knew about Nosenko. The key is that Nosenko himself was quite genuine. Nosenko was in the Second Chief Directorate and handled OSWALD material in the normal course of events. So he was perfectly willing to tell what he knew. The material was true as far as the Second Chief Directorate was concerned. If you accept the evidence from Nosenko himself that he personally is genuine, that does not mean that he is genuine as far as an unwitting control is concerned. ANGLETON was doing exactly what they wanted to happen.
The second part of the Nosenko affair dealt with KGB penetration of CIA and the Golitsyn case. Golitsyn had predicted Nosenko's appearance and that he would try to discredit his bona fides as a defector. ANGLETON was always saying the Nosenko was going to destroy Golitsyn's leads and therefore he would destroy Golitsyn. Nosenko was a pawn in whatever play was going on involving ANGLETON and Golitsyn.
When they ultimately gave him polygraph tests that were not rigged, Nosenko came out perfectly all right. The Soviets let him out. He didn't know he was playing their role. What they did to make him run, I don't know. That's the reason they never broke him.
Edward Petty pointed out that Nosenko was never asked,
Think about it fellow, are there any facts which would cause you to believe that the Soviets were putting pressure on you to leave?' Whether he would tell anybody such a thing at this point is something else. The CIA in that sense was inclined to look at things as either black or white. Either he was 'Okay' or he was a dispatched agent. They didn't understand that there could be a middle ground.
Cleveland Cram stated:
At that time ANGLETON foolishly did not believe Nosenko, not because of OSWALD and the assassination, but because of Golitsyn having denounced him. I believe Nosenko was bona fide.
Cleveland Cram was asked if Yuri Nosenko could have unwittingly been given false information then spooked into defecting. He stated:
If you had a big conspiracy in the Soviet Union he might have been shown false stuff and reported that. It was looked into. With the evidence we have now from the Soviets, we know that is not true. Nosenko saw what the KGB had, and he reported what he saw. The problem was that JIM was so screwed up in his thinking because of Bagley and Golitsyn he did not want to accept Nosenko, who was the only person who really had first hand information on OSWALD in the West, available to us. ANGLETON didn't have the brains to run OSWALD as vestpocket operation. That's ridiculous. OSWALD was too unreliable. All you guys in this conspiracy shit should do something else. Like the JFK movie. It's just not true.
Cram was asked if there could have been a middle ground:
His information was very accurate about all the important things. He had access to the OSWALD file after the assassination. I know the sun rises in the East and sets in the West. Nosenko was a genuine defector. It is firmly established now. Former Soviet Generals will tell you this. I'm not sure that Goleniewski had any false information planted on him before his defection. That's a theory cooked-up by nut cases like JIM ANGLETON, who never could prove it. ANGLETON was trying to prove some of his goofy theories, and that's how it got started. Goleniewski says it isn't true.
ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE GROUND THEORY
OSWALD did not supply the Soviets with strategic information until April 1960. His report could have been placed in a RESTRICTED file. Yuri Nosenko might have been exposed to the non-sensitive OSWALD file and was assigned to Geneva then provoked into defecting. Or he might have defected on his own. Either way he would have been genuinely convinced the KGB had no connection with OSWALD. As for the contradictions in his story about OSWALD and the KGB, Scott Malone believed: "He was a drunk and a lair. He lied - because he was a liar." Did he lie because he was trying to exaggerate his importance to the CIA? The CIA explored something akin to "a middle ground" when it asked:
Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of Yuri Nosenko by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without Yuri Nosenko being given a specific mission? The above possibility has been given consideration, even though the ultimate ramifications are practically incalculable. The conclusion is that as regards Nosenko, with the single exception detailed below, there is no evidence of a political type objective which could be considered of sufficient importance by the KGB to warrant the dispatch of a KGB officer with the knowledge of Nosenko to speak freely with the CIA without his being given a specific mission, or missions, by the KGB...The only area touched upon in any way by Nosenko which might meet the above requirements is the assassination of President Kennedy.
The CIA also asked: "Is there any evidence that the contacts of Nosenko in 1962 or in 1964 with the CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection?" The CIA:
It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as the KGB file on Nosenko is not available, any conclusion concerning whether Nosenko was, or was not, dispatched by the KGB can only be based on a full review of available information from Nosenko...One of the particular areas considered was his apparent behavior during his contacts with the CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB control at the time.
The CIA reasoned that had Nosenko been under KGB control, he would not have expressed considerable concern over his personal security, but it had to admit: "It is recognized that the above indicated concern is not substantial evidence that Nosenko was not under KGB control." The CIA also dismissed the possibility that the Soviets discovered that the documents Yuri Nosenko had stolen were missing. It cited the fact Yuri Nosenko lied about his rank as further proof of his bone fides: no dispatched KGB agent would be that stupid. The possibility that Yuri Nosenko was discovered, then "spooked" into defecting, was not covered in this report.
YURI NOSENKO AND THE WARREN COMMISSION
Yuri Nosenko offered to testify before the Warren Commission. The CIA never allowed him to do this, nor was he mentioned in the Report or Twenty-Six Volumes. Interviews with Yuri Nosenko were included in the documents of the Warren Commission. Edward Petty commented, "While the CIA considered Nosenko to be a dispatched agent from the word go, actually from before he ever arrived, the CIA could not hold back word of what Nosenko had to say about OSWALD from the Warren Commission." The CIA told the HSCA: "CIA was unable to resolve satisfactorily the question of his bona fides until well after the Warren Commission had completed its work. The point is that CIA, per se, did not reach an agreed position on Mr. Nosenko until late 1968." Former President Gerry Ford was Yuri Nosenko's foremost opponent:
Ford: I have been led to believe, by people who I believe know, that there is a grave question about the reliability of Nosenko being a bona fide defector...I feel so strongly about this that I just think the Commission has got to make a decision on it.
Warren: I am allergic to defectors...So I think exactly as you do, Gerry.
Dulles: I concur in what you said. Over the weekend I had an opportunity to discuss the Nosenko matter in some detail with my former colleagues...
Ford: It is my best recollection that he was actually a defector some time in December, at a disarmament meeting in Geneva, Switzerland. And the original press releases were to the effect that he was a highly significant catch as far as we were concerned...There was a great mystery about his particular defection, because the Soviet Union made such a protest - they went to the Swiss Government and raised the devil about it. Now subsequent information has developed that he doesn't appear to be quite as big a catch, if any, as far as we were concerned. Having absolutely no faith in what the Soviet Union tries to do in these cases, he might have been dangled for one reason two or three months before the assassination, but pumped last th (illegible) the assassination, and a man that was as high as he allegedly is, with the mental capacity he is supposed to have, could very well be filled with all the information which he is now giving us in reference to the OSWALD case. As I say, I am a complete and total skeptic and cynic about these kinds of people, and there would be no better way for the Soviet Union to try and clean its own skirts than to have a high ranking defector come and discount OSWALD'S importance, OSWALD'S significance while in the Soviet Union." [WC Proceedings 6.23.64]
BRANIGAN'S DOUBTS ABOUT NOSENKO
William Branigan pointed this out to William Sullivan:
With respect to the points that are to be elaborated on, Nosenko stated that he next heard about OSWALD two hours after the assassination of President Kennedy when he was summoned to the KGB center in Moscow. The time element of two hours is highly unlikely. Elsewhere, Nosenko states that when OSWALD appeared at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, the First Chief Directorate of the KGB at Moscow was advised of his interest in returning to Russia and the First Directorate consulted the Second Directorate. This could only have occurred in late September or early in October 1963, but then Nosenko says following the assassination no file on OSWALD could be located at the KGB center in Moscow. This seems unlikley. [NARA FBI 124-10169-10063]
YURI NOSENKO'S IMPRISONMENT
ANGLETON knew for a fact that no matter how you cut it, Nosenko was not for real. The CIA kept Yuri Nosenko locked up for five years under prison-like circumstances. He was tortured and deprived of basic human necessities. Helms commented: "One of the first problems we had with him in the United States was he liked to drink and carouse. One of the reasons to hold him in confinement was to get him away from booze..." Yuri Nosenko undertook numerous polygraph tests. One of these tests, according to Helms, "was designed as sort of a psychological trick on Nosenko to indicate that he wasn't telling the truth." He was administered LSD. Some in the Bureau were convinced Yuri Nosenko was real:
The FBI perceived Nosenko's statements about OSWALD, depending upon a subsequent, definitive resolution of Nosenko's bona fides, to be the most authoritative information available, indicative of a lack of Soviet Governmental involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy. The FBI found no substantial basis to conclude that Nosenko was not a bona fide defector...
YURI NOSENKO'S REHABILITATION
In 1967 Bruce Solie, of the CIA's Office of Security, wrote a critique of a lengthy report Tennent Bagley had prepared on Yuri Nosenko. Bruce Solie determined that Yuri Nosenko had not been dispatched. During the tenure of the HSCA, Bruce Solie, Chief of the Security Analysis Group, supplied the Committee with many of its documents. In 1968 the FBI issued a Top-Secret Nosenko Report.
It is noted that a brief chronology of events is set forth in the preface to the WFO paper. It is indicated therein that Sammy is considered by CIA as a part of a large scale KGB deceptive operation. In addition to those comments, it is noted that a paper prepared in December 1964 by CIA as an agenda for proposed CIA-FBI conference, concluded that Nosenko was dispatched by the KGB in March 1962, as one part of a broad provocation effort conceived as early as 1959 and set in motion in the latter part of 1961. It was stated, “We believe the major figures in this provocation include at least three defectors, and at one time or another more than eight Soviet officials in-place as American Intelligence Service (AIS) agents. They are supported by a large number of staged incidents and purposefully handled agents known by the KGB to be under Western control. NOSENKO (SAMMY) is but one of these figures, a pivotal one and the one offering us the greatest insight into the larger operation."
The paper went on to say that the provocation was directed by a group of highly experienced KGB officers probably working directly under the Chairman of the KGB or one of his deputies. It was also stated, "We have been able to discern how NOSENKO was briefed and trained and his legend shaped, and have been able to identify tentatively the specific KGB officers running this operation.”
The December, 1964, paper also made proposals for the disposal of SAMMY. In the event his full confession and cooperation were not obtained, it was proposed that he be removed from U. S. territory for controlled detention abroad followed by a public statement identifying him as a confessed provocateur.
(This is close to what happened to EYEBALL in 1967.) It was stated that preparation should be made for action against sources "whom we believe to be suspect or related to the NOSENKO case," to be coincidental with action against SAMMY.
The December, 1964, paper and others emanating from CIA which conclude that SAMMY is a plant and that all other defectors or defectors in place who support him are likewise plants, attempt to discredit Bureau sources as well as SAMMY. They illustrate the subject of defector interrogation and exploitation is clearly within the interests of the Bureau.
SAMMY has been under almost daily interrogation by Mr. BRUCE SOLIE of the Office of Security of CIA from October 30, 1967, to date. SOLIE's technique has been to question SAMMY in such a manner that he will volunteer information and only in rare instances has he challenged SAMMY's statements or become involved in arguments about what SAMMY did or did not furnish previously. The theory was to get SAMMY to volunteer information without reference to previous interrogations. This technique has been effective.
The current interrogations have not exhausted SAMMY's knowledge of Soviet Intelligence but thousands of pages have been recorded covering his career, cases known to him, and general as well as specific, data regarding KGB. The transcripts have been made available to WFO and have been thoroughly reviewed by three WFO Agents who have collectively more than 50 years of experience in Soviet counterintelligence work.
Based upon the review of this voluminous material and the results of some collateral investigation it has been concluded, contrary of some collateral investigation in the 1968 paper, that SAMMY is what he says he is, that he is knowledgeable in the areas and to the extent that he should be, and he has a logical explanation for his acquisition of information which normally would not have been accessible to him in his claimed positions. It is believed impossible that he developed this detailed knowledge by KGB briefings only. The consistency between previous and current interviews is substantial proof of this. If he was dispatched by KGB he was given a "green light" to tell everything he knew. This is believed incredible, particularly because of his connections with ranking KGB officers and because his information is closely related to that furnished by various other sources. Collectively these sources have seriously damaged SIS operations and have rendered valuable assistance to Western Counterintelligence. They have supplied the key to practically all successful counterintelligence operations during the past five years. To hold that they are all "Plants" is preposterous. While SAMMY admittedly during previous interrogations, exaggerated and in some instances lied about his KGB rank and his personal involvement in some cases, there is no reasonable basis for now doubting his bona fides.
The current interrogation of SAMMY by SOLIE is being handled as indicated in number six above and has been productive. Based upon the results summarized in the attached paper, the conclusion is inescapable that the persons who handled previous interrogations and evaluations of SAMMY were either incompetent or for reasons of their own persisted in the attempt to prove the February, 1964, conclusion that he was not bona fide. There was a definite failure to take elementary steps to clarify questioned matters. A good example is the insistence that KGB could not have placed "metka" (powder) on the clothing of JOHN V. ABIDIAN because he did not employ a Soviet maid until 16 months after his arrival in Moscow. The current interrogation of SAMMY developed that KGB was aware that ABIDIAN had an American girl friend who sent her maid to clean ABIDIAN's apartment. Recent interview of ABIDIAN by SOLIE confirmed this; the maid therefore could have had access to his clothing beginning 6 months after his arrival in Moscow. Other examples of inadequate interrogation and collateral investigation are set forth in the attached paper:
RECOMMENDATIONS
WFO believes that SAMMY is a bona fide defector and that his isolation and detention re based on erroneous conclusions and unsound grounds and are incompatible with the American system of justice.
Yuri Nosenko was freed in April 1969. He was put on the CIA payroll as an independent contractor.
YURI NOSENKO'S HSCA TESTIMONY
In 1979 the HSCA questioned Yuri Nosenko about why the Soviets allowed OSWALD to remain in Russia. He said two psychiatrists determined he was insane, and if they tried to deport him he might commit suicide: "Simply a mentally unstable person, they didn't want to go it on any such action." Yuri Nosenko declared that, although extensive KGB resources were devoted to physical and technical surveillance of OSWALD, the KGB never interviewed him. In 1964 Yuri Nosenko had supplied different information to the FBI: OSWALD was put under
…passive observation to make sure he was not an American intelligence agent temporarily dormant...in view of instructions from KGB, Moscow, no active interest in OSWALD could be taken in Minsk without obtaining prior approval from KGB, Moscow. No such approval was ever requested or granted and based on his experience, he opined that the only OSWALD coverage during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, inquiry of neighbors and review of his mail.
Yuri Nosenko explained: "Well I told them there was work done against OSWALD; it was ordered, passive work, it's called passive. Whenever it's ordered not to make an approachment, not to make a contact, not to make a recruitment, this is passive."
THE YURI NOSENKO INCUBUS
When ANGLETON was deposed in HUNT v. WEBERMAN in 1979, he stated:
Well, I will simply say that during my tenure the [Nosenko] case had never been resolved...and, Mr. Helms, in his testimony before the assassination committee recently, had words to the effect that the problems of Nosenko were still an incubus that hung over our heads...I have never in a, as a matter of policy and as a matter of professional judgement, come to any conclusion other than the case was unresolved. That was the official position and I can speak to my tenure. That was the official position of the former Deputy Director of Operations, i.e., the Clandestine Services, Thomas Karamessines. It was reflected in the FBI disseminations of his reports to the effect that they were from a defector whose bona fides had not been resolved...There were many speculations that the so-called methodology that Nosenko alleged was the methodology of the KGB was inaccurate, but that was in the realm of speculation based on very thorough analysis of Nosenko's testimonies. As I said earlier, the incubus was still hanging over our head. There was no quotation, no determination.
Helms told the HSCA: "To this very day no person familiar with the facts, of whom I am aware, finds Mr. Nosenko's comments about OSWALD and the KGB to be credible. That still hangs in the air like an incubus." Nosenko was dispatched by the Soviets to disassociate OSWALD from the KGB. He had to remain in America and he could never redefect. He would be condemned as a traitor by the Russian Intelligence Service and sentenced to death. It was unlikely the death sentence could be carried out within the United States. He was an extremely strong-willed person, and could not be broken by torture. He may have supplied the CIA with a lot of good information, but his information about OSWALD and others was a lie. Nosenko's real mission was to prevent World War III by supplying the CIA with information which disassociated OSWALD from the KGB. ANGLETON knew first hand Nosenko was full of shit because ANGLETON had run OSWALD in the Soviet Union.
OSWALD: JULY 1960 TO NOVEMBER 1960
July summer months of green beauty, pine forest, very deep. I enjoy many days in the enviorments of Minsk with the Zegers who have a car "Mosivich". I always goes along with Anita. Leonara seems to have no Sov-friend, many admirirs. She has a beauiful Spanish figure, long black hair, like Anita. I pay much attention to her shes too old for me she seems to dislike my lack of ambition for some reason. She is high strung. I have become habituated to a small cafe which is where I dine in the evening the food is generally poor and always strictly the same, menue in any cafe, at any point in the city. The food is cheap and I don't really care about quiality after three years in the U.S.M.C.
By September 1960, OSWALD was becoming openly critical of Soviet society:
As my Russian improves I become increasingly concious of just what kind of a sociaty I live in. Mass gymnastics, complusory afterwork meeting. Complusary attendance at lectures and the sending the entire shop collective except me) to pick potatoes on a Sunday, at a state collective farm. A "patroict duty" to bring in the harvest. The opions of the workers (unvoiced) are that its a great pain in the neck. They don't seem to be esspicialy enthusia about any of the "collective" duties. I am increasingly aware of the presence, in all things, of Lebizen, shop party secretary, fat, fortyish and jovial on the outside. He is a no-nonsense party regular.
October 1960. The coming of Fall, my dread of a new Russian winter are mellowed in splendid golds and reds of fall in Belorussia. Plums pearch appricots and cherrys abound for these last fall weeks. I am healthy brown color and stuffed with fresh fruit. (at other times of the year unobtainable)
ELLA GERMAN
ELLA GERMAN on the right
October 18, 1960. My 21st birthday see's Rosa, Pavil, Ella at a small party at my place. Ella a very attractive Russian Jew I have been going walking with latly, works at the radio factory also. Rosa and Ella are jelous of each other it brings a warm feeling to me. Both are at my place for the first time. Ellas and Pavil both give ash-tray's (I don't smoke) we have a laugh.
November 1960. Finds the approch of winter now. A growing lonliness overtakes me in spite of my conquest of Ennatachina, a girl from Riga, studing at the music conservatory in Minsk. After an affair which lasts a few weeks we part.
November 15, 1960. In Nov. I make aquiataces of four girls roomming at the For. lan. Dormitory in room 212. Nell is very interesting, so is Tomka, Tomis and Alta. I usually go to the institute domatory with a friend of mine who speaks English very well, Eraich Titov 22: is in the forth year at medical insitute. Very bright fellow. At domatory we sit and talk for hours in English.
December 1960. I am having a light affair with Nell Korobka."
The Warren Commission named Eric Titovyets as OSWALD'S oldest existing acquaintance. In his Historic Diary, OSWALD reflected he did not trust Eric, who was a loyal Communist Party member, and did not tell him he was returning to the United States until one day before his departure. [CIA 1295-482, 1295-482]
OSWALD: JANUARY 1961
January 1, 1961 - New Years I spend at home of Ella Germain. I think I am in love with her. She has refused my more dishonourable advances, we drink and eat in the presence of her family in a very hospitable atmosphere. Later I go home drunk and happy. Passing the river homewards, I decide to propose to Ella.
January 2, 1961. After a pleasent hand-in-hand walk to the local cinima we come home, standing on the doorstep I propose's. She hesitates than refuses, my love is real but she has none for me. Her reason besides lack of love: I am american and someday simply might be arrested simply because of that example Polish Intervention in 20's led to the arrest of poeple in the Soviet Union of Polish origin "you understand the world situation there is too much against you and you don't even know it." I am stunned she snickers at my awkarness, in turning to go (I am too stunned tothink!) I realize she was never serious with me but only expolited my being an american, in order to get the envy of the other girls who consider me different from the Russian Boys. I am misarable.
January 3, 1961. I am misarable about Ella. I lover her but what can I do? It is the state of fear which was always in the Soviet Union.
Priscilla Johnson related that LEE told Marina Oswald "Being American, German thought I was a spy." He confided that he "loved Ella with all his heart," and "her only fault was that at 24 she was still a virgin, due entirely to her own desire...Our last formal date was in February 1961 after which I stopped seeing her." [Johnson Lee & Marina p401: CIA Name List with Traces] Was Ella German reporting back to the KGB? The CIA's Name List With Traces: "An American visitor in Moscow on 19(??) reported being assigned an interpreter named Ella Herman (also spelt German) who was described as single, Jewish and in her early 30's with an excellent command of English including a good vocabulary in thermodynamics. She claimed to have two years of experience translating for a chemical institute. Ella Herman was furnished by the Moscow Energetics Institute and was reportedly attached to the English chair of the Institute." Vladimir Semichastny said OSWALD'S primary interest was womanizing.
OSWALD OFFERED SOVIET CITIZENSHIP
January 4, 1961 One year after I received the residence document I am called in to the passport office and asked if I want citizenship (Russian) I say no simply extend my residental passport to agree and my document is extended untill Jan 4, 1962.
January 4, 1961 to January 31, 1961. I am stating to reconsider my desire about staying. The work is drab that money I get has nowhere to be spent. No nightclubs or bowling allys no place of recreation acept the trade union dances. I have had enough.
On January 12, 1961, S.A. John W. Fain was still assigned to the OSWALD case and was under the supervision of ASAC W. David Breen and SAC Curtis O. Lynum.
February 1, 1961. I made my first request to American Embassy, Moscow, for reconsidering my position, I stated "I would like to go back to the U.S.
On February 1, 1961, the State Department sent Airgram A-127 via diplomatic pouch to the American Embassy, Moscow, which requested that the American Embassy inform the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Marguerite Oswald was worried about her son. Delivery time for such pouches was from three to ten days. On February 5, 1961, before the American Embassy passed this message to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, OSWALD mailed a letter dated February 1, 1961 to the American Embassy, which the American Embassy received on February 13, 1961. In this letter, he expressed his interest in returning to the United States. American Embassy officials stated this was the first time they had heard from, or about, OSWALD, since November 16, 1959. Marguerite Oswald's letter and OSWALD'S decision to leave the Soviet Union were unrelated. His mission had ended and he was not admitted to Patrice Lumumba University. The Warren Commission concluded: "The simultaneity of the two events was apparently coincidental. The request from Marguerite Oswald went from Washington to Moscow by sealed diplomatic pouch and there was no evidence that the seal had been tampered with." [WR p275] Richard E. Snyder: "All we could do in cases like that would be to forward a letter to the Foreign Office with a request that they forward it. We could not contact the individual himself."
REFERENCE TO LETTER U.S. EMBASSY NEVER RECEIVED
OSWALD'S February 5, 1961, letter to the American Embassy, Moscow, contained a reference to a December 1960 letter allegedly mailed to the American Embassy from Minsk, which the American Embassy never received: "Since I have not received a reply to my letter of December 1960 I am writing again asking that you consider my request for the return of my American passport." The CIA reported:
There is no indication in the diary or elsewhere in OSWALD'S papers of his having written to the Embassy in December 1960 as mentioned in the letter as set forth above. Furthermore, the diary refers to his February 1, 1961, letter as his first request concerning return to the United States. One possible explanation for reference to a spurious letter may be that OSWALD wished to give the Embassy the impression that he had initiated the correspondence regarding repatriation before having renewed his identity document on January 4, 1961.
OSWALD'S letter may have been intercepted by the KGB and not delivered to the American Embassy in order to give him time to reconsider his decision to re-defect.
D. E. BOSTER
D. E. Boster suggested the American Embassy, Moscow, mail him his passport directly. Secretary of State Dean Rusk vetoed this: "If the Embassy is fully satisfied that he has not expatriated himself in any manner...his passport may be delivered to him on a personal basis only, after being [illegible] valid for direct return to the United States. For security reasons, the Department does not consider that it would be prudent for the Embassy to forward OSWALD'S passport to him by mail." [DOS A-273, 4.13.61] In August 1961 a State Department passport analyst wrote a Memorandum for the Record in which he expressed incredulity that the decisions regarding OSWALD'S passport had been "routed to D. E. Boster of SOV." [DOS Memo Johnson to White 3.31.61; WCE 24A]
MICHAEL JELISAVCIC
The letters "AM EX" appeared at least six times in OSWALD'S address book; he also had the telephone number of the American Express office in Moscow. Next to it, the name "Jelisvacic" (the office manager, according to the phone book at the American Embassy and the words "one-two Di-ner" appeared. OSWALD mentioned nothing about this in his Historic Diary. Another document revealed that the CIA's Office of Security had a file on Michael Jelisavcic. [Mader CIA 500 East Berlin FRD - AMEX; CIS/RRC Bulletin Lib. Cong. #JX1295-H45-A5; CIA 1298-477]
Address Book Page 28 (A2)
A. Ex.
K-4200
384
1 – 2 Dinner
Room 384
Jelisavcic
1. The Telephone Directory of the American Embassy Moscow lists the American Express Company Room 384, Hotel Metropol telephone 942000; manager Mr.
Micheal JELISAVCIC.
2. The initial number 9 and letter K are interchangeable in the Moscow telephone system
3. The nationality of JELISAVCIC is unknown. No further traces.
On December 17, 1968, the New York Office of the FBI sent this wire to the Director:
Enclosed herein for the Chicago Office are 14 copies of various communications relating to the investigation of Michael Jelisavcic. Also enclosed for Chicago is one photograph of Jelisavcic and one photograph of 'Sammy' for possible use during interrogation of Jelisavcic.
For the information of the Chicago Office, Michael Jelisavcic, currently employed as an American Express Company representative, Moscow, USSR and is visiting US on home leave. It was ascertained, this date, that Jelisavcic departed from the New York City area on December 11, 1968, en route to Chicago. Raymond V. Stormes, American Express Company Representative, New York City, advised that Jelisavcic can be reached at the following address: 150-41 Morgan Street, Harvey, Ill. Tel. # 312- ED-1-3085. Jelisavcic can be reached through the above address until January 1, 1969, when he is scheduled to depart from Chicago with connecting flights at New York direct to Moscow, USSR.
The Bureau is requested to authorize Chicago to immediately interview Jelisavcic in an effort to resolve all facts concerning possible compromise of Jelisavcic by Soviet intelligence during his employment within the USSR.
The enclosures for the Chicago Office contain all pertinent information re Jelisavcic in the possession of the New York Office. Chicago's attention is directed particularly to Bureau letter, dated January 8, 1965, in captioned matter wherein Jelisavcic’s name and room number were in possession of OSWALD. During interview he should be questioned concerning all circumstances surrounding any possible association with or knowledge of OSWALD and this information should be set out in Letter Head Memorandum form suitable for dissemination under OSWALD caption. All other pertinent information re Jelisavcic's connection with Soviets in USSR and possible compromise by Soviet Intelligence should be set out in a form suitable for dissemination under Subject's caption." [FBI 62-109060- 1ST NR 6626 12.17.68; NARA FBI 124-10060-10199]
On October 30, 1969 the New York Times reported,
A U.S. Travel Agent Expelled by Soviet Moscow: The manager of the American Express Company here said tonight that he had been ordered to leave the Soviet Union “as soon as possible.” He is Michael S. Jelisavcic, a United States citizen who was born in Yugoslavia and who has been in Moscow for nine years. Mr. Jelisavcic said that the order for his departure had been relayed to him by officials of the United States Embassy. He said in an interview that the apparent reason for his expulsion order was his involvement of August 6 in an automobile accident. The accident, Mr. Jelisavcic said, occurred when an apparently intoxicated Soviet citizen walked in front of the automobile he was driving. Mr. Jelisavcic said that his wife was vacationing in France and his son was a student in New York.
To: SAC New York City, Chicago
MICHAEL JELISAVCIC- ESPIONAGE, RUSSIA
Re: SAC New York, airtel, December 17, 1968.
Classified SECRET, exemption category, 2, 3,
Date of Automatic Declassification: INDEFINTE.
Bufile 65-69127 Division 9 / Civil Rights
An article from the Moscow United States Embassy website finally revealed who Michael Jelisavcic really was and which side he was on:
Remarks at the Opening of Conference on the Role of Exchanges in the U.S.-Russian Relationship
Spaso House
July 9, 2009
Distinguished Guests; Ladies and Gentlemen:
I am very pleased to open today’s conference on the role of exchanges in the U.S.-Russian relationship. I want to thank those of you have come here today to share your memories of the past and your ideas for the future. I would like to thank Olga Borisovna Pokrovskaya, Editor-in-chief of America magazine, who provided rare photos for the photo exhibit at the conference. I’d like to thank Vladimir Meletin, who has made a remarkable new film of the 1959 exhibition, which he is presenting to participants today. My special thanks to Aleksey Fominykh and Michael Jelisavcic, for providing material from the original comment books Russian visitors signed at the exhibition.
[http://moscow.usembassy.gov/beyrlerem070909.html]
How did Michael end-up with this guest book if all he did was work from American Express? Why did he have dinner with OSWALD?
curtjester1 wrote:
> Name one true defector who stayed. Name one person that wasn't on
> assignment. Name anybody who stayed.
MARSH REPLIED;
Charles Jenkins of Rich Square, N.C.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9904EEDD1139F935A25752C0A960958260
James Dresnok.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/29/news/deserter.php
Read the HSCA defector study.
THE DEFECTOR STUDY
The HSCA conducted a defector study to ascertain if OSWALD'S defection
was suspicious. The Committee: "To determine which individuals the
Committee would study, a letter was sent to the CIA requesting the names
of persons who defected to the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1964." The
CIA "provided a list of the names and variations of the names of 380
Americans who were in the USSR during that time period," entitled,
"U.S.
Persons Who Have or May Have Defected to the USSR Between 1958 and
1963." This list included the names of Communist Party members who made
frequent trips to the Soviet Union or were there on official Party
business, like Henry Winston. Winston could not be termed a defector.
The names of emigrants were included in this list. Some had been in the
Soviet Union for over 20 years. The CIA: "This listing represented U.S.
persons, including some non-U.S. citizens, who owed some measure of
allegiance to the United States, who had either defected or shown some
interest in defecting." [HSCA V12 p404] The HSCA requested the CIA
provide more information so that it could select, for a detailed
analysis, those defectors who were most similar to OSWALD. The CIA
provided a second list which was "a computer listing of the name, 201
file number, date and place of birth, and a compilation of information
derived from the 201 file, as well as citations for various other
Government agency reports." No HSCA investigators visited CIA
headquarters and went through defector files there. Instead, the CIA
gave the HSCA some of the files the Committee requested, "the vast
majority of which" were in undeleted form. The HSCA conceded there was
not always "an independent means of verifying that all materials
requested from the Agency had, in fact, been provided. Accordingly, any
finding that is essentially negative in nature - such as that LEE HARVEY
OSWALD was neither associated with the CIA in any way, nor ever in
contact with that institution - should explicitly acknowledge the
possibility of oversight." [HSCA R 197] From the second defector list,
the HSCA eliminated those who had :
(A) Been born outside the United States.
(B) Gone to the USSR some time other than the 1958 to 1962 time period.
© Remained outside the United States until 1964."
The HSCA focused on the files of 23 defectors from the original list of
380. The Committee then examined the request dated October 25, 1960,
from the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research on 13
individuals whom it considered defectors. That list included the following:
(A) OSWALD.
(B) Seven individuals whose files the committee had decided to examine
under the previous criteria: Mollie Block; Morris Block; Bruce Frederick
Davis; William H. Martin; Bernon F. Mitchell; Libero Ricciardelli;
Robert Edward Webster.
© Two individuals whose names appeared on the computer listing but had
been excluded since they were not born within the United States [Joseph
Dutkanicz and Vladimir Sloboda]
(D) Three individuals who had not previously been known to the committee
as defectors: David DuBois; (FNU) Sergeant Jones; Sergeant Ernie Fletcher.
When the CIA responded to the October 25, 1960 request of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, two additional
names were added to the original list of twelve defectors - Maurice
Halperin and Virginia Coe. The HSCA had already selected Maurice
Halperin from the computer list of 380 names, but had no knowledge of
Virginia Coe.
MAURICE HALPERIN
Maurice Halperin (born March 3, 1936) was a specialist in Latin American
affairs employed by the OSS during World War II. In the summer of 1967
Maurice Halperin assisted Soviet agents Martha Dodd Stern and her
husband Alfred Kaufman Stern to secretly travel from Mexico to
Czechoslovakia. Maurice Halperin traveled to the USSR shortly after the
departure of the Sterns from Mexico; he was employed by the Soviet
Government as a Latin American specialist and has "periodically renewed
his American passport." This information on Maurice Halperin was
compiled by JAMES ANGLETON. [CIA CSCI-316/01206-67]
The Committee requested all CIA 201 files on the 23 individuals from the
computer list. It requested files on Joseph Dutkanicz, Vladimir Sloboda,
Jones, David DuBois and Ernie Fletcher, since their names appeared on
the State Department defector list. Finally, it asked for the file on
Virginia Coe.
Out of the 29 individuals whose files were the subject of this request,
five were immediately dropped. The CIA could not identify Jones (an Air
Force Intelligence document existed about his defection); David DuBois
and Virginia Coe had defected to China, not the Soviet Union; and the
Martin & Mitchell file was too sensitive and could not be presented to
the HSCA. Now the list was down to 24, on whom the Committee asked other
Government Agencies to provide selected information. After this
analysis, thirteen more defectors were eliminated: 5 for lack of
substantive information; 5 for being Communist Party members who made
frequent trips to the Soviet Union, or for residing outside the United
States for an extended period of time before entering the Soviet Union;
and three for remaining in the Soviet Union for over 20 years. The HSCA:
"Thus, the defector study was reduced to 11 individuals, two of whom
were married." Actually, three of the defectors were married. These
three couples could logically have been eliminated from the study
because OSWALD was single when he defected.
THE THEORY
Anyone who defected to the Soviet Union at the height on the Cold War,
and wasn't a hard core Communist ideologue, had to be a little crazy.
Many of the defectors were just that.
THE BLOCKS
Morris Block (born March 30, 1920) attended the 1957 Sixth World Youth
Festival in the Soviet Union. After the conference, he traveled to
Communist China, prompting the State Department to impound his passport
for misuse. He tried to defect to the Soviet Union with a falsified
passport in 1958. In 1959 Morris Block, his wife Mollie, (born November
6, 1912) and his child defected to Poland. They were transferred to
Moscow, where they applied for visas to China. The Soviets suggested the
Blocks accept Soviet asylum in September 1959, and later issued them
Soviet internal passports for foreigners. They were sent to Leningrad.
There, Morris Block had an affair with his Russian-language teacher, and
his family left him and moved to Moscow where his daughter was
hospitalized for a nervous disorder. After the Blocks were reunited,
they decided to re-defect; however, their applications for Soviet exit
visas were refused. Morris Block disconnected a loudspeaker broadcasting
propaganda at his place of work. Molly Block granted an anti-Soviet
interview to The New York Times. Finally, the Blocks were expelled from
the USSR.
LIBERO RICCIARDELLI
Libero Ricciardelli decided that exposing his three children to a
Communist system of government could straighten out his domestic
problems. In February 1959 he defected, contracted influenza, and was
granted Soviet citizenship after he denounced the United States. By June
1963, the Ricciardelli family returned to the United States.
HAROLD CITRYNELL
Harold Citrynell (born March 10, 1923) entered the Soviet Union with his
wife and child on February 27, 1958. He was granted Soviet citizenship
and remained in the Soviet Union until June 29, 1959. The FBI: "Subject
was born in the U.S. in 1923 and served in the U.S. Army from 1942 to
1945. He graduated from the College of the City of New York with a
degree in mechanical engineering and held many jobs in that field
between 1950 and 1958. In February 1958 he took his wife and infant
daughter to Russia and attempted to obtain Soviet citizenship...he
returned to the U.S. in July 1959. His wife divorced him in 1962 and
after holding several jobs in the U.S. he traveled to England and then
to Bulgaria in 1964. After working for one month in Bulgaria he went on
strike and refused to work. He had numerous difficulties in that country
and eventually returned to the U.S. in 1965 and it appears that he is
emotionally disturbed and suffers from a persecution complex." [From
Legat London (163-2201) Director (165-70603) 8.12.67] That brought the
number of relevant defectors down to eight. Two of these should have
been excluded because they fit the not native-born American criterion,
although their names appeared on the State Department list.
VLADIMIR SLOBODA
Vladimir Sloboda, a native of the Ukraine, was sent to Germany as a
forced laborer during World War II. He enlisted in the United States
Army in Germany in 1953. He became a United States citizen in 1958.
After basic training in the United States, Sloboda was assigned in
August 1958 to an Army Intelligence Group in Europe. He defected to East
Germany in August 1960 requesting Soviet asylum. Vladimir Sloboda's CIA
201 file reflected that the "fact of Army countermeasures caused by the
arrest of 154 MID [East German Military Intelligence] agents recently"
was responsible for his defection. JAMES ANGLETON agreed: "The Sloboda
defection was participated by increased Army security measures,
according to (deleted) in January 1962. Our conclusion that Sloboda was
in prior connection with the KGB turned on the facts that:
(1) Sloboda's prior KGB involvement was confirmed by (deleted) in
January 1962. (It is our assumption that he made the same statements to
the Army debriefers who spoke with him in early 1962.
(2) He was a KGB resettlement case.
(3) he later told an American Embassy official in Moscow that he had
been blackmailed and framed in going to the USSR." Counter-Intelligence
Staff member Newton S. Miler (CI/OG/SOV) prepared a report on Vladimir
Sloboda on October 12, 1960.
SLOBODA'S ATTEMPT AT RECRUITMENT
On April 25, 1969, the CIA reported:
"The Office of Security file of (deleted) reflects that on November 20,
1960, (deleted), an employee of the Joint Overt Interrogation Center
Berlin received a telephone call from an English speaking male
identifying himself as 'your friend Vladimir.' The caller asked
(deleted) if he had been to his mailbox yet, and when (deleted) answered
in the negative, the caller said there was a letter in the box and he
suggested that (deleted) pick it up. The caller added that (deleted)
should not worry about the letter since it had been placed in the box by
a secure means. (Deleted) retrieved the letter, which was postmark
November 20, 1960, read it and immediately called his chief."
The text of the recruitment letter read:
"Dear Mr. Deleted. Don't be surprised at his way of contacting you and
don't take rash action before considering the contents. After watching
and studying your life and activities for some time in the United
States, Austria (Vienna), in Zone (Ulm) and here in West Berlin we have
concluded we might be of service to each other. From different sources
we have come to know many details of your official and private life and
we are aware that your present position gives you small chance for
promotion, and we are aware of the financial hardships you must face.
These difficulties could be much greater if we did not think of sending
you this letter. Being aware of your slips and blunders in work we have
not made any moves which could undermine your reputation with Col. Ross
(Berlin) and Major Huey (Oberusel). It is believed you could draw the
right conclusion from out attitude. It is enough to mention that we were
able to learn much from the documents in March 1959 in Frankfurt Am Main
when you were driving a hired car. Through your slips in handling your
sources Wolfgang and Dieter, in whose path we put no obstacles, many
things became known to us. The same is to be said about the sources you
ran in Vienna under the cover name Porter. By so doing, we hoped to come
to an agreement with you at a suitable time on mutually profitable
terms. We could continue to relate information regarding your activities
and work of your office known to us because of your mistakes, but this
would be pointless. We offer you a business-like cooperation on terms
profitable to both sides. There is no need to describe what we are. It
must be clear to you. Since you are a man of reason and sound logic you
must understand that cooperation will give you a chance to overcome
financial difficulties and make savings for the future. Also, we could
create conditions which would aid the growth of your prestige at your
office and in turn help you get a better job on your return to the
United States. If agreement is reached we will immediately provide you
with a substantial sum to settle your affairs and guarantee you monthly
pay in the future, higher than your salary, as long as you stay in
contact. If you agree to our proposal, come to the democratic sector of
Berlin for future talks. On November 20, 1960, from 1930 to 2000 hours
arrive at the U-Bahn Station in Warchauerbruecks. A representative of
our organization, Vladimir, will meet you at the flower shop at the
entrance to the station...It goes without saying that if during talks we
can't reach mutual agreement, that we will still guarantee you absolute
security and safety. You face no danger during the talks. If we do not
hear from you by December 1, 1960 we shall consider ourselves free to
act. To assure you this letter is not a trap laid by your security
service, we shall broadcast on Soviet Forces Volga Network an old waltz
tune on November 20, 1960, at 1310. If this is not convincing, write us
in advance what other piece of Russian music you would like to hear and
when you would like to hear it. Write to Herr Gruneat, Berlin,
Lichtenberg 1, Postschliessfach 34. When writing we recommend you do not
sign the letter, using any fictitious return address you like...We would
like to warn you that it would be a mistake on your part to show this
letter to your chiefs, because in the long run this will only harm you.
We know there is an instruction from Washington which deals with such
cases and that is kept at the Security Section of Lt. Col. McCord's
office. We do not like to resort to threats, and in principle blackmail
runs counter to our working methods, but you must realize we may be
forced to resort to certain measures, not to compromise you, but to stop
your activities against us. So you have ample chance to get everything
you are striving for. For this you must have courage and resourcefulness."
(Deleted) was of the opinion "that the Russian Intelligence Service was
attempting to suggest that Vladimir Sloboda (MIG defector in August
1960) was being used in this approach." [CIA AC/FIOB/SRS Jerry G. Brown
4.25.69] Vladimir Sloboda had engaged in discussion with (deleted)
regarding "Wolfgang and Dieter" who were assets. Vladimir Sloboda was
clearly a spy seeking asylum, not an American defecting. The Russians
quoted Vladimir Sloboda as saying that he defected because of his
revulsion to the U-2 flights. He never returned to the United States. On
March 23, 1962 ANGLETON'S Deputy, James Hunt, Deputy Chief,
Counter-Intelligence, was consulted about questioning Mrs. Lilian
Sloboda by (deleted) SR/CI/RED. [NARA 1993.06.18.17:30:46:900000 dated
3.28.62]
In 1965 the CIA prepared a report on Vladimir Sloboda, much of which was
withheld. This report dealt with Vladimir Sloboda's knowledge of CIA
personnel and a possible recruitment attempt by him. The document
concluded: "It is not known whether Sloboda is affiliated with the
Soviet Intelligence Services at this time. According to a December 19,
1962, Foreign Service Dispatch from the American Embassy, Moscow,
(deleted)." [CIA Memo J.F. Meredith to Chief/FIOB 9.30.65]
JOSEPH DUTKANICZ
Foreign-born Joseph Dutkanicz visited the Soviet Embassy, Washington, in
1952, made pro-Soviet statements, and listened to Radio Moscow. In 1954
the U.S. Army court-martialed Joseph Dutkanicz on charges of subversive
activity. He was acquitted and allowed to continue his normal U.S. Army
activities. In 1958, while he was stationed in Germany with the U.S.
Army, he was approached and recruited by the KGB. A Western-bloc
security investigation caused him to seek asylum in the USSR.
Joseph Dutkanicz defected to the Soviet Union in June 1960. JAMES
ANGLETON commented: "Security investigations was immediate cause of
defection. USAREUR Case Summary 2-62-2 indicated that DUTKANICZ told
American Embassy, Moscow, official that he was under investigation for
security reasons. He defected soon after, in accord with a KGB
suggestion that he do so...A more significant indication of his KGB
involvement before his defection is the fact that the special decree
granting him Soviet citizenship was enacted three months before his
arrival in the USSR." In 1962 Joseph Dutkanicz's wife, Lilian Dutkanicz
recounted that after their arrival, Russian agents contacted her husband
on a daily basis for a period of six months or more. After one year, her
husband told her he wished to return to the United States and that she
should tell the officials at the U.S. Embassy he had been blackmailed
into collaborating with the Soviets. Joseph Dutkanicz's wife was allowed
to leave the USSR. On November 15, 1963, Joseph Dutkanicz died in a
hospital in Lvov, USSR. [FBI LHM 5.20.65 highly deleted no serial
"Enclosure 105-189"]
Colonel Burke, an Army Counter-Intelligence officer informed Jane Roman
that he suspected Joseph Dutkanicz had KGB connections only after his
defection: "Dutkanicz had not been attached to the 513 MID but to a
signal outfit in which his job was climbing telephone poles. The
statement that both these men had prior KGB connections is not true.
Army just suspected this to be the case after their defection. The
statement that both men fled as the result of Army Security checks is
not true. Both men were not under security check although the Army was
taking an "informal look into" the activities of one of them."
ANGLETON
prepared a report on Joseph Dutkanicz's pre-defection KGB connections
for the Department of the Army in connection with the Warren Commission
report: "USAREUR Case summary 2-62-2 indicated that Dutkanicz himself
told American Embassy officials in Moscow that he had been approached by
KGB representatives in a bar near Darmstadt in 1958 and accepted
recruitment as a result of their threats and inducements. He claimed to
have given them a minimum for cooperation from then until his defection,
although the Army considered it probable that the had done more than he
admitted." [CSCI-316/01779-64 dated 11.7.64 NARA 1993.06.18:56:10:93000]
Lee H. Wigren, Chief, Soviet Research, Counter-Intelligence Research,
noted Joseph Dutkanicz's wife indicated her husband had connections with
the Counter-Intelligence Corps: "She indicated that their trip behind
the Iron Curtain 'had been made possible because her husband worked for
the CIC and was allowed to do things the ordinary 'GI' could not do.
There are also penciled notations in the 201 file suggesting that his
Army assignment may have included intelligence functions of some kind."
[NARA 1993.06.18.17:18:53:500000 - CIA 893-910]
The file made a convincing argument for both defectors having prior
contact wit the KGB. This brought the number of relevant defectors down
to six.
SHIRLEY DUBINSKY
In October 1961 Shirley Dubinsky (born March 11, 1925) wrote several
letters to Premier Khrushchev asking for citizenship, then traveled to
the Soviet Union, where her bizarre behavior caused her to be placed in
a mental hospital. She returned to America in February 1963.
NICHOLAS PETRULLI
Nicholas Petrulli (born February 13, 1921; died in April 1982) was
another mentally ill defector. Nicholas Petrulli visited the Soviet
Union in August 1959 and believed he could land a high-paying job there.
He went to the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, and renounced his citizenship.
Richard Snyder administered the oath of renunciation. About two months
later, Nicholas Petrulli realized he had made a mistake. The State
Department declared him legally incompetent and he was allowed to return
to the United States. Nicholas Petrulli had received a medical discharge
during World War II based on a mental breakdown, and had received
disability payments as a schizophrenic. [FBI Los Angeles JFK case
#-11.24.63] Richard E. Snyder recalled, "The Soviets decided that they
didn't want him. They looked him over for quite a while, the same as
they did OSWALD. And they said, 'No, go home boy.' He was no longer an
American citizen, which made for a bureaucratic tangle. The out that
arose in his case was that he had been discharged from the Air Force on
a mental discharge." After Petrulli returned to the United States the
FBI interviewed his brother, Dominick Petrulli who said Nicholas
"returned from Russia about three or four years ago; shortly thereafter
the attempted to commit suicide, was committed to a mental hospital on
Long Island and later moved to California. Dominick described Nicholas
as being extremely nervous, highly sensitive and one who become
emotional after he realized the gravity of a situation." [FBI Los
Angeles 11.24.63]
On October 31, 1960, the Staff of the Office of Security of the CIA
drafted a memorandum which was sent to the Chief, Security Research
Staff, that listed defectors of interest to the CIA: "Robert Edward
Webster, and Nicholas Petrulli were subject of OO/C [Domestic Contacts
Division] requests on May 29, 1959, and June 15, 1959, respectively,
with a view to their being debriefed upon their return from visits to
Russia. Neither was interviewed by CIA, either before or after their
visits. With reference to Nicholas Petrulli it is noted that his cousin,
Michael Thomas Schiralli, [SSD 84, 253] is a former CIA covert employee
who was assigned to the Robalo site in Panama under Project FJ-HOPEFUL
and also took part in PB SUCCESS. [The overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in
Guatemala in 1954]. As of 1954 he was to be debriefed as he chose to
return to private employment." [CIA Memo from M.D. Stevens 10.31.60
Subject: American Defectors]
MARTIN GREENLINGER
Martin Greenlinger, had fallen in love with a Russian woman while he was
attending the 1957 World Youth Festival in Moscow. In April 1958 he
returned to the Soviet Union and married her, then applied for an exit
visa for her and her child from a previous marriage. In July 1958 Martin
Greenlinger returned to the United States alone. One year later, the
Soviet authorities issued Mrs. Greenlinger the exit visa. The U.S.
Embassy, however, refused to issue an entrance visa due to her Communist
Party affiliation. The CIA file on Martin Greenlinger stated: "This
apparently involved Komsomol membership although the wives of Parker and
OSWALD - q.v. - had many more drawbacks and were let in." In September
1960 Martin Greenlinger was awarded a National Science Foundation
fellowship for one year. Still unable to obtain a U.S. entrance visa for
his wife, he applied for visas at the British Embassy, and was told his
wife would be issued a visa if he got a job in England. Eventually the
National Science Foundation approved his plans to study mathematics in
Manchester, England. The HSCA reported: "No further information is
known." If no further information was known, then this defector did not
fit the criterion of having re-defected before 1964.
BRUCE FREDERICK DAVIS/LEE HARVEY OSWALD
This left three defectors to correlate. One of them was Bruce Frederick
Davis (born Rome, N.Y. May 4, 1936).
1. Bruce Frederick Davis was born in Rome, New York in 1936. He was the
son of Dorothy Talbert of Scottsdale, Arizona. His father was killed in
the Second World War. His stepfather was an officer in the U.S. Army and
his family moved frequently around the U.S. His upbringing was very
strict. [CIA Memo 6.29.62] Bruce Frederick Davis had a difficult
childhood since he spent 12 years of schooling in ten different schools.
OSWALD'S mother moved frequently during his childhood and OSWALD
attended ten different public schools. [WR pp. 672-681]
2. In June 1954, following his high school graduation, Bruce Frederick
Davis enlisted in the Marines and served three years. Bruce Frederick
Davis attended the U.S. Marine Aviation Electronics School. OSWALD
enlisted in the Marines around this time, and attended a similar school.
After discharge from the Marines, Bruce Frederick Davis attended college
and supported himself through various part-time jobs. He enlisted in the
Army in November 1958, and was sent to Fort Benning, Georgia, for
advanced training, and then to Germany, where he was given a Secret
clearance. While in Germany, Bruce Frederick Davis was involved in an
incident with "a Negro soldier, name unrecalled. During the fight half
of Bruce Frederick Davis' right ear was bitten off...Subject's injury
was called 'service connected.'" OSWALD was involved in an attack on a
Mexican-American soldier while he was in the Marines.
3. Bruce Frederick Davis defected to East Germany on August 19, 1960. He
raced his car past the U.S. military patrol near the border, then
abandoned it at the barricade of the border itself. "He walked past the
barricade and was apprehended about 300 yards inside the Soviet Zone of
Germany by two border policemen who searched for weapons and turned him
over to another two man police border patrol." Bruce Frederick Davis was
questioned by Soviet Zone authorities. He claimed he answered all their
questions innocuously, and did not reveal he had a Secret clearance
while assigned for a short period to Division Headquarters in Wuerzberg,
Germany. The Soviets were dissatisfied with the results of the
interview, and Bruce Frederick Davis was sent to East Germany, where he
was kept in a series of safehouses, then blindfolded and sent to a
barred building. Bruce Frederick Davis asked if he could attend
Friendship University in Moscow to complete his college education.
Instead, on October 3, 1960, he was sent to the University of Kiev.
In October 1960 two articles appeared in Izvestya and Pravda, with
statements by Bruce Frederick Davis attributing his defection to
disillusionment with U.S. foreign and military policy: "On the night of
August 19, 1960, I deserted the U.S. Army. I am 24 years old. I was born
and raised in the U.S.A. I am not married. I didn't belong to any
political party and didn't have any other reasons to be discontented
with my life in the West. All my hopes as a simple American who wants
peace were destroyed by the spy flights of the U-2 and RB-47 planes, and
the breakdown of the Paris conference for heads of states...I hope to
receive this political asylum in the USSR, to continue my education and
to live and work among the Soviet people." On July 1, 1960, the Soviets
had shot down an Air Force RB-47 reconnaissance plane which was on a
ferret flight along the Soviet border, a mission designed to activate
and pinpoint Soviet radar. [Ross & Wise The Espionage Establishment
p251] OSWALD denied that he was a communist prior to his defection,
which allegedly was based on similar objections to capitalism.
4. Although Bruce Frederick Davis physically defected, he did not
officially denounce his American citizenship, and the documents provided
to him by the Soviets categorized him as a stateless person. OSWALD was
issued a stateless-person passport. Bruce Frederick Davis settled in
Kiev as a student at the Kiev Institute of National Economy, where he
was provided a free dormitory room and a subsidy of 900 old rubles per
month. OSWALD received a government subsidy of 700 old rubles per month.
UNAUTHORIZED TRAVEL
Bruce Frederick Davis made many unauthorized trips while he was studying
in the Soviet Union. The CIA reported: "After his repatriation in 1963,
Davis told U.S. authorities that he made a total of seven unauthorized
trips from Kiev during the 1961 to 1963 period...Davis was apprehended
on two of his seven trips, and was returned to Kiev each time under
escort. On both occasions he was merely reprimanded by the Deputy Chief
of the Institute at which he was studying." On May 1, 1961, he flew to
Moscow and spent three days there, where "he met an American tourist, a
former salesman for an electronics firm in Los Angeles, approximately 27
years old, who stated that he had been in Rumania. He was separated from
his wife, by whom he had two children, because of a love affair with a
girl in Rumania. Bruce Frederick Davis later wrote a letter to him and
sent it off to Rumania. The unidentified tourist answered by stating
that correspondence between them might be dangerous to those in the
U.S.A., and therefore was not to be continued." The meaning of this was
unclear. In July 1961 Bruce Frederick Davis made an unauthorized trip to
Johnkoi, Crimea, where he had seen some Badger bombers arriving and
departing from an unseen military airfield. Bruce Frederick Davis was
apprehended for traveling without a permit, and sent back to Kiev. In
September 1962 he appeared at the American Embassy, Moscow, to request
an American passport. He was apprehended on the second day and sent back
to Kiev under guard. He phoned the Embassy and stated he would not be
completing the application, as he had been arrested for participation in
a brawl in Kiev. He returned to the Embassy in October 1962, and was
issued a passport and an entry visa into West Germany. Bruce Frederick
Davis allowed the passport and visa to expire, allegedly due to a new
Soviet girlfriend he met.
Bruce Frederick Davis visited the Embassy on another unauthorized trip
in January 1963. He delivered papers to the Embassy from another unhappy
defector and from Soviet citizen Vitalya Kalinochenko. These papers
contained Kalinochenko's autobiography, the reasons he was dissatisfied
with the Communists, and a request to be contacted regarding his
experiences with the Soviet Navy and the rockets used by the Soviet
Navy. On July 19, 1963, Bruce Frederick Davis went to the U.S. Embassy,
Moscow, and, "with the help of a Mr. Fain, U.S. Embassy official" his
re-defection plans were completed. Fain was listed in Who's Who in the
CIA: "Fain, Thomas Alexander. Born: March 22, 1922; Language: Russian.
1943 to 1945 First Lieutenant in G-2 of U.S. Army; from 1949 in
Department of State, work for CIA (Economic espionage); 1962
Intelligence School in Oberammergau; OpA: Belgrade, Oberammergau, Moscow
(2nd Secretary), Washington." The decision that Bruce Frederick Davis
had not expatriated himself was made by Counsel Samuel G. Wise: "Samuel
Wise may well be Samuel Griffin Wise Jr. #74574, SD & SSD, who
apparently was once (deleted). The State Department reviewed Wise's file
on June 2, 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. Wise was Second
Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time Wise advised
in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Fredrick
Davis, #352267 who defected from the United States Army in Germany on
August 18, 1960, had not expatriated himself. Davis' case is very
similar to that of OSWALD, and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet
Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application
for return to the United States. Wise was an applicant for CIA
employment in early 1953 and was security approved Subject to polygraph
on August 11, 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the
office which had been interested in him was 'no longer interested.' On
November 13, 1953, Wise was (deleted)." [CIA Office of Security
Marguerite D. Stevens 1.29.64]
BRUCE FREDRICK DAVIS' POLYGRAPH TEST
Bruce Frederick Davis was returned to military control in July 1963 and
was debriefed by Army Intelligence. He told Army Intelligence that he
believed in "the theory of Marxism and Leninism. He feels that the
system would work in a highly industrialized nation, such as the United
States, because in the USSR, which is a backward nation, the system does
not work properly. Bruce Frederick Davis does not believe in the present
method of application of the system in the USSR. Bruce Frederick Davis
refused to admit he was a communist, but he did admit that he was
sympathetic towards communism. During the interview, he, at every
opportunity, defended the Soviet way of life, praised their economic
struggle, and voiced admiration for the Soviet communist personality."
Bruce Frederick Davis was polygraphed by Army Intelligence with such
questions as, "Were you required to sign a statement of obligation to
work for Eastern intelligence upon your return to the U.S.?" Bruce
Frederick Davis answered, "No," and the polygraph showed no sign of
deception. Bruce Frederick Davis was then asked a similar question,
which was withheld by Army Intelligence. His answer to this question was
also withheld, but we are told he displayed reactions indicative of
deception. The debriefing report continued: "A reaction indicative of
deception was recorded in his answer to Question 2, Test III," which
was, "Isn't it true you were forced to leave Russia?" Bruce Frederick
Davis answered, "No." When confronted with his reaction, "He
denied
being forced in any way to leave Russia, or that he was asked by anyone
to leave. He denied that he left for any reason except of his own desire
and he left by the method he had previously revealed, that of contacting
the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, and being given a visa." The report continued:
"Bruce Frederick Davis failed to answer Question 7, Test III." This
question was: "Do you believe in communist theory?" "No
answer." He was
asked why he did not answer the question. "He replied that he refused to
answer under the provisions afforded him in Article 31, UCMJ, because
his answer might tend to incriminate him."
The FBI: "Following his return to United States control he was sentenced
on October 1, 1963 to a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay
and allowances, hard labor for one year, and reduced to the enlisted
grade of Private E-1. He is currently serving this sentence at the
Federal Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas." [highly deleted memo D.J.
Brennan to Sullivan 12.7.63] In the early 1960's, the CIA and the State
Department conducted an interagency exchange of information on
defectors. The CIA reported to the State Department that there were five
defectors who were ascertained KGB agents: Dutkanicz, Martin, Mitchell,
Sloboda and Bruce Frederick Davis. [CIA 1634-1088 p11] This researcher
has no further information on Bruce Frederick Davis other than a highly
deleted FBI report from Phoenix, Arizona, dated November 13, 1964. [FBI
105-92510-35 pgs. B, 1-4, 6-8; FBI 105-92510 NR Serial dated 7.28.69]
ANALYSIS
When Bruce Frederick Davis was not on the polygraph, he expressed his
belief in communist doctrine. When he was connected to the polygraph,
however, he refused to discuss his beliefs. Would the polygraph have
indicated deception? Bruce Frederick Davis fit OSWALD'S profile. He was
possibly an Army "dangle." A recently released CIA document described
him as "a source."
ROBERT EDWARD WEBSTER
Robert Edward Webster, (born October 23, 1928, Tiffin, Ohio), was a
plastics technician for the Rand Development Corporation who made
several trips to the Soviet Union to prepare for the 1959 U.S.
Exhibition in Moscow. He defected to the USSR in October 1959.
THE RAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
The Rand Development Corporation was a CIA proprietary. On October 9,
1959, the CIA surmised that "As was pointed out last June and earlier,
it might well have been of value to have obtained from ATIC, or the
coordinator for the fair, a list of persons who Rand was sending to the
USSR in order to avoid inadvertent contacts with such people as Robert
Edward Webster and Ted Korycki as Guide 223 or Lincoln Leads
respectively. This might be something to note for any future operation.
Of the others mentioned [in a newspaper article about Webster's
defection] H.J. Rand was (deleted)." In 1975 the CIA reported: "A
check
of Agency records has not revealed that Webster has ever been used in
any capacity by this Agency or ever been given any type of clearance.
Consideration was being given in late May 1959 and early June 1959 for a
debriefing of Webster in regard to his proposed travel to the USSR.
However, Webster was not contacted prior to his departure for the USSR.
On his return to the United States in 1962 Subject was debriefed by
Agency Officers to obtain Soviet Realities data." [NARA
1993.08.14.09:37:45:870028]
DOCTOR H. J. RAND
The President of the Rand Development Corporation was Doctor H. J. Rand.
H.J. Rand's father was Vice-Chairman of Sperry-Rand. [63-Civ-2753-USDC
SDNY; Fortune 11.63 p135] The telephone number for the Rand Development
Corporation in New York City was answered at a division of
Martin-Marietta. Martin-Marietta was a major stockholder in Sperry-Rand.
H.J. Rand undertook private negotiations with the USSR for the purchase
of technical devices and information, on behalf of the CIA's Office of
Scientific Intelligence. During the late 1950's, CIA Agent Christopher
Bird was the representative of the Rand Development Corporation in
Washington, D.C. The Executive Vice President for Research and
Development of the Rand Development Corporation, George Bookbinder, was
a former OSS man who worked under Frank Wisner in Bucharest in 1944.
[NYT 6.15.59; Smith OSS Univ. of Calif. Press London 1977 p397;
Bookbinder DOB 7.7.14 died 11.79] In 1967 the Chairman of Rand
Development was J. Elroy McCaw. In 1990 Forbes Magazine named him one of
the richest 400 men in America. In 1970 Bookbinder and H.J. Rand had a
falling out. Bookbinder sued Rand Development. [USDC SDNY 71 Civil 5631]
On October 23, 1964, Birch O'Neal suggested that Yuri Nosenko (AEDONER,
"Sammy") be questioned about George Bookbinder, H.J. Rand and
Brigadier
General W. Randolf Lovelace's connection to Galina Ivanovna Rednikina, a
Russian language secretary.
Sammy Misc Ex 355
October 23, 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/CI/K (Deleted). Attention Miss (Deleted).
SUBJECT: Requirement for AEDONER
1. It is requested that AEDONER be shown the attached items which refer
to the following individuals and be requested to provide all information
he may have concerning the persons and events referred to in all the items:
Galina Ivanova Rednikina, an interpreter at the Sovietskaya Hotel in
Moscow who has acted as a Russian language secretary for,
George H. Bookbinder, an official of the Rand Development Corporation of
Cleveland, Ohio, and
Henry James Rand, head of the Rand Development Corporation, and
Brigadier General W. Randolph Lovelace, Flight Surgeon and head of
aero-space medical program of NASA, who visited the USSR in 1958 with
Bookbinder and Rand.
2. For your information, only Rand, Bookbinder and Lovelace have had
frequent contact with Soviet officials both in the United States and the
USSR, including Mikhail Ilich Bruk, formerly with the Soviet Ministry of
Health, who was identified by AEDONER as an agent of the KGB.
3. You will also note that Rand was the employer of Robert E. Webster,
who defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and renounced his U.S. citizenship.
4. This matter will also be of interest to Mrs. (Deleted) of SR/CI.
Birch O'Neal Chief, CI/SIG
Attachments: Bio Sheet and Photo of Redivkina (Photo to be returned to
CI/SIG); Original clipping and copy from New York Times dated November
15, 1959, with photo of Bookbinder (Original photo of Bookbinder to be
returned to CI/SIG); Copies of clipping referring to Rand and Webster;
Copy of clipping referring to Lovelace.
Distribution: SR, OS/SRS, CI/SIG
THE RAND CORPORATION
The Rand Development Corporation was often confused with CIA-linked
think tank known as the Rand Corporation - the Rand Development
Corporation was called the Rand Corporation in at least one State
Department document. The Rand Corporation was organized in 1946 by
General Henry "Hap" Arnold to perpetuate the partnership of military
men
and university scientists that had been established during the war. Rand
was initially administered by the Douglas Aircraft Corporation. The
Sperry-Rand Corporation provided part of the initial funding for the
Rand Corporation although Rand stands for research and development.
In 1968 the CIA ties of the Rand Development Corporation were exposed
because of an Department of Interior expense inquiry into an
antipollution contract between the Rand Development Corporation and that
Agency. Donald L. Hambric of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration mentioned the contract to Department of the Interior
officials. He wrote: "Rand also has a small classified contract with the
CIA and any auditor working at Rand should have at least a secret
clearance." [NYT 4.25.55, 4.16.67, 3.7.68, Sel. Repat. Cases Inv. U.S.
Def. to USSR c/c 11.6.64; 71-Civ-5631 USDC-SDNY p3; Balt. News. American
1.31.75; NYT 3.7.68]
TONY ULASEWICZ AND RAND DEVELOPMENT
Tony Ulasewicz, a member of NIXON's White House/Special Operations Group
wrote: "When I first met Chotiner, the first thing he did was to hand me
a file on the Rand Development Corporation and its officers...Chotiner's
file on the Rand Development Corporation disclosed that during the 1968
presidential campaign Rand was named as a defendant in a lawsuit started
by some angry Minnesota businessmen. The charge was that the Small
Business Administration and the Government Services Administration were
guilty of fraud and conspiracy in the way a government contract for some
postal vehicles was awarded to a wholly-owned the Rand Development
Corporation subsidiary, the Universal Fiberglass Corporation. The
Universal Fiberglass Corporation, the lawsuit charged, was born for the
sole purpose [of obtaining this contract]. "Despite apparent lack of
qualifications, a crony of Senator Hubert Humphrey awarded the contact
to the Universal Fiberglass Corporation. The Universal Fiberglass
Corporation defaulted and disappeared under Rand Development's
umbrella." Murray Chotiner was trying to bring this situation to the
attention of the media. [Ulasewicz, Pres. Priv. Eye, 1990]
ROBERT EDWARD WEBSTER'S DEFECTION
While in Moscow for seven weeks, beginning May 1959, Robert Edward
Webster dated Vera Ivchenko, the hostess employed at the tourist
restaurant of the Hotel Ukraine. In this capacity, Vera Ivchenko
contacted many foreign correspondents, including those who accompanied
Vice President NIXON to the USSR. According to the information given to
the HSCA by the CIA, Vera Ivchenko was suspected of being a KGB agent.
When the HSCA wrote about Robert Edward Webster, it never mentioned Vera
Ivchenko's name: it referred to her as Robert Edward Webster's
girlfriend. Robert Edward Webster conveyed to Ivchenko that he wished to
divorce his wife in the United States and return to the Soviet Union to
marry her. Robert Edward Webster first revealed his desire to defect on
July 11, 1959. He approached two Soviet officials in charge of
arrangements for the U.S. Exhibition, and requested information
concerning the procedures for a U.S. citizen to remain in the USSR.
Robert Edward Webster was given a telephone number to call, and a
meeting was set up in the private room of a restaurant. Robert Edward
Webster was instructed to write a letter to the Supreme Soviet
requesting to remain as a citizen. He was given a form to fill out which
he would submit to Mr. Popof. With Popof, Robert Edward Webster filled
out a questionnaire furnishing his background and expressing his wish to
remain in Russia to "better himself in the plastics industry." When
Popof would not accept this, Robert Edward Webster said: "I want to stay
in the Soviet Union because all the businesses in America are
government-controlled." He refused to publicly denounce the United
States, but stated that he "wished to cooperate in every way with the
Soviet Union." In late July or early August, he attended a meeting in a
private restaurant room at the Metropole Hotel. Robert Edward Webster
told two Soviet chemists he could help them make the Rand spray gun
which he demonstrated at the U.S. Exhibition. Robert Edward Webster also
attempted to design a fiberglass resin depositor, but due to the lack of
parts and equipment, the machine did not work.
Robert Edward Webster told the FBI that he was never questioned by the
KGB: "The only time I was questioned concerning American defense matters
occurred when some Moscow engineers asked me what government work was
handled in the Rand Development Corporation. I denied any knowledge of
this, because I had none." Robert Edward Webster informed the HSCA that
the KGB never contacted him, that there was no reason for them to do so
as the government officials who aided him in his defection had his
entire story. He said he had never been questioned relative to
intelligence matters. On September 9, 1959, he was told that he had been
accepted as a Soviet citizen. He disappeared the next day. Although he
asked to work in Moscow, the Soviets informed him he would be sent to
Leningrad. The following day, the Soviet officials registered Robert
Edward Webster at the Bucharest Hotel, and instructed him not to leave.
He was given 1000 old rubles, and asked to write a note to a Rand
Development employee requesting that money be left for him at the hotel,
since he was going on a tour of Russia. The KGB threw a short party for
Robert Edward Webster on September 11, 1959. He was then flown to
Leningrad with an interpreter, where an Intourist representative met
him. He applied for work at the Leningrad Scientific Institute of
Polymerized Plastics, and lived in a hotel with Ivchenko. On October 17,
1959, Robert Edward Webster was in Moscow. He attended a meeting at the
OVIR Central Office with the original Soviet representative with whom he
had contact; an unknown Soviet; Doctor H.J. Rand; George H. Bookbinder;
and Richard E. Snyder. At this meeting, Robert Edward Webster said he
was free to speak; he told Richard E. Snyder that when he applied for
Soviet citizenship, he was granted a Soviet passport on September 21,
1959. He never exhibited the passport to Richard E. Snyder, because it
had not yet been issued to him. When Robert Edward Webster later decided
to re-defect, he told Richard E. Snyder he had no Soviet documentation
at the OVIR meeting but was still in possession of the American passport
which he never sent to Richard E. Snyder as requested. He did, however,
fill out a State Department form, "Affidavit for Expatriated Person,"
in
which he renounced his American citizenship. Vera Ivchenko joined him
the following day for a month-long vacation. [also see DOS ltr. Snyder
to Boster 10.28.59; Davis to Snyder 12.10.59] On return to Leningrad,
the couple began work at the plastics institute, where Vera Ivchenko was
employed as an assistant and translator. They resided in a new apartment
building.
On October 8, 1959, an Memorandum for the Record was generated by
(deleted) "Regarding: Attempts to Locate Webster; receipt of (above)
Emb. Cable. - AIIC Cleveland asked whether Webster was carrying out
clandestine task for CIA which hadn't been coordinated with them. Was
assured that this was not case & to best of our knowledge Webster had
not been briefed by & was unknown to either DDP or OO Offices. Check
made with (deleted); had encountered Webster on a few social occasions;
he will consult with Messrs. (deleted) to produce a more complete
picture of Webster."
On October 20, 1959, this Memorandum for the Record was generated by
Bruce L. Solie, Office of Security / Security Research Staff regarding
Robert Edward Webster: "(Deleted) advised (deleted) called Roman
regarding Agency interest in Webster. - Office of Security files - no
clearance; was an OO/C interest in Webster in late May 1959, but Webster
wasn't contacted by OO/C prior to trips to USSR. CI/OA files - no record."
On October 21, 1959, this document was sent by (deleted) to Chief,
Domestic Contacts Division, attention Support Branch "Regarding: Webster
case at recent Machine Searching Conference on October 20, 1959. Our
organization has no interest in matter."
On October 22, 1959, an Office Memo (Deleted) to Chief, Contact
Division, Attention Support (Deleted) re: Webster was generated
"Questions asked by Major Robert Lochera (?) of OSI: a) Is this office
doing anything re: Webster's defection? b) If not, do they contemplate
doing anything? c) What would this office have done if Webster left
normally? (Deleted) called next day w/response they knew only what was
in newspapers regarding Webster; (not very cooperative)."
"A CIA Office Memorandum dated October 23, 1959, was sent to Chief
Contact Bureau (Deleted)concerned: "information on Vera Ivchenko,
Webster's girlfriend."
"October 26, 1959. Memo (Deleted) to Director, FBI, regarding Agency
interest in Webster. Webster never used by Agency; was considered for
debriefing May 1959 to June 1959, however, he wasn't contacted prior to
departure for USSR. Agency does have (deleted) [interest in Rand
Development]. In view of Webster's employment with Rand Development
Corporation, please forward any information obtained in the
investigation of Webster."
On October 28, 1959 a report on Robert Edward Webster stated: "Webster
was given security clearance on June 5, 1959, but never had access to
military information."
"October 30, 1959. Office Memo (Deleted) regarding Kent (of WRU)
conversation with H.J. Rand regarding Webster."
These document came from a handwritten summary of all the CIA documents
in Webster's file prepared by the HSCA on March 15, 1978. Several pages
of entries marked Volume III (Cont.) & Vol. IV have been deleted.
ANALYSIS
Some people in the CIA thought Robert Edward Webster was an operation
due to his connection with the Rand Development Company. This researcher
thought Robert Edward Webster was an operation until documents
declassified in 1995 revealed that before coming to Rand Development,
Robert Edward Webster had worked for six corporations that had nothing
to do with the intelligence community. Just before Robert Edward Webster
left for the Soviet Union The New York Times took a family photograph.
It on October 20, 1959, and showed Robert Edward Webster, a Quaker, with
wife Martha, his seven-year-old son Michael, and daughter six-year-old
Anne reading a magazine entitled USSR. Robert Edward Webster deserted
his wife of eight years and his two children in Ohio with no apparent
warning except for a call to the Russian secretary in the Rand
Development Company's Moscow office; he requested the secretary notify
his family he was not returning. If Robert Edward Webster was an agent,
his method of establishing a cover was extraordinary. The KGB would have
found it difficult to believe that a CIA spy would leave his wife and
children in the United States, then have a child with a Russian woman.
Robert Edward Webster was destroying his family. Was someone carrying
out the dictates of the Doolittle Report and "hitherto acceptable norms
of human conduct no longer applied" or was Robert Edward Webster crazy?
Logic dictated that the KGB would have been interested in the Rand
Development Corporation, simply because its name evoked the Rand
Corporation. Webster was probably questioned by the KGB.
WEBSTER LOOSES HIS CITIZENSHIP
Robert Edward Webster was granted a Soviet internal passport after
writing a summary of his life, listing his relatives and where they
worked, submitting photographs of himself, and undergoing a medical
examination. In December or January 1960, he turned over his American
passport and obtained a Soviet passport at the OVIR office in Leningrad.
Robert Edward Webster had lawfully renounced his citizenship; the State
Department issued a Certificate of Loss of Citizenship.
MARINA OSWALD AND ROBERT WEBSTER?
This entry was found in a CIA Name List With Traces on Marina Oswald's
address book: "Prizentsev, Lev Kondrat'yevskiy Prosepepekt 7, Apt. 63 or
Kondrat'yevskiy Prosepepekt 63 Apt 7, Leningrad." In a December 17, 1963
FBI interview, Marina Oswald said she met Lev Prizentsev at a rest home
near Leningrad [October 1960?] and that 'he had an amorous interest in
Irina Volkova [q.v.] who, unfortunately was already married.' Traces: 1.
No traces on Prizentsev. 2. Robert E. Webster claimed to have resided in
a three-room apartment at Kondrat'yevskiy Prosepepekt 63 Apt. 18,
Leningrad." Did Robert Edward Webster know Marina Oswald? Robert Edward
Webster told the FBI he had no contact with LEE OSWALD, although he had
heard of him. [David Slawson WC Notes #340] In 1993 Lev Prizentsev said
he did not know that Robert Edward Webster lived in his building.
[Interview with W.S. Malone 5.12.93] ANGLETON sent a memorandum to J.
Edgar Hoover about this on May 11, 1964. Marina Oswald told this
researcher in 1994: "There may have been a connection or there was none
at all. I tell you what it is. When I was going to pharmacy school I was
there with Ellie Sobreta whose address is in my book. It just happened
to be in a good neighborhood, and if Robert Edward Webster was living
there, neither of us knew. She doesn't know it up to this day. So people
started making connections where is none. I did not know Webster. She
simply was my friend and I visit her and he lived in her building."
WEBSTER REDEFECTS
After six months had passed, Robert Edward Webster began to take the
steps necessary to re-defect. In early December 1959 he wrote to the
U.S. Embassy; he claimed he had received no reply to this letter. In
January 1960 he received a letter from his father informing him that his
mother had a nervous breakdown and he was needed in the United States. A
daughter, Svetlana Robertovna Webster, was born to the couple in August
1960. In late April 1961 Popof arranged for him and Ivchenko to visit
Moscow on Mayday. In Moscow, due to his American clothing, he entered
the American Embassy unchallenged. He informed Consul John McVickar that
he wished to return to the United States. John McVickar requested two
notarized statements from Robert Edward Webster's father saying he would
be responsible for his son after Robert Edward Webster's return, and
told him to apply for a Soviet exit visa. When he returned to Leningrad,
Ivchenko helped him prepare the application for the exit visa. She gave
her consent, which was required.
Still, high government officials, suspected Robert Edward Webster was on
a CIA mission. On April 15, 1961, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, sent a letter to McGeorge Bundy, the
National Security advisor to President John F. Kennedy's, which stated
the CIA had no operational relationship with Robert Edward Webster.
{Rockefeller Commission handwritten notes.] In June 1961, Robert Edward
Webster was apprised that his request for an exit visa had been denied;
he would have to wait one year before he could reapply.
On November 8, 1961, a CIA Official Routing Slip indicated that
documents on Webster had been sent to CI/SIG Mr. O'Neal, Mrs. Egerter,
Evans, Grady, RID Files. Remarks: CD/OO Case 29.267 From S. Stetson
CD/OO Support Branch.
Soviet officials from Moscow visited Robert Edward Webster, inquired why
he was unhappy, and suggested he send for his American family. In
February 1962 he was granted an exit visa. In March 1962 the American
Embassy gave him instructions on obtaining an American entrance visa.
Robert Edward Webster quit his job, and his father sent him a plane
ticket for his passage home. He surrendered his internal Soviet passport
for his exit visa in May. Robert Edward Webster arrived in the United
States as an alien under the Russian quota, on May 20, 1962. He did not
attempt to get Ivchenko or his daughter out of the Soviet Union. [DOS
For. Ser. Disp. 10.25.59 - Edward Freers; WCE960 p3; FBI 105-82555-NR
2.7.64; HSCA V12 p448-450]
WEBSTER'S DEBRIEFING
Shortly after his return to the United States, Robert Edward Webster's
wife divorced him. She married W.G. Belding of Zelienople, Pennsylvania.
Eugene S. Rittenburg, Cleveland Resident Agent, reported this to
Headquarters. Robert Edward Webster was debriefed in Ohio by CIA and Air
Force representatives. The CIA reported: "(Deleted) and (Deleted) talked
alone with Webster in the INS offices for about one hour. During this
time, no attempt was made to secure any FPI, rather it was a general
'get acquainted' type session. Webster was very well-dressed, but
extremely nervous. His nervousness was not caused by our presence, as
Mr. O'Brian had previously told us that he was having difficultly
getting Webster's fingerprints as he was perspiring so profusely - even
through his fingertips." [CIA Pitts F.O. 6.28.62] Robert Edward Webster
was brought to CIA Headquarters where he was debriefed for two weeks.
The debriefing reports included a chronology of his life, the CIA's
assessment of him, information regarding life in the Soviet Union,
Robert Edward Webster's work there, biographical data on persons he met
there, and other information which was classified. [CIA SR/6-62-274,
11.1.62, Kay Grady] Ann Egerter, Birch O'Neal, (FNU) Grady and (FNU)
Evans received copies of the debriefing.
Robert Edward Webster told the CIA that his father was a ceramics
engineer who was still in college when he was born. "The family lived in
Columbus until the father graduated from college and then moved to South
Milwaukee...Subject describes these years as being lean and describes
the family as being 'poor.'He recalls that in Milwaukee he developed a
fear of being in water. In Louisville he was caught trying to steal
apples from a neighborhood store. He states he was sent home by the
store owner but not punished. In Louisville, when the Subject was six or
seven years old his mother reportedly suffered a nervous breakdown. It
was described to him that his mother passed out and was hospitalized in
a Louisville City Hospital. He states that his father indicated that he
never knew the reason why his mother became ill. He recalls visiting his
mother in the hospital and viewing her through a screen wire door. This
scene became quite vivid for him again in January 1960 in Moscow when he
received a letter from his father in which the father stated that his
mother had suffered a complete mental breakdown and was in the hospital
again...He isn't sure how long his mother was in the hospital...At the
same time while studying at night he took a day job in a manufacturing
plant. On weekends he went home to his parents by bus and during one
such trip he met his future wife. She was also studying away from home
in a beauticians school and going home on weekends. After a short
courtship he proposed, she accepted and they eloped. His wife was under
age and kept her true age from the authorities when applying for a
marriage license. Their plan was to keep their marriage secret until
after his wife had finished beauticians school. However, the news
somehow got back to his wife's parents and the secret was out. His
mother-in-law was quite upset over the marriage. His parents, however,
accepted in calmly and without fanfare and the subject notes that they
could do little else since they also eloped when they were married. His
wife finished beauticians school and he dropped out of Carnegie Tech and
began the job of supporting them. He changed jobs and his wife began
part-time work as a beautician. But they found the going difficult and
after a few months he found a job in a plastics factory in his home
town. His wife, who is a diabetic and has been since childhood, became
pregnant. Because of her diabetes she required special medical care
during her pregnancy. One year and one month after their marriage their
first child, a son, was delivered by cesarean section. Subject became
active in civic and church affairs, was promoted to foreman capacity in
the plastics plant and he began attending a local small college in the
evening studying chemistry. (Paragraph Deleted) His wife required
constant medical attention as well as insulin and special diet. On two
occasions early in their marriage she went into insulin coma and was
seriously ill. Their expenses were greater than his income and he found
himself getting deeper in debt. Feeling he could better himself he began
looking for a new job and found a better paying one in a nearby town. He
again was given a supervisory position in this plastics plant but this
time he was supervising all female workers. (Paragraph Deleted). The
plastics plant where he was working was purchased by another firm and
though he was advised that he would not loose his job, in anticipation
of being fired he quite his job...he continued to look for other work
and through business contacts was approached by the Rand Development
Company of Cleveland and was offered a better paying job with them. He
accepted an moved to Cleveland. Soon he was assigned to a traveling job
in which he was to demonstrate a new piece of plastics manufacturing
equipment. He began to travel frequently and each trip began to keep him
away from home for longer periods of time. His wife became increasingly
upset because of his prolonged absences...On one trip in 1958 in Chicago
after getting an exhibit set up and eating and drinking in excess he had
his first episode of passing out. He describes being under a great deal
of tension he knew he was going into shock. Realizing what was going on
he told people what to do for him and after lying down for a while, he
soon recovered. A similar episode occurred in Moscow in May 1959 where
he was preparing the plastics equipment for the exhibition. In 1959 his
company asked him to go to Moscow to set up an exhibit...On the second
trip he was gone much longer than originally planned for and he soon
began receiving letters from his wife in which she gave him a 'fit about
his long absences. He notes that once in the States he was away for some
time and on returning home he found that his wife had taken the children
and had left town. He located them at his in-laws and when he asked his
wife to return she questioned whether he really wanted his family or
not. He convinced her that he did and she returned.
"During his second stay in Moscow he met a Russian girl, Vera. He first
met her in restaurant where she worked as a translator and soon
thereafter began dating her. He found himself comparing her with his
wife and soon began telling Vera all his family troubles. He describes
Vera as married but separated from her husband. She was pictured as
petite, womanly and passionate. In the next breath he spontaneously
denied intimate relationships with her until after the Soviets had
officially informed him he could stay in the Soviet Union (Deleted). The
Subject feels that somehow, somewhere during his second prolonged seven
to eight week visit in Moscow, Vera subtly suggested that he stay in
Russia. But at the same time she 'pooh-poohed the idea that he could or
would stay.' During this visit he made up his mind to attempt to stay in
Russia and so informed Vera. 'I must have been way off base and I wonder
if I had a nervous breakdown.' But staying in Russia offered him a
chance to get as far away as possible from his troubles at home and the
plastics industry in Russia was in its infancy and he felt he could make
his mark there.
"Sometime in mid-summer 1959 he returned to the U.S. and was home for
ten days. This period with his wife is described as being a honeymoon
but in spite of this he continued with his plan to return to the Soviet
Union and request permission to remain there. He packed some winter
clothes, books and jazz records to take with him.
"On returning to the USSR sometime in July 1959 he approached a male
translator at the exhibit and inquired as to necessary procedure to
obtain permission to become a permanent resident of the USSR. He
received some vague answers and then was asked to identify the person
who was interested in such a step. He then indicated he was the
interested party and there began shortly thereafter a series of
clandestine meetings with various Soviet officials. At each meeting he
states he drank heavily and was generally 'loaded' by the time the
meeting was over."
Technical information supplied by Robert Edward Webster was included in
a Joint Report of the Foreign Technical Division, Air Force Systems
Command, and the CIA. On February 20, 1970, the Domestic Contacts
Division/Operational Support Staff contacted CI/Liaison Jane Roman
regarding Robert Edward Webster. [NARA 1993.08.02.20:01:25: 870033]
Robert Edward Webster
Sstetson/ bm HH-20822
DCS/Operational Support Staff 2268
900 Key Building February 20, 1970
DO/DCSL
CI Liaison (Illegible)
Mrs. Roman For your information
2 C 42 Hq. (Illegible)
ROBERT EDWARD WEBSTER: A VEGETABLE
Frontline located Robert Edward Webster in 1993. He was in Oaks Nursing
Home, New Bedford, Massachusetts, and was allegedly unable to converse.
[CIA 535-227A, 522-228; CIA Name List with Traces Vladimir Makarov,
Robert Aleksanddrovich Ivanov also Vanda Kuznetsova] Robert Edward
Webster's nurse, Susan Gilbert, told me: "He suffers from no mental
illness. His family doesn't want him to talk and his legal guardian
doesn't want him to talk. He's a shell of the man he once was. Medical
ethics prevent me from telling you more. He doesn't want to talk to you
or see you."
OSWALD'S DOMESTIC CONTACTS DIVISION DEBRIEFING
The HSCA conducted a review of defector files to determine whether
defectors were routinely debriefed upon their return to the United
States. The HSCA began with the CIA's full list of 380 defectors. From
this list, the HSCA compiled a list of persons who were U.S. born
citizens who defected, or attempted to defect, to the Soviet Union
between 1958 and 1963, and who returned to the U.S. within the same
period. In addition, the Committee included individuals from the October
25, 1960, State Department letter regarding defectors sent to the CIA.
The Committee requested files on 29 individuals and the CIA provided
files on 28 individuals on whom it maintained records. These 201 files
were reviewed as well as any existing Domestic Contacts Division files.
The review revealed that, in the cases of six of the individuals, there
was no indication they had ever returned to the United States. As for
the other 22 defectors, the file review showed there was no record of
CIA contact with 17, although 4 of these files contained reports by
sources who had advised the Agency of their contact with the
re-defectors, so they had been indirectly contacted. The circumstances
of the CIA's contact with the other five defectors differed:
Irving Amron (born December 4, 1917) - His file reflected that he had
been living in the USSR since 1933 and returned to the United States in
1962. He was debriefed by a CIA officer after applying for employment in
response to a newspaper advertisement. Amron had been in the Soviet
Union too long to have been included in the study.
Bruce F. Davis - His file contained a CIA debriefing report.
Harold Citrynell - His file reflected he was unwittingly debriefed by a
CIA officer, upon the departure of the official from the Soviet Union,
in the American Embassy, Copenhagen. Also interviewed by Domestic
Contacts Division.
Robert Edward Webster - Extensive debriefing at CIA Headquarters.
Libero Ricciardelli - CIA debriefing by Boston Domestic Contacts Division.
Out of 22 defectors, nine had been debriefed by the CIA either directly
or indirectly, almost half. The HSCA: "Based on this file review, it
appeared to the committee that the CIA did not contact returning
defectors in 1962 as a matter of standard operating procedure. It
becomes clear from the review of these defector files that CIA
debriefing of defectors was a random occurrence. Nonetheless, in the
instances when the Agency did choose to debrief returning American
defectors...the persons who were debriefed were similar to OSWALD in
that they defected and returned within the same general time period and
each spent his time in the Soviet Union in areas of interest to the CIA."
If the CIA had debriefed Robert Edward Webster and Bruce Frederick
Davis, the defectors whose circumstances most closely resembled
OSWALD'S, why not OSWALD? Was he debriefed by a component other than
Domestic Contacts Division? The Committee: "The CIA has denied ever
having any contact with OSWALD and its records are consistent with this
position. Because the Agency has a Domestic Contacts Division that
routinely attempts to solicit information on a non-clandestine basis
from Americans traveling abroad, the absence of any record indicating
that OSWALD, a returning defector who had worked in a Minsk radio
factory, had been debriefed has been considered...not to be indicative
that OSWALD had been contacted through other than routine Domestic
Contacts Division channels."
REDWOOD
The Committee discovered conflicting information when it "interviewed
the former chief of an Agency component responsible for research related
to clandestine operations within the Soviet Union," who, on November 25,
1963, wrote the following memo:
Chief, (Deleted)
Chief, (Deleted)
Chief of Station, (Deleted).
(Deleted) OSWALD
For Information
For the record we forward herewith a memorandum by (Deleted) Staff
Employee in which he gives his recollections of (Deleted) interest in
Subject following Subject's return to the United States from the USSR.
(Deleted).
SUBJECT: OSWALD
TO: Deleted.
(1) It makes very little difference now but REDWOOD [the CARS - another
version] had at one time an OI (Overseas Intelligence) interest in
OSWALD. As soon as I heard OSWALD'S name, I recalled that as Chief of
the 6 Branch I had discussed, sometime in the summer of 1962, with the
then Chief and Deputy Chief of the 6 Research Section the laying on of
interviews through the Domestic Contacts Division or other suitable
channels. At the moment I don't recall if this was discussed while
OSWALD and his family were on route to this country or if it was after
their arrival. (2) I remember that OSWALD'S unusual behavior in the USSR
had struck me from the moment I had read the first (deleted), and I told
my subordinates something amounting to 'Don't push to hard to get the
information we need, because this individual looks odd.' We were
particularly interested in the information that OSWALD might provide on
the Minsk Radio factory in which he was employed, and of course we
sought the usual biographic information that might help develop foreign
personality dossiers.
(3) I was phasing into my (deleted) cover assignment, and out of
(deleted) at the time. Thus, I would have left the country shortly after
OSWALD'S arrival. I do not know what action developed thereafter. Addendum
(4) As an afterthought, I recall also at the time I was becoming
increasingly interested in watching a pattern we had discovered in the
course of our biographical and research work in 6: the number of Soviet
women marrying foreigners, being permitted to leave the USSR, then
eventually divorcing their spouses and settling down abroad without
returning 'home.' The (deleted) case was among the first of these, and
we eventually turned up something like two dozen similar cases. We
established links between some of these women and the KGB. (Deleted)
became interested in the developing trend we had come across. It was
partly to learn if OSWALD'S wife would actually accompany him to our
country, partly out of interest in OSWALD'S own experiences in the USSR,
that we showed operational intelligence interest in the HARVEY story.
(Deleted.)" [CIA 435-173A; CIA DO-02647-p3 of 3]
Edward Petty: "REDWOOD was not an operation, it was a type of activity.
It was the examination for exploitation of people who had come out of
the Soviet Union. REDSKIN was more a penetration type activity. Looking
for operational opportunities with people who were going in."
The author of this document told the HSCA that, to his knowledge,
contact was never made with OSWALD. Moreover, if a debriefing had
occurred, the officer stated he would have been informed. This officer
was wrong. OSWALD photographed the plant and procured a floor plan; this
was corroborated by a CIA employee, who, in 1962, had worked in the
Soviet Branch, Foreign Documents Division, Directorate of Intelligence.
He "Advised the HSCA he specifically recalled collecting intelligence
regarding the Minsk radio plant. This individual claimed, that during
the summer of 1962, he reviewed a contact report from CIA Field Office
representatives who had interviewed a former Marine who had worked at
the Minsk radio plant following his defection to the USSR. This
defector, whom the employee believed may have been OSWALD, had been
living with his family in Minsk. The employee advised the HSCA that the
contact report had been filed in a volume on the Minsk radio plant that
should be retrievable from the Industrial Registry Branch, then a
component of the Central Reference Office. Accordingly, the committee
requested that the CIA provide both the contact report and the volume of
materials concerning the Minsk radio plant. A review by the committee of
the documents in the volumes of the Minsk radio plant, however, failed
to locate any such contact report." Frontline researcher John Newman
reported: "A memo from CI/SIG has surfaced in these files with
handwriting on it which gives the name of a Domestic Contacts Division
employee - a name which appears to be one 'Andy' Anderson - as a CIA
contact for OSWALD. This document confirms the recollections of other CS
employees that Andy Anderson did in fact debrief OSWALD. Don Deneselya,
who worked in the Russian Branch, Foreign Documents Division, Office of
Contacts read Anderson's debrief in 1962." [Testimony to Rep. Conyers
11.17.93] John Newman stated that the former deputy chief of the
Domestic Contacts Division Division said that the CIA did debrief Oswald.
OSWALD'S ADDRESS BOOK
Scott Malone reported that when OSWALD was questioned about his address
book he pointed to a number and said it belonged to a CIA agent who
debriefed him. OSWALD had the telephone number of McGehee Investments
(RI 8 7604) in the Texas Bank Building in his address book. The words
"Rand 4 U at Jobco" appeared before this number. This firm was not
listed by Dunn and Bradstreet. There was no indication it existed other
than a listing in the 1963 Dallas Criss-Cross Directory. Earl Goltz
reported that President John F. Kennedy's Under Secretary Of State,
Dallas resident George McGhee (born March 10, 1912), was mentioned in a
letter written by OSWALD associate George DeMohrenschildt in 1961, in
which he suggested the Soviets might be interested in the film of his
Central American walking trip. George McGehee had an office in the
Republic National Bank Building. McGehee was in Washington and Germany
during the period OSWALD was in Dallas.
HELMS
Scott Malone also reported that in September 1993 Richard Helms admitted
that OSWALD "might have been" debriefed. In 1964 the Warren Commission
questioned then-CIA Director John McCone about CIA contact with OSWALD.
John McCone's testimony was based on a search supervised by Richard
Helms. John McCone submitted an affidavit and testified: "I have gone
into the matter in considerable detail personally, in my inquiry with
the appropriate people within the Agency, examined all records in our
files relating to OSWALD...OSWALD was not a CIA agent, employee or
informant. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with
him...The Agency never furnished him with any funds or money...in the
Soviet Union or anyplace." John McCone was then asked whether he was
made aware of every CIA agent and informer. He answered, "Mr. Helms, who
is directly responsible for that Agency division's activities as a
Deputy Director, might explain. Would that be permissible?"
Richard Helms stated: "On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all of our records
searched to see if there had been any contacts at any time prior to
President Kennedy's assassination by anyone in the CIA with OSWALD. We
checked our card files and our personnel files and all our records. Now,
this check turned out to be negative." Richard Helms said "no contact
had even been contemplated with OSWALD." [Wash. Star 10.1.76] The Warren
Commission never questioned ANGLETON.
ANGLETON
When questioned in the late 1970's ANGLETON denied that the CIA ever
contemplated contacting OSWALD. Attorney Marvin Miller asked:
Q. Could it have happened without your knowledge?
A. No.
Q. Then your testimony would be that every single activity undertaken by
your section with any individual was cleared with you first or given to
you afterwards?
A. Well, I think I would have learned from my Deputy if there had been
any, any attempt or any desire to contact OSWALD because of the FBI
jurisdiction of the case.
Q. What about the time he was in the Soviet Union?
A. I don't think I was aware at the time.
END OF NODULE.
CLICK HERE TO GO ON TO THE NEXT NODULE.
>
>>>>> influx. LHO was the 3rd one. Most didn't go to
Russia, just eastern
>>>>> bloc
>>>>> countries. They didn't go there on their own whim.
>>>> Most? OK. How does that translate to 40?
>>> Seen lists, and people in the know who leaked. Oswald
was at the top
>>> of the list.
>> Nonsense.
>>
>>
>
> Otto Otepka.
>
>>>>>>> one was so secretive because they were using two.
The evidence is
>>>>>>> overwhelming that they lived very parallel lives
and worked through
>>>>>>> CIA
>>>>>>> folk. It was too bad one portion of the CIA
hated JFK so bad a
>>>>>>> vendetta
>>>>>>> formed, and finding away for one to be their
scapegoat in the end.
>>>>>>> It
>>>>>>> ended with both Oswalds in the Texas Theater, and
the subsequent
>>>>>>> cover-up,
>>>>>> You saw two Oswalds in the Texas Theater? Show us.
>>>>> Unfortunately they weren't able to get any photo shots of
either one.
>>>> They? Who? Pictures were taken of Oswald. Who is this other
guy?
>>> You just asked to show the photos of Oswald in the Texas Theater.
And
>>> how
>>> would I see them? What is so hard to understand that there
were none?
>>> I
>> Show me evidence of another Oswald in the theater.
>>
>>
>
> I did in past threads within the year, as well as this one. One does
have
> to watch where one casts their pearls...
>
Evidence, not speculation.
> CJ
FALSE
DEFECTOR
The Kennedy
Assassination and the Current Political Moment
"James
Angleton was the mastermind not of the Bay of Pigs (that was Richard Bissell),
but of a false defector program that sent spies into the
Transcript of a lecture given on January 28, 2007 at the 92nd
Street Y in New York City
by Joan Mellen
It
happened going on 44 years ago; yet, the murder of President Kennedy remains
simultaneously a subject of fascination and taboo within mainstream discourse.
You will not find a free exchange of views on the Kennedy assassination in the New
York Times nor, to date, an acknowledgement of the unanswered questions
arising from 9/11. This past November, I spoke at a Jewish
I'm
grateful to the
James Jesus
Angleton
The Kennedy assassination is present even in its absence in the recent film, The
Good Shepherd, a movie about the CIA. Its central character, played by Matt
Damon, is based largely on the late head of CIA Counter Intelligence, James
Jesus Angleton. The distortions of the film return us to the meaning of the
Kennedy assassination.
James
Angleton in real life was the mastermind not, as the film suggests, of the Bay
of Pigs (that was Richard Bissell), but of a false defector program that sent
spies into the
An
FBI document demonstrates that Oswald, who was indeed one of Angleton's assets
in the
One
CIA document refers to an FBI "65" file, an espionage file, for
Jelisavic, a reference inadvertently unredacted when CIA declassified the
document. This number clearly directs CIA to an espionage file. Oswald also had
Jelisavcic's name and room number in his possession. Angleton's false defector
program, not mentioned in The Good Shepherd, remains among the CIA's most
closely guarded secrets; a secret necessary to preserve the fiction of the
Warren Report.
Otto Otepka
The figure of Lee Harvey Oswald, and his peculiar biography
as a low-level intelligence agent, continues to haunt those whose paths he
crossed. After A Farewell to Justice was published, I drove down
Highly
commended for his diligence, Mr. Otepka displayed to me a wall filled with a
display of framed commendations, including one signed by Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles on behalf of President Eisenhower. (In these times President
Eisenhower seems to be a bonafide liberal, not only for his prescient remark
about the military industrial complex, but for another of his observations, that
most of America has accepted the idea of the New Deal, but for a few oil
millionaires in Texas).
Otepka
saw at once that there was something unusual about Lee Oswald, “tourist.” As
he placed this list of defectors into his security safe, Mr. Otepka planned to
request that the CIA look into this individual. A nighttime burglary, obviously
an inside job, resulted in this file vanishing. Soon Otto Otepka was demoted to
an inconsequential post, writing summaries of documents. Oswald's
“defection” was not to be scrutinized.
This
all took place in the early sixties. In the year 2006, The Good Shepherd
still could not mention Angleton's false defector program, which would have
driven the film to the door of the Kennedy assassination. Instead the film
conveniently closes in 1961 during the
Oswald CIA
Courier
In A Farewell to Justice I demonstrate that Oswald was
an employee of the CIA; a fact recently re-confirmed by historian Michael Kurtz.
Professor Kurtz reports on an interview he did in 1981 with Hunter Leake, second
in command at the
Leake
also explained in this telephone interview with Professor Kurtz why there was no
documentation on Oswald's employment with CIA in
In
A Farewell to Justice, I write for the first time that Oswald had also
been enlisted by
As
you study the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination, you discover repeatedly
that the press relinquished its freedom more than forty years ago. The latest
document I was sent came from the LBJ library in
CIA
releases once marked “Secret” are filled with revelations of how reporters,
such as Al Burt, the Latin America editor of the Miami Herald, visited
the CIA to be instructed on what was and was not in the Agency's interest that
he print. There are precedents for our present co-opted press, from FOX to CNN,
its twin. Even Keith Olbermann on MSNBC seems unduly cautious.
E. Howard Hunt
In his memoir, American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA,
Watergate & Beyond, long-time CIA operative E. Howard Hunt suggests that
Lyndon Johnson should be viewed as the prime suspect in “having Kennedy
liquidated.” It seems clear that Hunt, age 88, was still engaged in the
business of drawing attention away from the massive evidence connecting CIA to
the assassination.1 Lyndon Johnson, the direct beneficiary of the
assassination, seemed to Hunt a likely target.
Hunt
was far too clever to regurgitate J. Edgar Hoover's disinformation that the
Mafia planned and then covered up this crime. His obvious intention was to
provide a false sponsor, someone other than the Agency. Even Hunt didn't bother
to revive the fantasy that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, or acted at all, in
the assassination.
The
Richard
Reeves' 1994 biography, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, quotes
President Kennedy's fury at the sabotage of his presidency by the CIA. In the
one true political moment in The Good Shepherd, Kennedy threatens to
splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and cast them to the winds. “I'll get
those CIA bastards if it's the last thing I do,” Kennedy said, famously,
underestimating his adversaries. The CIA's “Executive Action”
("murder") capability was in place by 1963; it had already been
involved in the murder and/or attempted murders of various heads of state,
efforts which are outlined in detail in the papers of the Church Committee.
Bobby Kennedy
Our mainstream press manages to avoid confronting the Church Committee
documents, writing about the CIA as if it had no history, but was born in the
aftermath of 9/11. They are particularly unwilling to connect our present
political morass to past events. Foreign reporters have not been similarly
restrained. On a magazine segment on BBC-2 which aired on November 20, 2006,
documentarian Shane O'Sullivan revealed an extraordinary photograph connecting
the assassination of John and Robert Kennedy. You won't find this information in
that other Kennedy movie of this season, Bobby.
The
press photographs (shown on page __) were taken at the Ambassador Hotel
on the evening of the assassination of Robert Kennedy, where a crowd had
gathered to celebrate his victory in the
With
Campbell was a long-time CIA operative named David Sanchez Morales, who worked
with CIA propaganda expert David Atlee Phillips, a figure I discuss at length in
A Farewell To Justice. Morales had assisted Phillips in the 1954 coup
against President Arbenz in
Morales
was also close to a CIA operative named Felix Rodriguez, famously present at the
murder of Che Guevara in
The
third unlikely well-wisher of Robert Kennedy in this trio was CIA psychological
warfare specialist, George Joannides. Joannides was CIA handler in
I
also discovered what Oswald actually said to Lieutenant Francis Martello, which
Martello chose not to share with the
It
may be (here I'll speculate), that the street fight on Canal Street that
established Oswald as pro-Castro, purveyor of leaflets for “Fair Play For
Cuba,” was a propaganda victory by Joannides, whose specialty was
psychological warfare. Five years later, Joannides apparently stands awaiting
the impending murder of Robert F. Kennedy. There was a complete blackout in the
George H.W.
Bush
I'm sure many in this audience are aware of the third recent
moment at which the Kennedy assassination has surfaced. There are a few scant
degrees of separation between the two Bush presidents, the role of the CIA in
the Kennedy assassination, and Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA asset. This surprising
invocation of the Kennedy assassination occurred on January 2, 2007 at the
funeral of President Gerald Ford, the last surviving member of the
After
a deluded gunman assassinated President Kennedy, our nation turned to Gerald
Ford and a select handful of others to make sense of that madness – and a
conspiracy theorist can say what they will – but the Warren Commission report
will always have the final definitive say on this matter. Why? Because Gerry
Ford put his name on it and Gerry Ford's word was always good.
Allow
me to add that when amendments were offered to the Freedom of Information Act,
enlarging public access to affairs of state, Gerald Ford vetoed the bill; only
to have Congress to override his veto. Ford was no more a supporter of the truth
than Mr. Bush's son. George H. W. Bush's own word was not always so good either.
There are powerful reasons why George H. W. Bush was motivated to invoke the
Warren Report, even, amazingly, to refer to a “conspiracy theorist”—as if
that designation would at once banish some truths he does not want available.
There are only two degrees of separation between George H.W. Bush and Lee Harvey
Oswald.
At
his 1976 confirmation hearings for the post of Director of Central Intelligence,
a post into which he was elevated by Gerald Ford, Bush denied that he had any
prior connection to the CIA. This was a falsehood. A CIA document at the
National Archives and posted on the Internet (Record Number 104-10310-10271)
reveals that in 1953, when George H.W. Bush founded Zapata Oil, his partner was
one Thomas J. Devine—an oil wildcatter and long-time CIA staff employee.
Thomas Devine's name does not appear in the original papers of Zapata, but it
does in the company Bush created shortly thereafter as “Zapata Offshore.”
This
CIA document reveals that Thomas Devine had informed George Bush of a CIA
project with the cryptonym, WUBRINY/LPDICTUM. It involved CIA proprietary
commercial operations in foreign countries. By 1963, Devine had become not a
former CIA employee, but "a cleared and witting contact" in the
investment banking firm which managed the proprietary corporation WUSALINE.
WUBRINY involved Haitian operations, in which, the documents reveal, a
participant was George de Mohrenschildt, the
In
late April 1963, in
A
May 22, 1963 CIA document has de Mohrenschildt admitting he had “obtained some
Texas financial backing” and had visited interested people in Washington
regarding the candidacy of one M. Clemard Joseph Charles for President of Haiti,
“as soon as Duvalier can be gotten out.” We are reminded of CIA's efforts to
influence the political configurations of other countries. An obvious example is
the CIA's obliging of British Petroleum—for a price—in the overthrow of
Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, and his replacement by the Shah.
To
summarize: George H.W. Bush is linked in April 1963, seven months before the
Kennedy assassination, to a CIA project involving Lee Oswald's handler, Count
Sergei Georges de Mohrenschildt, through his own CIA partner, Thomas Devine.
Bush and Devine later traveled to
On
the day Gaeton Fonzi was to interview de Mohrenschildt for the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, de Mohrenschildt was shot, and his death ruled a
suicide. Fonzi's card was in his pocket. Joseph McBride's Nation article
("The Man Who Wasn't There: George Bush, CIA Operative, July 16, 1988),
exposed how George H.W. Bush was debriefed by the FBI about the Kennedy
assassination on November 23rd . The inadvertently released document refers to
“Mr. George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency.” Bush claimed it was a
different George Bush, George William Bush, who worked for the Agency. But it
wasn't so. George William came forward to say he was never debriefed by anyone.
Every
road leads to the assassination of President Kennedy. What should also give us
pause is that these documents about Zapata Offshore, which had offices on
several continents but never did much business, were released under the JFK Act
as Kennedy assassination documents. So it is the Agency itself, not the dreaded
“conspiracy theorists,” that links George H.W. Bush with the Kennedy
assassination. Or it's the government that is the ultimate “conspiracy
theorist.”
A
Farewell to Justice was
published in November 2005. In the intervening time, new documents have emerged
that corroborate my view that the Central Intelligence Agency planned,
supervised and implemented the assassination of President Kennedy. Those who
claim that we will never know what happened to President Kennedy would do well
to spend some time at the National Archives. P
<![endif]>
©2007
Joan Mellen is the author of A Farewell to Justice: Jim Garrison, JFK's
Assassination and the Case That Should Have Changed History (www.joanmellen.net),
available from The Last Hurrah, 937 Memorial Ave, Williamsport, PA 17701 (570)
321-1150. She is also the author of Jim Garrison: His Life and Times, The
Early Years, available at www.jfklancer.com. She is a professor of English
and creative writing at
Endnotes
1.
According to Hunt's son, Saint John, Hunt left a more specific two-page deathbed
memorandum, explaining how Frank Sturges had attempted to enlist him in the
Kennedy assassination, which, according to this fragment, was being masterminded
by Lyndon Johnson. Involved also were CIA murder specialist William Harvey, CIA
officer out of Counter Intelligence named Cord Meyer, David Atlee Phillips,
against whom there is massive evidence indeed, and a few others. According to
Saint, as he is called in Rolling Stone, Hunt said, no thanks. He didn't
want to be involved in any operation with William Harvey. Instinct if nothing
else suggests that Hunt was settling old scores with those in the Agency with
whom he had issues. There is no way to corroborate any of these accusations made
by Hunt, deathly ill and, as another of his children suggests, drifting in and
out of clarity. If nothing else, this Hunt brouhaha suggests that "deathbed
confessions," if that's what this is, are specious sources of historical
information. ("The Last Confession of E. Howard Hunt," Rolling
Stone, April 5, 2007)
<![endif]>
ADDENDUM
Shane
O'Sullivan's documentary "Who Shot Bobby Kennedy?," which aired in the
UK on November 20, 2006, revealed photographic evidence that three senior CIA
operatives were present at the scene of RFK's assassination. Present at the
Ambassador Hotel in
FALSE
DEFECTOR
The Kennedy
Assassination and the Current Political Moment
"James
Angleton was the mastermind not of the Bay of Pigs (that was Richard Bissell),
but of a false defector program that sent spies into the
Transcript of a lecture given on January 28, 2007 at the 92nd
Street Y in New York City
by Joan Mellen
It
happened going on 44 years ago; yet, the murder of President Kennedy remains
simultaneously a subject of fascination and taboo within mainstream discourse.
You will not find a free exchange of views on the Kennedy assassination in the New
York Times nor, to date, an acknowledgement of the unanswered questions
arising from 9/11. This past November, I spoke at a Jewish
I'm
grateful to the
James Jesus
Angleton
The Kennedy assassination is present even in its absence in the recent film, The
Good Shepherd, a movie about the CIA. Its central character, played by Matt
Damon, is based largely on the late head of CIA Counter Intelligence, James
Jesus Angleton. The distortions of the film return us to the meaning of the
Kennedy assassination.
James
Angleton in real life was the mastermind not, as the film suggests, of the Bay
of Pigs (that was Richard Bissell), but of a false defector program that sent
spies into the
An
FBI document demonstrates that Oswald, who was indeed one of Angleton's assets
in the
One
CIA document refers to an FBI "65" file, an espionage file, for
Jelisavic, a reference inadvertently unredacted when CIA declassified the
document. This number clearly directs CIA to an espionage file. Oswald also had
Jelisavcic's name and room number in his possession. Angleton's false defector
program, not mentioned in The Good Shepherd, remains among the CIA's most
closely guarded secrets; a secret necessary to preserve the fiction of the
Warren Report.
Otto Otepka
The figure of Lee Harvey Oswald, and his peculiar biography
as a low-level intelligence agent, continues to haunt those whose paths he
crossed. After A Farewell to Justice was published, I drove down
Highly
commended for his diligence, Mr. Otepka displayed to me a wall filled with a
display of framed commendations, including one signed by Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles on behalf of President Eisenhower. (In these times President
Eisenhower seems to be a bonafide liberal, not only for his prescient remark
about the military industrial complex, but for another of his observations, that
most of America has accepted the idea of the New Deal, but for a few oil
millionaires in Texas).
Otepka
saw at once that there was something unusual about Lee Oswald, “tourist.” As
he placed this list of defectors into his security safe, Mr. Otepka planned to
request that the CIA look into this individual. A nighttime burglary, obviously
an inside job, resulted in this file vanishing. Soon Otto Otepka was demoted to
an inconsequential post, writing summaries of documents. Oswald's
“defection” was not to be scrutinized.
This
all took place in the early sixties. In the year 2006, The Good Shepherd
still could not mention Angleton's false defector program, which would have
driven the film to the door of the Kennedy assassination. Instead the film
conveniently closes in 1961 during the
Oswald CIA
Courier
In A Farewell to Justice I demonstrate that Oswald was
an employee of the CIA; a fact recently re-confirmed by historian Michael Kurtz.
Professor Kurtz reports on an interview he did in 1981 with Hunter Leake, second
in command at the
Leake
also explained in this telephone interview with Professor Kurtz why there was no
documentation on Oswald's employment with CIA in
In
A Farewell to Justice, I write for the first time that Oswald had also
been enlisted by
As
you study the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination, you discover repeatedly
that the press relinquished its freedom more than forty years ago. The latest
document I was sent came from the LBJ library in
CIA
releases once marked “Secret” are filled with revelations of how reporters,
such as Al Burt, the Latin America editor of the Miami Herald, visited
the CIA to be instructed on what was and was not in the Agency's interest that
he print. There are precedents for our present co-opted press, from FOX to CNN,
its twin. Even Keith Olbermann on MSNBC seems unduly cautious.
E. Howard Hunt
In his memoir, American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA,
Watergate & Beyond, long-time CIA operative E. Howard Hunt suggests that
Lyndon Johnson should be viewed as the prime suspect in “having Kennedy
liquidated.” It seems clear that Hunt, age 88, was still engaged in the
business of drawing attention away from the massive evidence connecting CIA to
the assassination.1 Lyndon Johnson, the direct beneficiary of the
assassination, seemed to Hunt a likely target.
Hunt
was far too clever to regurgitate J. Edgar Hoover's disinformation that the
Mafia planned and then covered up this crime. His obvious intention was to
provide a false sponsor, someone other than the Agency. Even Hunt didn't bother
to revive the fantasy that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, or acted at all, in
the assassination.
The
Richard
Reeves' 1994 biography, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, quotes
President Kennedy's fury at the sabotage of his presidency by the CIA. In the
one true political moment in The Good Shepherd, Kennedy threatens to
splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and cast them to the winds. “I'll get
those CIA bastards if it's the last thing I do,” Kennedy said, famously,
underestimating his adversaries. The CIA's “Executive Action”
("murder") capability was in place by 1963; it had already been
involved in the murder and/or attempted murders of various heads of state,
efforts which are outlined in detail in the papers of the Church Committee.
Bobby Kennedy
Our mainstream press manages to avoid confronting the Church Committee
documents, writing about the CIA as if it had no history, but was born in the
aftermath of 9/11. They are particularly unwilling to connect our present
political morass to past events. Foreign reporters have not been similarly
restrained. On a magazine segment on BBC-2 which aired on November 20, 2006,
documentarian Shane O'Sullivan revealed an extraordinary photograph connecting
the assassination of John and Robert Kennedy. You won't find this information in
that other Kennedy movie of this season, Bobby.
The
press photographs (shown on page __) were taken at the Ambassador Hotel
on the evening of the assassination of Robert Kennedy, where a crowd had
gathered to celebrate his victory in the
With
Campbell was a long-time CIA operative named David Sanchez Morales, who worked
with CIA propaganda expert David Atlee Phillips, a figure I discuss at length in
A Farewell To Justice. Morales had assisted Phillips in the 1954 coup
against President Arbenz in
Morales
was also close to a CIA operative named Felix Rodriguez, famously present at the
murder of Che Guevara in
The
third unlikely well-wisher of Robert Kennedy in this trio was CIA psychological
warfare specialist, George Joannides. Joannides was CIA handler in
I
also discovered what Oswald actually said to Lieutenant Francis Martello, which
Martello chose not to share with the
It
may be (here I'll speculate), that the street fight on Canal Street that
established Oswald as pro-Castro, purveyor of leaflets for “Fair Play For
Cuba,” was a propaganda victory by Joannides, whose specialty was
psychological warfare. Five years later, Joannides apparently stands awaiting
the impending murder of Robert F. Kennedy. There was a complete blackout in the
George H.W.
Bush
I'm sure many in this audience are aware of the third recent
moment at which the Kennedy assassination has surfaced. There are a few scant
degrees of separation between the two Bush presidents, the role of the CIA in
the Kennedy assassination, and Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA asset. This surprising
invocation of the Kennedy assassination occurred on January 2, 2007 at the
funeral of President Gerald Ford, the last surviving member of the
After
a deluded gunman assassinated President Kennedy, our nation turned to Gerald
Ford and a select handful of others to make sense of that madness – and a
conspiracy theorist can say what they will – but the Warren Commission report
will always have the final definitive say on this matter. Why? Because Gerry
Ford put his name on it and Gerry Ford's word was always good.
Allow
me to add that when amendments were offered to the Freedom of Information Act,
enlarging public access to affairs of state, Gerald Ford vetoed the bill; only
to have Congress to override his veto. Ford was no more a supporter of the truth
than Mr. Bush's son. George H. W. Bush's own word was not always so good either.
There are powerful reasons why George H. W. Bush was motivated to invoke the
Warren Report, even, amazingly, to refer to a “conspiracy theorist”—as if
that designation would at once banish some truths he does not want available.
There are only two degrees of separation between George H.W. Bush and Lee Harvey
Oswald.
At
his 1976 confirmation hearings for the post of Director of Central Intelligence,
a post into which he was elevated by Gerald Ford, Bush denied that he had any
prior connection to the CIA. This was a falsehood. A CIA document at the
National Archives and posted on the Internet (Record Number 104-10310-10271)
reveals that in 1953, when George H.W. Bush founded Zapata Oil, his partner was
one Thomas J. Devine—an oil wildcatter and long-time CIA staff employee.
Thomas Devine's name does not appear in the original papers of Zapata, but it
does in the company Bush created shortly thereafter as “Zapata Offshore.”
This
CIA document reveals that Thomas Devine had informed George Bush of a CIA
project with the cryptonym, WUBRINY/LPDICTUM. It involved CIA proprietary
commercial operations in foreign countries. By 1963, Devine had become not a
former CIA employee, but "a cleared and witting contact" in the
investment banking firm which managed the proprietary corporation WUSALINE.
WUBRINY involved Haitian operations, in which, the documents reveal, a
participant was George de Mohrenschildt, the
In
late April 1963, in
A
May 22, 1963 CIA document has de Mohrenschildt admitting he had “obtained some
Texas financial backing” and had visited interested people in Washington
regarding the candidacy of one M. Clemard Joseph Charles for President of Haiti,
“as soon as Duvalier can be gotten out.” We are reminded of CIA's efforts to
influence the political configurations of other countries. An obvious example is
the CIA's obliging of British Petroleum—for a price—in the overthrow of
Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, and his replacement by the Shah.
To
summarize: George H.W. Bush is linked in April 1963, seven months before the
Kennedy assassination, to a CIA project involving Lee Oswald's handler, Count
Sergei Georges de Mohrenschildt, through his own CIA partner, Thomas Devine.
Bush and Devine later traveled to
On
the day Gaeton Fonzi was to interview de Mohrenschildt for the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, de Mohrenschildt was shot, and his death ruled a
suicide. Fonzi's card was in his pocket. Joseph McBride's Nation article
("The Man Who Wasn't There: George Bush, CIA Operative, July 16, 1988),
exposed how George H.W. Bush was debriefed by the FBI about the Kennedy
assassination on November 23rd . The inadvertently released document refers to
“Mr. George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency.” Bush claimed it was a
different George Bush, George William Bush, who worked for the Agency. But it
wasn't so. George William came forward to say he was never debriefed by anyone.
Every
road leads to the assassination of President Kennedy. What should also give us
pause is that these documents about Zapata Offshore, which had offices on
several continents but never did much business, were released under the JFK Act
as Kennedy assassination documents. So it is the Agency itself, not the dreaded
“conspiracy theorists,” that links George H.W. Bush with the Kennedy
assassination. Or it's the government that is the ultimate “conspiracy
theorist.”
A
Farewell to Justice was
published in November 2005. In the intervening time, new documents have emerged
that corroborate my view that the Central Intelligence Agency planned,
supervised and implemented the assassination of President Kennedy. Those who
claim that we will never know what happened to President Kennedy would do well
to spend some time at the National Archives. P
<![endif]>
©2007
Joan Mellen is the author of A Farewell to Justice: Jim Garrison, JFK's
Assassination and the Case That Should Have Changed History (www.joanmellen.net),
available from The Last Hurrah, 937 Memorial Ave, Williamsport, PA 17701 (570)
321-1150. She is also the author of Jim Garrison: His Life and Times, The
Early Years, available at www.jfklancer.com. She is a professor of English
and creative writing at
Endnotes
1.
According to Hunt's son, Saint John, Hunt left a more specific two-page deathbed
memorandum, explaining how Frank Sturges had attempted to enlist him in the
Kennedy assassination, which, according to this fragment, was being masterminded
by Lyndon Johnson. Involved also were CIA murder specialist William Harvey, CIA
officer out of Counter Intelligence named Cord Meyer, David Atlee Phillips,
against whom there is massive evidence indeed, and a few others. According to
Saint, as he is called in Rolling Stone, Hunt said, no thanks. He didn't
want to be involved in any operation with William Harvey. Instinct if nothing
else suggests that Hunt was settling old scores with those in the Agency with
whom he had issues. There is no way to corroborate any of these accusations made
by Hunt, deathly ill and, as another of his children suggests, drifting in and
out of clarity. If nothing else, this Hunt brouhaha suggests that "deathbed
confessions," if that's what this is, are specious sources of historical
information. ("The Last Confession of E. Howard Hunt," Rolling
Stone, April 5, 2007)
<![endif]>
ADDENDUM
Shane
O'Sullivan's documentary "Who Shot Bobby Kennedy?," which aired in the
UK on November 20, 2006, revealed photographic evidence that three senior CIA
operatives were present at the scene of RFK's assassination. Present at the
Ambassador Hotel in
On 18 Nov, 16:39, Bill <beatle...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> it seems to me that after he defected to the soviets & offer up
> information about U-2 flights, & one U-2 gets shot down ( Power's U-2
), I
> would think someone from the cia would be waiting for Lee when he returned
> to the USA. & arrest him for spying. I read that the Russian were not
> interested in Oswald's knowledge of U-2's but how do we know this, after
> all no U-2 were shot down before Oswald's defection, this alone should
> send a red flag to everyone!
Because it would have implicated the CIA in an embarrassing position for
having him sent there in the first place?, and of course if they were
involved in JFK's murder and had controlling interests in its
investigation, it would have to be bypassed?
Oswald and The CIA (Otto Otepka) - Previously posted in 2008
Otto Otepka was head of the State Department's Office of Security (SY) and
responsible for issuing or denying security clearances for State
Department personnel. He took his job very seriously and, in 1958,
received an award for Meritorious Service from Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles (brother of CIA Director Allen Dulles) for his attention to
detail, loyalty, devotion to duty, and sound judgment.
By October, 1960 eighteen US Citizens had "defected" to the Soviet
Union
and came to Otepka's attention at the State Department. He *informally*
asked the CIA and military intelligence to identify which these
"defectors" were double agents working for the US but, after receiving
no
response, formally requested the information.
On October 25 Hugh Cumming, of the State Department's Intelligence and
Research Bureau, wrote a letter to CIA Deputy Director of Plans (DDP)
Richard Bissell requesting detailed information on the eighteen
"defectors." Bissell turned the request over to James Angleton's
Counterintelligence (CI) staff and Sheffield Edwards' Office of Security
(OS), *but not to the Soviet Russia (SR) division which had jurisdiction
in dealing with the "defectors," including Oswald. This is
confirmation
that Angelton's CI staff was involved with false "defectors,"
including
Oswald.* Angleton's CI/SIG chief, Birch D. O'Neal, prepared the responses
on behalf of counterintelligence while Robert Bennerman handed the request
to members of his staff in the CIA's Office of Security that included
Bruce Solie, Morse Allen, and Paul Gaynor. Gaynor was head of the
Security Research Staff where *James McCord, of future Watergate fame*,
worked.
Bennerman specifically instructed Marguerite Stevens, in the research
staff (OS), to provide information *only on American "defectors" other
than Lee *Harvey* Oswald* (and six other "defectors"), explaining that
Otepka already had information on these individuals. The Office of
Security then coordinated their response with Angleton's CI staff before
sending it to Richard Bissell (DDP) in late November for his signature.
When Otepka finally received the CIA's response at the State Department,
the 10th name on the list was Lee Harvey Oswald with the notation
"SECRET."
On December 9, 1960, a few days after providing information on
"defectors"
to the State Department, Angleton's trusted associate Ann Egerter, of the
Special Investigation Group (SIG), opened a "201" file on Lee *Henry*
Oswald (201-289248). *This file was opened 13 months *after* Oswald
"defected" to the Soviet Union and 6 months *after* the memo was
written
about the CIA's interest in the *Harvey* story."*
It appears that if not for Otepka's investigation into American
"defectors", the CIA would never have opened a file on Oswald.
*This
indicates that Lee *Harvey* Oswald and his activities were so sensitive
that only Angleton, and perhaps SIG , knew the truth about Oswald which
they held only in memory.* Prior to President Kennedy's assassination, Lee
*Henry* Oswald's "201" file was held within Angleton's Special
Investigations Group (SIG).
NOTE: *During Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union cover sheets of Oswald
documents contained the notation "CI/OPS," which is an abbreviation
"Counterintelligence Operations."
#SIG member Ann Egerter was asked by the HSCA if a CIA asset or agent
would have a "201" file and if it would contain material of an
operational
nature. She replied, "I assume that person would have a 201 file but
it
would be a restricted 201 file and *it might even be a false 201 file, not
having anything in it. Everything would be held by the case
officer...operational material is not filed in 201 files...It would be
held by the operations officer, case officer."*
#*Angleton's deputy Ray Rocca said, "The key documents in establishing a
fiduciary relationship would not be in the 201. They would be in a
separate file held by the desk and whoever was handling the individual."*
#*Former CIA employedd Phillip Agee said, "The 201 file is divided into
two parts which are stored separately for maximum secutiry. One part
contains true name documents while the other contains operational
information."
#*The obvious question: "Who was Oswald's case officer?"*
Soon after trying to pry information on the eighteen American
"defectors"
from the CIA, Otto Otepka's duties began to change and soon his position
as Chief of Security at The State Department appeared to be in jeopardy.
Even though head had received awards for Meritorious Service only two
years earlier. Otepka soon found that his access to sensitive cases was
limited. Stories began to appear in the press that the State Department,
and specically Otepka's Office of Securiy, would soon experience a
"reduction in force." Otepka was soon asked by his superior to
transfer
to another division within the State Department and take a different job
but refused.
*NOTE: James Angleton had developed a fearsome reputation within the
agency and was known to expose agents he no longer trusted. CIA career
officer John Whitten (aka John Scelso) told the HSCA, "Several times in my
career I was appointed by Helms or Karamessines to investigate or look
into investigations where Angleton was running....They always told him.
And when they say, now, you go tell Angleton you are going to do this. I
used to go in fingering my insurance policy, notifying my next of kin."*
*It is reasonable to speculate that Otepka's problems originated with
Angleton after he began pressing the CIA for information relating to
"defectors", including Oswald. A phone call from Angleton to CIA
Director
Allen Dulles, and a subsequent call from Dulles to his brother, Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles , could easily have set the wheels in motion
to "neutralize" Otepka and stop his investigation at the State
Department
(the Eishenhower administration remained in the White House until late
January, 1961).*
Otepka, *for unexplained reasons*, was called before the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee, which was chaired by Senator James Eastland and
Senator Thomas Dodd. He was questioned at length by Jules (Jay) Sourwine,
the subommittee's Chief Counsel, about procedures established by Otepka
for issuing clearances for State Department applicants. Sourwine and
Otepka soon became friends and discussed at length a proposal by the
subcommittee to loosen security clearance procedures for State Department
personnel.
Sourwine soon realized that the loosening of security procedures was not
the only reason the subcommittee was focusing their attention on Otepka.
In an attempt to learn what was really happening at the State Department,
behind the scenes, Sourwine began to informally question Otepka. But
Otepka, following protocol and procedure, told Sourwine that if he wanted
to question him further he would have to question him before the
committee.
When the subcommittee questioned Otepka they asked if had been subjected
to any recent "reprisals" from the State *Department, which he denied,
and
defended the department's actions. A short while later* hidden listening
devices were placed in Otepka's office and a former employee of the
National Security Agency (NSA), David Belisle, was assigned to work with
him. Otepka's secretary was replaced by an individual who spied on him,
his house was placed under surveillance, and his trash was inspected
daily.
*QUESTION: Which agency of the US government has the capability and the
political muscle to electronically bug the Office of Security at the State
Department?*
One evening Otepka was working late in his office and went out for dinner.
Upon returing he found David Belisle and an NSA employee in his office,
but when he asked for a reason for their intrusion *neither man gave a
rational explanation for being there.*
Otepka soon found that someone had drilled a hole in his safe and, with a
tiny mirror, had determined the combination and removed the contents.
According to Otepka the only sensitive material in the safe was his
uncompleted study of American "defectors" to the Soviet Union, *which
included Lee *Harvey* Oswald. Fred Traband, who also worked in the Office
of Security ate the State Department, told the Eastman Committee that it
was Otepka's boss, John Francis Reilly, who searched, who searched
Otepka's files and his safe.
*NOTE: Three weeks before the assassination of President Kennedy, Otto
Otepka was ousted from the State Department, but had not yet determined if
Lee *Harvey* Oswald was an agent of the US Government. Following the
assassination OTepka told journalist Sarah McClendon that he knew who had
JFK killed, but declined comment in public.*
pgs. 306-08 Harvey and Lee, How the CIA framed Oswald, J. Armstrong.
* = Italicizing
CJ
HSCA
XII Defector Study Page 435
THE
DEFECTOR STUDY
Staff
Report
of
the
Select
Committee on Assassinations
Ninety-fifth
Congress
Second
Session
March
1979
(435)
Contents
Page
436
CONTENTS
Paragraph
I. Foreword
1-13
II. Morris and Mollie Block
14-24
III. Harold Citrynell
25-29
IV. Bruce Frederick Davis
30-34
V. Shirley Dubinsky
35-38
VI. Joseph Dutkanicz
39-49
VII. Martin Greendlinger
50-55
VIII.
Nicholas Petrulli
56-64
IX. Libero Ricciardelli
65-76
X. Vladimir Sloboda
77-85
XI. Robert Webster
86-103
XII. Lee Harvey Oswald
104-149
XIII.
Soviet citizenship
150-158
XIV. Propaganda use and financial arrangements
159-163
XV. Residence employment and financial arrangements
164-168
XVI. Soviet relationships and exit visas
169-174
XVII.
KGB contact
175-188
Addendum
: American Debriefing Practices
189-199
(436)
Foreword
Page
437
I.
FOREWORD
A.
BACKGROUND
(1)
From a comparative analysis of 11 defectors who were similar to Lee
Harvey Oswald, the committee sought to determine what, if anything, was unusual
about Oswald's defection.
(2)
To determine which individuals the committee would study, a letter was
sent to the CIA requesting the names of persons who defected to the Soviet Union
between 1958 and 1964. In response, the CIA provided a list of the names and
variations of the names of 380 Americans who were in the U.S.S.R. during that
time period.
(3)
The CIA was subsequently requested to provide more information on the 380
defectors to enable the committee to select, for a detailed analysis, those most
similar to Oswald. The CIA provided a computer listing of the name. 901 file
number,* date and place of birth, and a compilation of information derived from
the 201 file, as well as citations for various other Government agency reports.
(4)
From this second list of defectors, the committee eliminated those that
appeared to have (a) been born outside the United States; (b) gone to the
U.S.S.R. sometime other than the 1958-69 time period; and (c) remained outside
the United States until 1964. The committee decided to examine the files on the
remaining- 03 individuals, listed below:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name
Date of birth
Place of birth
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amron,
Irving __________________________________
United States.
Block,
Mollie _______________
Nov. 6, 1912 ________ New
York, N.Y.
Block,
Morris _______________
Mar. 30, 1920________
Do.
Citrynell.
Harold ____________ Mar. 10, 1923
_______ Do.
Davis,
Bruce Frederick ______
May 4, 1936 ________
Rome, N.Y.
Dubinsky,
Shirley ____________ Mar. 11, 1925
_______ New York, N.Y.
Frank,
Richard Cyril ________
Aug. 22, 1922 _______ Rochester,
N.Y.
Frank,
Susan Heligman ________ Nov. 18.
1913 _______ New York, N.Y.
Gold,
Robert _________________ Mar. 14,
1928 _______ Massachusetts.
Greendlinger,
Martin _________ Mar. 25, 1932
_______ New York. N.Y.
Halperin,
Maurice H __________ Mar. 3, 1906
_______ Boston Mass.
Jones,
Louis Henry ___________ Mar. 17,
1934 _______ Arlington Heights, Ohio
Lawson,
John Howard __________ Sept. 25,
1894 ______ New York, N.Y.
Martin,
William H ___________
May 27, 1931 ________ Columbus,
Ga.
Martinkus,
Anthony V _________ June 15, 1911
_______ Chicago, Ill.
Meyer,
Karl Henry ____________ June 30,
1937 _______ Mountain, Wis.
Mitchell,
Bernon F ___________ Mar. 11, 1931
_______ San Francisco, Calif.
Parker,
James Dudley _________ Feb. 21, 1926
_______ Oakland, Calif.
Petrulli.
Nicholas ___________ Feb. 13, 1921
_______ Brooklyn, N.Y.
Pittman,
John Orion __________ Sept. 17, 1906
______ Atlanta, Ga.
Ricciardelli.
Libero _________ June 18,
1917________ Needham, Mass.
Webster,
Robert Edward _______ Oct. 23, 1928
_______ Tiffin, Ohio.
Winston,
Henry _______________ Apr. 2, 1911
________ Hattiesburg, Miss.
(5)
The committee then examined the October 25, 1960, request from the State
Department to the CIA for information on 13 individuals they considered
defectors. That list included the following:
----------------
(437)
Page
438
438
(a) Lee Harvey Oswald.
(b) Seven individuals whose
files the committee had decided to examine under the previous criteria: Block,
Mollie; Block, Morris; Davis, Bruce Frederick; Martin, William H.; Mitchell,
Bernon F.; Ricciardelli, Libero; Webster, Robert Edward.
(c) Two individuals whose
names appeared on the computer listing but had been excluded because they were
not born within the United States: Dutkanicz, Joseph--Date of birth: June 9,
1926, place of birth: Corlice, Poland; Sloboda, Vladimir--Date of birth: January
7, 1907, place of birth: Redkomien, U.S.S.R.
(d) Three individuals who
had not previously been known to the committee as defectors: DuBois, David--Date
of birth: March 9, 1925; David Graham McConns--place of birth: Seattle, Wash.;
Jones, Sergeant (FNU); Fletcher, Sgt. Ernie.
(6)
The CIA response to this State Department request is dated November 21,
1960. It included available information on the above defectors and stated:
In addition to those appearing on your list, there is included
information on Virginia Frank Coe and Maurice Hyman Halperin. While these
individuals have not renounced their American citizenship or declared themselves
in any way, both are employed by the bloc countries in which they now reside.
(7)
The committee had selected Halperin from the computer listing as a
defector who fit the previously stated criteria, but had no knowledge of Coe.
(8) In a February 27, 1978,
letter from the committee to the. CIA, access to all existing 201 files were
requested for the following individuals:
(a) The 23 individuals from
the computer listing;
(b) Dutkanicz, Sloboda,
DuBois, Jones, and Fletcher (because their names appeared on the defector list
with Oswald's name); and
(c) Coe (because the CIA
added his name as a possible defector)
(9)
Five of the individuals were immediately dropped from this defector
analysis. The CIA could not identify Sergeant Jones without additional
identifying data, none of which could be found. DuBois and Coe were eliminated
because they defected to Communist China and did not offer any insight into
Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union. The information on Martin and Mitchell
was considered too sensitive in nature by the CIA to be provided to the
(10)
The committee also requested the FBI, the Department of Defense and the State
Department to provide selected information on the 24-name defector sample.
(11)
From the available information, the committee performed an analysis of
treatment provided by the Soviets to individuals during the approximate period
Oswald was there. The committee used the following criteria for its detailed
examination:
Background
Date of defection
Page
439
439
Defected with whom
Rejection of American
citizenship
Length of time for Soviets
to grant residence
Type of residence permit
granted
Circumstances after
defection and prior to resettlement
Propaganda statements made
to Soviet press
Relationships with Soviet
citizens
Place of residence in Soviet
Union
Military training prior to
defection
Employment in Soviet Union
Income provided
Financial aid provided
Contact with Soviet
officials, especially KGB personnel
Known surveillance
Time period for Soviets to
grant exit visa
Time period for United
States to grant entrance visa
Time period for spouse or
children to obtain exit visa
Time period for spouse or
children to obtain entrance visa
(12)
During this analysis, 13 individuals were eliminated for the following
reasons:
(a) Lack
of substantive information: Fletcher, Ernie; Gold, Robert: Jones, Louis; Lawson,
John; Meyer, Karl; Parker, James.
(b)
Communist Party members who made frequent trips to the Soviet Union, were on
official party business in the Soviet Union, or had resided outside the United
States for an extended period before entering the Soviet Union, making a
comparison to Oswald's situation difficult:Frank, Richard; Frank, Susan; Halpenn,
Maurice; Pittman, John; Winston, Henry.
(c)
Residents in the Soviet Union for over 90 years, making a comparison to Oswald's
situation difficult: Amron, Irving;
Martinkus, Anthony.
(13)
The defector sample eventually compared to Lee Harvey Oswald was reduced
to 11 ,individuals, 2 of whom were married:
Block,
Mollie; Block, Morris; Citrynell, Harold; Davis, Bruce; Dubinsky,
Shirley; Dutkanicz,
Joseph; Greendlinger, Martin;
Petrulli, Nicholas; Ricciardelli, Libero; Sloboda, Vladimir;Webster, Robert.
Morris
and Mollie Block
Page
439
II.
MORRIS AND MOLLIE BLOCK
(14)
Morris Block attended the Sixth World Youth Festival in the Soviet Union
during 1957. (1) Immediately after the conference he traveled to Communist
China, prompting the State Department to impound his passport for misuse. (2) In
1958, he made an unsuccessful attempt to reach the Soviet Union with a falsified
passport. (3)
(15)
Then, in July 1959, Morris Block arrived in Gydnia, Poland with his wife
and child. (4) After being kept in seclusion for 1 month, they were transferred
to Moscow where they were met by, a "Soviet representative." (5) The
Blocks were taken to the Leningradskaya Hotel and provided excellent
accommodations while they applied for travel visas to China. (6).Although the
Soviet representatives had reached an agreement with the Blocks to participate
in
press conference, it did not take place. (7)
Page
440
440
(16)
In September 1959, the Soviets suggested the Blocks accept Soviet asylum,
and later issued them Soviet internal passports for foreigners.
(8) The Soviet authorities
immediately settled the Blocks in a two-room, 19 ruble-a-month apartment in
Odessa and provided them 1,000 rubles to buy furniture. (9) Morris Block
obtained a job as a mechanic in a Soviet shipyard while Mollie Block taught in
the Polytechnic Institute. (10) Their combined
income
was 166 rubles per month. (11)
(17)
A Ukranian newspaper published a letter by Block in December 1959,
stating his intent to live in the Soviet Union. (12) He severely criticized life
in the United States and detailed a long history of unemployment and alleged
"persecution" by the FBI after his return from China. (13) Again he
denounced the United States interview with his local newspaper in 1960. (14)
(18)
Because Morris Block had difficulty with the Russian language, he was
assigned a young girl to teach him. (15) An affair resulted and Mollie Block
arrived in Moscow with her daughter in February 1960. (16) The same Soviet
official met Mrs. Block, this time taking her to the Hotel Metropole. (17) Until
June she remained there, with the Soviet Red Cross paying expenses. (18) When
her daughter hospitalized due to a nervous disorder, Mollie Block moved into a
one-room apartment and began work as a typist-translator for the Soviet
Publishing Office in Moscow. (19)
(19)
In August Morris Block arrived in Moscow and requested remain there with
his family. (20) Because the Soviets insisted months later Mollie and Morris
Block returned to their previous jobs in Odessa. (21) Their daughter did not
join them until May 1961.(22)
(20)
After numerous visits to the Soviet authorities, the Blocks received
permissiou to visit the American Embassy in Moscow. Mollie Block requested the
Embassy provide passports for herself, her husband, and an immigration visa for
their daughter. (24) She also requested financial aid to repatriate. (25) The
U.S. authorities were willing to aid the Blocks since their passports had
expired, but the Soviet authorities refused to grant exit visas and forced a
return to Odessa. (26) The Blocks were subsequently approached on three
occasions to renounce their U.S. citizenship and become Soviet citizens. (27)
They refused to do so. (28)
(21)
The State Department asked the American Embassy on January 30, 1963, to
issue Mollie Block a passport for return to the United States only, her daughter
an alien entry visa and Morris Block an emergency certificate of identity and
registration for return to the United States only. (29) They did so. (30)
(22)
Then in late February 1963, the Blocks lost their Soviet documentation.
(31) In May the Soviet. Government stated they would not reissue temporary
documents axed the Blocks would have to accept permanent registration instead.
(32) Applications for exit visas were filed during the summer months of 1963,
refused, and filed again in April 1964. (33)
(23)
Morris Block became annoyed at the Soviets broadcasting propaganda
through the loudspeaker at his place of employment early 1964.(34) He
disconnected it and was severely punished by
Page
441
441
several
young Soviet workers. (35) The Soviets would not grant permission for the Blocks
to visit the Embassy in Moscow or grant exit visas so they could leave the
Soviet Union. (36)
(24)
Mollie Block provided an account of their difficulties to a cor-
respondent for the New York Times that was visiting Odessa.(37) When the article
concerning Soviet treatment of the Blocks was published, the Soviets began
harassing the Blocks. (38) The U.S. consular officials discussed the Block case
with Minister of Foreign Affairs, and then the Blocks were expelled from the
U.S.S.R.(39) Morris Block was charged with acts of hooliganism and Mollie Block
was charged with handling out anti-Soviet propaganda to foreign students at the
Polytechnic Institute.(40) They departed from the U.S.S.R.
to
the United States on July 11, 1964. (41)
Harold
Citrynell
Page
441
III.
HAROLD CITRYNELL
(25)
Harold Citrynell entered the Soviet Union with his wife and child on
February 27, 1958. (42) He crossed the Czechoslovakian border as a tourist,
intending to establish residence and become a citizen. (43)
(26)
After several days in Moscow, Citrynell applied to the Office Visas and
Registration for permanent residence ,and Soviet citizenship. (44) He wrote a
statement containing 13 reasons prompting his request for Soviet citizenship,
one which may have been his inability to obtain employment in his desired
field.(45) Within a few days Citrynell was notified that he had been accepted
and that the Red Cross would take care of him and his family.(46)
(27)
Citrynell was provided a one-bedroom apartment in Kharkov job in a mine
surveying instrument factory with an "above average salary for the
job." (47) He stated that while living in Kharkov, he felt that his
neighbors and coworkers had participated in planned effot to make him dislike
the Soviet Union.
(28)
In the autumn of 1958, Citrynell decided to return to the United States.
(49) He requested an exit visa and began writing government offices and
influential people. (50) He stated that after October 1958 his detention was
involuntary. (51)
(29)
Before Citrynell's departure on June 29, 1959, the Red Cross requested he
sign a statement agreeing never to say anything derogatory about the Soviet
Union or any individual in it. (52)
Bruce
Frederick Davis
Page
441
IV.
BRUCE FREDERICK DAVIS
(30)
After serving approximately 5 years in the U.S. Army, Bruce Frederick
Davis left his post in Germany.(53) He defected to East Germany in August 1960,
and spent a month in East Berlin before entering the Soviet Union. (54)
(31)
In October 1960, two articles appeared in Izvestiva and Pravda with
statements by Davis attributing his defection to disillusionment with U.S.
foreign and military. policy.(55) Although Davis physically defected, he did not
officially denounce his American citizenship and was documented by the Soviet as
a stateless person.(56)
(32)
Davis was settled in Kiev as a student at the Kiev Institute
Page
442
442
of
National Economy.(57) He was provided a free dormitory room and a stipend of 900
old rubles a month.(58) This is three times what Soviet students receive, but
normal for a non-Soviet-bloc student. (59) In October Davis wrote a friend of
his in the Army stated he was given an outright sum of 10,000 old rubles; it is
known if this is true. (60) He was promised a free apartment if his unauthorized
travel was discontinued and his grades were improved. (61)
(33)
In August 1962, Davis appeared at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to request
an American passport.(62) He phoned the Embassy the following day and stated he
would not be completing the application as he had been arrested for his
participation m a brawl Kiev. (63) He returned to the Embassy in October 1962
and was issued a passport and entry visa into West Germany.(64) Davis, allowed
the passport and visa to expire due to a new Soviet girl friend he had met. (65)
(34)
In 1963 Davis visited the Embassy on an unauthorized trip January to make
statements concerning his dissatisfaction and deliver papers from another
disgruntled U.S. citizen.(66) In May he made another trip to renew his passport
and reapply for a West German visa.(67) Davis was returned to military control
in July 1963.(68)
Shirley
Dubinsky
Page
442
V.
SHIRLEY DUBINSKY
(35)
Shirley Dubinsky wrote several letters from East Berlin to Soviet Premier
Khrushchev denouncing her American citizenship and requesting Soviet citizenship
in October 1961.(69) On December 95, 1962, she arrived in Moscow after
purchasing a 3-day tour from a travel agency in Switzerland. (70) She refused to
leave the Soviet Union when her visa had expired. (71)
(36)
The American Embassy in Moscow was informed by the Hotel Metropole that
an American guest there, Dubinsky, was acting "queer?' (72) She was
committed to a mental hospital on January 5, 1963, with $100 in her possession.
(73) The diagnosis was "schizophrenic break."(74)Soviet psychiatrists
advised that Dubinsky was unable to travel and extended treatment was necessary.
(75) The American Embassy informed the State Department of the situation. (76)
(37)
It was reported that Dubinsky had visited the offices of Department of
Visas and Registration, apparently to obtain Soviet citizenship. (77) When she
attempted to visit the offices of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin she was
turned over to Intourist. (78)
(38)
A repatriation loan, in the form of a plane ticket to New York, was
awarded to Shirley Dubinsky, and she returned to the United States on Febru- ary
1, 1963.(79)
Joseph
Dutkanicz
Page
442
VI.
JOSEPH DUTKANICZ
(39)
Joseph Dutkanicz informed the American Embassy that in 1958 while he was
stationed in Germany with the U.S. Army, he was approached by KGB officers and,
because of threats and inducements, was recruited.(80) His wife stated that he
often spoke of fleeing to the
Page
443
443
Soviet
Union during 1959.(81) The Soviets
recommended that Dutkanicz defect in May 1960 and a Western bloc investigation
for security reasons prompted him to do so.(82) Two weeks prior to his scheduled
return to the United States in June 1960, Dutkanicz took his wife and three
children on a trip.(83) They visited Czechoslovakian Embassy in Vienna, then,
passing through Czechoslovakia, were escorted to the Ukraine, Soviet Union. (84)
After being driven to L'vov, the family was settled in first-class
accommodations, with KGB assistance.(85)
(40)
Tass announced the Dutkanicz family had sought assistance in July 1960.
(86) Articles began appearing that gave autobiographical statements on
the history and motivation for defection in anti-American terms. (87) Later an
article by Dutkanicz was published that indicated he was living in L'vov with
his family and contained anti-Hitler and anti-U.S. propaganda. (88) Two radio
broadcasts were made in Moscow also.(89)
(41)
Dutkanicz stated he never applied for or requested Soviet
citizenship.(90) A private bill bestowing citizenship on him, Supreme Soviet
decree No. 135/3, was enacted in March 1960, before he defected.(91) September
1060, a Soviet passport was delivered to him.(92)
His wife was documented as a foreigner upon request and his children as
Soviet citizens.(93)
(42)
Dutkanicz was given employment as a technician in a TV factory for an
undisclosed salary and his wife taught English conversation lessons for 10
rubles a month. (94)
(43)
Although they moved into an apartment in 1061, the daily contact by
Russian agents that Dutkanicz's wife described during their first 6 months, did
not end.(95) During a March 6, 1967, visit to the American Embassy she stated
that the secret police (KGB) were in constant contact with her husband,
telephoning daily, and that 1960 were watching them closely."(96)
(44)
The American Embassy received a letter from Dutkanicz's wife, Mary, on
September 14, 1961, requesting a visa to visit her sick mother in the United
States.(97) It stated she thought
her husband was only visiting the Soviet Union at the time of his defection and
that her passport had been taken from her.(98) She appeared at the Embassy on
December 5, 1961, for a passport, stating her mother had died.(99) Mary was sent
back to L'vov.(101)
(45)
An application to the Red Cross was filed in February or March 1962 for a
loan of 500 rubles to be used for a trip to Moscow.(102) The request is denied
"although the so-called Soviet Red Cross had given large sums of money to
other defectors who were American born and had no KGB connection."(103)
(46)
During Mary Dutkanicz's visa processing visits to the Embassy, she
revealed that her husband was thoroughly disillusioned and wanted to return to
the United States regardless of any charges.(104) She explained that her husband
was encouraged by the fact he had received an undesirable discharge from the
Army, not dishonorable.(105)
Page
444
444
(47)
Dutkanicz requested the Embassy to aid his children and himself in
returning to the United States on March 22, 1962 (the day after his wife
departed to the United States).(106) The FBI and CIA did not want Dutkanicz
brought back on their account, but on August 15, 1962, the State Department
advised the Embassy to issue him a passport.(107) The file reflected that the
Embassy could not reach Dutkanicz on the phone prior to November 22, 1963. (108)
(48)
Dutkanicz's children, ages 11, 9, and 8, stated that on July 25, 1963.
they were taken from their home and placed in boarding schools (the 11-year-old
had been in school previously).(109) They were allowed to see their father once
and he had cried, saying that. "they" wanted to do something to his
nervous system to make him an idiot. (110)
(49)
Mary Dutkanicz was informed that her husband had been found in a drunken
state, placed in the hospital in L'vov and died in November 1963.(111) The U.S.
consul was informed in March 1964, that the three children would be allowed to
leave the Soviet Union.(112) The children were to be documented as Soviet
citizens for the departure, but were to travel on U.S. passports after crossing
Soviet borders.(113) In May 1964, the children joined Mary Dut-
kanicz
in the United States. (114)
Martin
Greendlinger
Page
444
VII.
MARTIN GREENDLINGER
(50)
A mathematician at New York University, Martin Greendlinger attended the
World Youth Festival held in Moscow in 1957. (115) He met Yelena Ivanovna
Pyatnitskaya, nee Kapustina, a student at the Lenin Pedagogical Institute. (116)
(51)
Greendlinger returned to the Soviet Union in April 1958, and within a
month had married Yelena. (117) He had been encouraged to believe her passport
and Soviet exit visa would be issued in 3 to 4 months by OVIR. (118)
Greendlinger meant to bring his wife, her daughter by a previous marriage, and
possibly a child of their own marriage to the United States. (119)
(52)
In July 1959 Greendlinger left his home in Borisoglebsk and returned to
the United States alone.(12O) After a year, the Soviet authorities had issued
his wife an exit visa to depart from the U.S.S.R.(121) The U.S. Embassy,
however, refused to issue an entrance visa due to her membership in Komsomol
after 1947 and in trade union after 1951. (122)
(53)
Greendlinger applied to the State Department for his wife's entry visa in
August 1960.(123) In September he received a U.S. passport to visit his wife and
child for a month and was awarded National Science Foundation fellowship for 1
year.(124)
(54)
It was December 1960 before Greendlinger returned to Moscow.(125) He and
his wife spoke to American Embassy personnel about acquiring an entrance visa.
(126) The Embassy stated his wife could not receive an entrance visa to the
United States because there could be no waiver of section 243(g) of the
act.(127) The CIA file on Greendlinger states:
This apparently involved Komsomol membership, although the Soviet wives
of Parker and Oswald--q.v.--had many more drawbacks and were let in. (128)
Page
445
445
(55)
When Greendlinger applied for visas at the British Embassy he was told
that his wife would be issued a visa if he could get a job in England and
guarantee support. (129) He settled in Ostankine, a suburb of Moscow, and worked
as a mathematician. (130) Finally, the National Science Foundation approved his
studying math at Manchester, England. (131) No further information is known.
(132)
Nicholas
Petrulli
Page
445
VIII.
NICHOLAS PETRULLI
(56)
An American laborer, Nicholas Petrulli purchased an organized tour to
Western Europe and the U.S.S.R. for $965.(133) He entered the Soviet Union at
Vyborg on August 10, 1959, using a regular 7-day tourist visa issued in
Washington the previous month. The tour passed through Leningrad en route to
Moscow where it was to remain until August 18. (134) Petrulli did not show up at
the train station to depart from Moscow. (135) He canceled his ship reservations
through an Intourist guide and remained in the Ukraine Ho-
tel.(136)
(57)
Petrulli spoke to several Americans in the hotel restaurant the following week
about his decision to remain in the Soviet Union.(137) He had no communistic
sympathies or ideological leaning toward the U.S.S.R. and had no grievances
against the United States. (138) Petrulli believed there was a good opportunity
to obtain employment in the Soviet Union, although he did not know the language,
people, or country. (139)
(58)
A resident American correspondent encouraged Petrulli to tell the Embassy
in Moscow about his intention to defect. (14O) On August 28, 1959, Petrulli was
interviewed for 2 hours by an Embassy official, Snyder.(141) The correspondent
was present when Petrulli explained his reasons for staying and how he had
learned the procedure for remaining from the hotel manager and Intourist guide.
(142) He stated no one had induced
or influenced him. (143) Petrulli stated that upon the guide's advice, he had
drafted a letter to the Supreme Soviet requesting Soviet citizenship, but had
not sent it yet. (144) He stated be had informed the intourist guide he was
virtually out of
money.(145)
He did, however, have possession of ship and plane tickets for his return to the
United States. (146) Petrulli was given the name of a Catholic priest in Moscow
he subsequently spoke to who warned about possible exploitation, and so
forth.(147)
(59)
The following day Petrulli sent the letter to the Supreme Soviet.(148) He
told the Embassy it contained five points as specified by the Intourist guide:
(1) date and place of birth; (9,) names and addresses of relatives; (3) property
and bank accounts (none); (4) skills, education, and work record; and (5) moral
and ideological reasons for wanting Soviet citizenship. (149) Petrulli would not
relate what he had written for No. 5 or if it was derogatory to the United
States. (150)
(60)
Petrulli visited the American Embassy on September. 9, 1959, turned in
his passport, stated he had sent the letter to the Supreme Soviet and asked to
renounce his U.S. citizenship. (151) Snyder explained the irrevocabi]ity of
renunciation and told Petrulli to return in the afternoon. (152) He did so and
Snyder administered the oath of renunciation. (153)
Page
446
446
(61)
Several people were told by Petrulli that he felt "morally and
economically at home in the Soviet Union," that they were trying to do
things right, that people were not in a hurry and not nervous wrecks.(154) He
said he had many jobs in the United States and he was not happy there; he liked
the Soviet Union better.(155)
(62)
Petrulli visited the American Embassy. again on September 8, 1959 and
asked for a written statement of his citizenship status for the Soviet
authorities. (156) When told that the Embassy would inform him as soon as the
State Department informed them, Petrulli began requesting information on visa
requirements to the U.S.(157) The Soviet authorities had not responded to his
letters on job requests and Petrulli felt he was getting the run-around.(158)
His hotel was being paid for by the Soviets but he was without money, friends or
the ability to communicate with Russians.(159). Petrulli left the
Embassy
and told an American correspondent he just wanted to go home. (160)
(63)
On September 14, 1959, a Soviet official informed Petrulli he should have
applied at the Soviet Embassy in Washington for citizenship. (161) The manager
of the Ukraina Hotel told him he had 2 days to vacate the premises.(162) Both
men told him he had to leave the Soviet Union and needed some type of traveling
document from the American Embassy. (163)
(64)
The next day Petrulli was back at the Embassy.(164) It is unknown if he
applied for a passport during this visit, but a September 19, 1959, newspaper
article stated that the State Department had declared Petrulli legally
incompetent and returned his U.S. citizenship. (165) He was given a one-way
passport to the United States and returned to his home m New York on September
22, 1959. (166)
Libero
Ricciardelli
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446
IX.
LIBERO RICCIARDELLI
(65)
Libero Ricciardelli decided that exposing his family to a socialistic
system of government might straighten out domestic problems and guarantee his
children's future well-being. (167) In 1958 he visited the Soviet Embassy in
Washington. D.C., and asked to visit Soviet Russia.(168) Ricciardelli obtained
Soviet visas to tour Moscow for six days with his wife and three children, and
did so in February 1959.(169)
(66)
When his Intourist guide learned that he wanted to defect, she
recommended
that Ricciardelli visit the visa department, Intourist Service Bureau. (170) He
did so and was informed that he must depart on the expiration date on his
visa.(171) Ricciardelli did not depart and was not pressured to do so. (172) He
continued to visit the visa department and wrote the President of the RSFSR as
was recommended to him by Intourist. (173)
(67)
Financial aid was requested by Ricciardelli because he had $500 and 6
days of meal tickets on him.(174) The director of the Soviet Union Red Crescent
or Red Cross and a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with
Ricciardelli and discouraged remaining in the Soviet Union. (175) An
investigation concerning Ricciardelli's application for a visa at the Soviet
Embassy in the United States was begun.(176)
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447
447
68)
Riccardelli contracted influenza, which developed into rheumatic fever
and was placed in a hospatal for 3 weeks.(177) While there, he was visited by
representatives of the Red Cross and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who announced
he could remain in the Soviet Union and the Red Cross would be responsible for
him.(178) They helped Ricardelli fill out forms, and the Soviet in charge of
Intouristat the hotel arranged for aid from the International Red Cross.(179)
(69)
After Ricciardelli returned from the hospital, he was questioned from 7
p.m. to 7 a.m. by a journalist from "Izvestia" and presumably a Red
Cross Representative(180) Ricciardelli signed a statement that dealt with having
conditions in the United States as compared to the Soviet Union and information
that would protect the Soviets from allegations he was being held against his
will.(181) These articles later appeared in "Pravda" and "Izvestia."(182)
When Ricciardelli could understand enough Russian to read the articles he did so
and felt they, were slanted, self-serving statements condemning life in the
United States. (183)
(70)
Although Ricciardelli applied for Soviet citizenship, his wife refused to
do so. (184) Subsequent to this application for citizenship, the director of the
Red Cross in Moscow and a reprentative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
arranged for a move to a climate more suitable to Ricciardelli's health (185) He
had requested a home Kiev or L'vov.(186)
(71)
In July 1959. Ricciardelli arrived in Kiev and was presented with an
Internal Russian Passport, indicating he was a Soviet citizen.(187)
No oath of allegiance was taken and Ricciardelli did not give up his U.S.
passport and did not feel as if he had given up his U.S. citizenship. (188) The
Soviets considered all his children Soviet citizens although his wife refused to
accept the passport offered to her. (189)
(72)
Ricciardelli sketched ideas for new tools and machines as mechanical
engineer for the Main Operation for Building Construction. (190) He was required
to join a trade union but refused to vote or give speeches at the meeting when
asked.(191)
(73)
With his salary of 150 new rubles, Ricciardelli rented a thirdfloor
walkup apartment consisting of four rooms and a bath. (192) As rent was only
seven to nine rubles a month, there was a]so money for a TV and radio. (193) For
2 rubles a month, Ricciardelli kept a phone in his apartment, though it took him
2 years to get it installed. (194) Ricciardelli traveled on five or six trips to
Moscow from Kiev and went on a vacation to Gagua, Cavcasas on the Black Sea.
(195)
(74)
There were few visitors to the Ricciardelli apartment, and those that
came believed it was wired for sound. (196)
(75)
In the summer of 1960, Ricciardelli visited the Czechoslovakian Embassy
in Moscow and applied for visas.(197) After his children had received an
education, Ricciardelli felt it would be easier to return to the United States
from Czechoslovakia than the Soviet Union. (198)
Two years later when the entrance visas were granted, the Soviets refused
to grant exit visas. (199)
(76)
Ricciardelli's domestic problems had increased by August 1962 and he decided his
wife should return to her parents' home in Illinois
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448
448
and
he would return to his parents' home with the three children. (200)
Ricciardelli applied for a renewed U.S. passport and was told his
citizen- ship was terminated when he accepted Soviet citizenship. (201) On March
27, 1963, his wife left the Soviet Union for the United States after filling out
an application to have him granted a permanent resident visa as the husband of a
U.S. citizen. (202) Ricciardelli applied as an alien to return to the United
States on a permanent resident visa. (203) The U.S. Embassy granted the visa in
June 1963, and after 14-day delay over whether his oldest daughter was a Soviet
citizen he and his children flew to New York. (204)
Vladimir
Sloboda
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448
X.
VLADIMIR SLOBODA
(77)
Vladimir Sloboda became a naturalized citizen of the United States on
August 14, 1958, and was assigned to the 513th Military Intelligence Group, U.S.
Army, with duty station at Frankfurt, Germany. (205)
(78)
August 1960, Sloboda defected into East Germany, requesting Soviet
asylum. (206) Although his wife said he was extremely worried about gambling
debts, his 201 file, maintained by the CIA reflects that "emotional state
and fact of Army countermeasures caused by arrest of 154 MID agents
recently" are probably responsible for defection. (207) Sloboda later
explained he had been blackmailed and framed into defecting. (208)
(79)
Immediately after Sloboda's defection, he was utilized by the Soviets for
propaganda purposes.(209) In an August interview on Moscow TV, Sloboda based his
defection on the expressed views that the United States was a warmonger with spy
activity in Germany.(210) The September issue of Golos Roding repeated this as
did other articles and various press releases (211) According to one of the
later articles Sloboda was given Soviet citizenship in August 1960, the month he
defected. (212)
(80)
Sloboda's British wife requested that the Soviet consul in London arrange
transportation for herself and three children to the Soviet Union. (213) Travel
arrangements were made to Leningrad and all expenses, such as shipment of
furniture and transportation tickets were paid for by the Soviets.(214) A
Russian Intelligence Service (RIS) resettlement officer made arrangements for
travel from Leningrad to L'vov.(215).When she and the children joined Sloboda on
November 19, 1960, he was already having doubts about his defection(216)
(81)
Soviet authorities provided Sloboda with approximately
300 rubles a month and a three-room flat in L'vov for his parents, with
and children. (217)
(82)
In early 1962 Sloboda's wife requested an exit visa from the L'vov
authorities.(218) She called the American. Embassy and informed them that both
she and her husband were desperate to return to the United States. (219)
In March she received an exit visa and passport, (220) Sloboda and his
wife then visited the British Embassy discuss bringing her Son and daughter out
of the Soviet Union with her. (221)Sloboda explained to the Embassy that he was
afraid to visit
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449
449
the
American Embassy. (222) He stated that his wife and oldest and youngest children
had been issued Soviet internal passports for foreigners. (223) He stated his
other child was a U.S. citizen with an expired passport. (224)
(83)
Sloboda's wife took the youngest child to England, leaving the
eldest
at the International Boarding School and the other son at day school.(225) On
her departure she was given 50 rubles to purchase present for her mother. (226)
(84)
The British Embassy sent a representative to visit Sloboda in August
19612. (227) They learned that "he had been subjected to fairly frequent
questioning by the KGB in L'vov since he visited the embassy in Moscow."
(228) (85)
In March 1963, Sloboda's wife sent him a telegram stating she was
returning to the Soviet Union so the eldest sons should not be sent. (229)
Robert
Webster
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449
XI.
ROBERT WEBSTER
(86)
Robert E. Webster, an employee of the Rand Development Co., made several
trips to the Soviet Union in order to prepare for the 1959 U.S. exhibition in
Moscow. (230) While there for 7 weeks, beginning in May 1959, Webster steadily
dated the hostess employed at the Hotel Ukraine's tourist restaurant. (231) She
worked there during the period correspondents accompanying Vice President
Nixon's visit to the U.S.S.R. resided there, and was suspected of being a KGB
agent. (232) Webster informed his girlfriend
he wished to divorce his wife in the United States and return to the
Soviet Union to marry her. (233)
(87)
Webster first revealed his desire to defect on July 11, 1959. He
approached the two Soviet officials in charge of arrangements for the exhibi-
tion at the fairgrounds and requested information concerning the procedures for
a U.S. citizen to remain in the U.S.S.R. (235) Webster was told to call one of
the officials in their Solkolniki Park office and a meeting was set up.(236)
(88)
A few days later, the English-speaking official Webster had met
previously, escorted him to a private room in a restaurant. (237) A represen-
tative of the Soviet Government, questioned him about his desire to remain in
the Soviet Union.(238) The representative was also interested in whether Webster
had told other Americans of his interest to defect and instructed him not to.
(239) While intoxicated with vodka Webster was told to write a letter to the
Supreme Soviet requesting to remain as a Soviet citizen. (240) He did so and was
given a biographic data sheet to take with him and fill out.(241)
(89)
Subsequently when Webster submitted the data sheet, he stated that his
dissatisfaction with the United States was due to the tendency of American
employers to hire a man and then fire him when he had learned the job. (242)
This reason was not acceptable because Webster had not personally experienced
this. (243) He rewrote the form to state that in the United States, Government
controlled big business.(244) He also wrote that he wished to work, marry, have
children, earn a degree and learn the Russian language in the Soviet Union.(245)
Although he stated he wished to cooperate in every way with the Soviet Union,
the Soviet authorities tried to dissuade Webster from
defecting.(246)
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450
450
(90)
In the last of July or early August, Webster attended what described as a
serious, no drinking meeting held in a private restaurant room at the Metropole
Hotel.(247) Webster told two Soviet chemists he could help them make the Rand
spray gun he had demonstrated at the U.S. Exhibition.(248) On September 9 he was
told he had been accepted by the Soviets. (249) Although he had requested to
work in Moscow, Webster was informed he would be sent to Leningrad. (250 )
(91)
The following day the Soviet officials registered Webster at the Bucharist
Hotel, and instructed him not to leave.(254) He was given 1,000 old rubles and
asked to write a note to a Rand employee requesting the money be left for him at
the hotel because he was on a tour of Russia. (252)
(92)
There was a short party for Webster on September 11. (253) He was
immediately flown to Leningrad with an interpreter and met by an Intourist
representative.(254) He applied for work at the Leningrad Scientific Research
Institute, Polymerized Plastics and lived in the Baltiskaya Hotel for a month.
(255) He was allowed to call his girlfriend and she was allowed to visit and
make plans for a vacation. (256)
(93)
On October 17, 1959 Webster was staying in Moscow.(257) He artended a
meeting at the central office, visas and registrar, ion (OVIR) with the original
Soviet representative he had contact with, an unknown Soviet, H.J. Rand. his
assistant George H. Bookbinder and Richard E. Snyder of the U.S. Embassy. (258)
Webster stated he was free to speak, and told Snyder when he had applied for
Soviet citizenship, he had been granted a Soviet passport on September 21,
1959.(259) He filled out a form entitled "Affidavit for Expatriated
Person" and wrote his resignation to Rand Development Corp. (260)
(94)
Webster later explained he had no Soviet documentation at the time,
having in his possession an American passport which he never sent to Snyder as
requested.(261) Webster stated the Soviets had instructed him to say his reasons
for defecting were political. (262)
(95)
Webster's girlfriend joined him the following day and both went on a
month vacation at the Suitland Sanitarium in Sochi. (263) They returned to
Leningrad and began work at the institute, where his girlfriend was employed as
an assistant and translator. (264) Webster received 280 rubles per month and a
semiannual bonus of 50 to 60 rubles. (265) He lived with his girlfriend in a new
apartment building and had three rooms with a bath. (266)
(96)
After writing a summary of his life, listing his relatives and where they
worked, submitting pictures of himself and undergoing medical examination,
Webster was granted a Soviet internal passport.(267) In December 1959 or January
1960, he turned over his American passport and obtained the Soviet passport at
the OVIR office in Leningrad. (268)
(97)
On January 27, 1960, a letter was delivered to Webster from his
father.(269) It contained news of
his mother's nervous breakdown and word that his father had assumed financial
support of Webster's children. (270) At that point, Webster decided to return to
the United States.(271)
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451
451
(98)
A note in Webster's file stated that on April 6, 1969, he was to give a
speech on the United States, although there was no indication whether he, in
fact, did make the address. (272)
(99)
The original Soviet representative in Moscow arranged for Webster and his
girlfriend to visit there for the May Day celebration.(273) Webster entered the
U.S. Embassy unchallenged, due to his American clothing.(274) He informed John
McVicker that he wished to return to the United States. (275) He was told to
apply for a Soviet exit visa. (276)
(100)
Webster requested two notarized invitations for his return to the United
States, to be made by his father, copies to be sent to the American Embassy.
(277) His girl friend helped him fill out the application for a Soviet exit visa
and gave her consent, which was required. (278)
(101)
Webster's girlfriend gave birth to Svetlana Robertovna Webster in August
1960.(279) The child was immediately adopted by Webster and reistered. (280)
During the majority of the time after this. Svetlana's Russian grandmother also
lived in the Webster apartment.(281) Webster was assigned a new translator at
the Institute.(282)
(102)
Two months after submitting his application for a Soviet exit visa,
Webster was turned down and told he could not reapply for 1 year. (283) Soviet
officials visited him from Moscow, inquiring why he was unhappy and suggesting
that he send for his family from the United States.(284) One year later he
reapplied, and in February 1962. Webster
was granted a Soviet exit visa.(285)
(103)
In March 1962, the American Embassy gave Webster instructions on how to
obtain an American entrance visa.(286) His father sent him a plane ticket for
his passage home, and Webster quit his job (287) It was May before Webster
actually surrender his internal Soviet passport for his exit visa. (288) Webster
arrived in the United States as an alien under the Russian quota on May 20,
1962. (289) He had never intended to aid his girlfriend in leaving the Soviet
Union. (290)
Lee
Harvey Oswald
Page
451
XII.
LEE HARVEY OSWALD
(104)
In comparing Oswald's defection to the other 11 individuals in this
study, certain points must be taken into consideration.
The Warren Commission requested through the State Department that the
Soviet Government provide "any further available information concerning the
activities of Lee Harvey Oswald during his residence from 1959 to 1962 in the
Soviet Union, in particular, copies of any official records concerning
him." (291) In May 1964 the Soviet
Union
provided approximately 15
documents concerning
the sojourn employment and medical history of Oswald while in their
country. (292) The documents also dealt with the departure of Oswald and his
wife from the U.S.S.R. (293)
(105)
No documents appear to be from the KGB or make mention of Oswald's being
debriefed by it. (294)There are some dates, times, and facts in the documents
that differ from Oswald's statements. (295)
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452
452
The
signatures of most of the Soviet officials are illegible. (296) The authenticity
of these documents could not be established, but they must be taken into
consideration. It was the only case in this study in which the Soviet Union
added to the existing body of information.
(106)
The committee also had available to it statements and a diary that
handwriting experts determined were written by Lee Harvey Oswald. (297) The
diary covered the period Oswald was in the Soviet Union. (298). The committee
found all of Oswald's writings concerning his life in the Soviet Union to be
generally credible. To a great extent, they parallel the documents provided by
the Soviet Union on Oswald in 1964; that is, that he was in the Soviet Union
during the time period stated; that he attempted suicide; that he worked at
radio plant in Minsk; that he met and married a Russian woman; that he was
originally issued a residence visa for stateless persons and then a residence
visa for foreigners; that he obtained exit visas for himself and his family, and
left the Soviet Union. (299)
(107)
The committee tried to determine the credibility of both the Soviet
documents and Oswald's writings, and in doing so endeavored to obtain any
additional information. Witnesses before the committee stated that the Soviet
Government would have additional information on Oswald from its surveillance of
him. (300) Through the State Department. the committee requested the Soviet
Union to provide any documentation on Oswald they might possess. (301) The
Soviet was requested to allow the interviewing of the Soviet citizens Oswald
mentions
throughout his diary.(392) The State Department was informed by Soviet officials
that no additional information was available and Soviet citizens could not be
interviewed.
(108)
Thus, information that the committee has collected and used concerning
Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union for this study, is only partially complete.
(109)
Lee Harvey Oswald was issued an entry visa to the Soviet Union by the
U.S.S.R. consul in Helsinki, Finland, on October 14, 1959. (303) Stamps on
Oswald's passport show he entered Finland October 10 and left on October 15.
(304)
(110)
On October 16, Oswald arrived in Moscow after crossing the border from
Finland at Vyborg. (305) He was escorted to the Hotel Berlin by an Intourist
representative who met him at his train. (306) There, he registered as a student
on a 5-day luxury tourist ticket and met his Intourist guide Rimma Shirikova.
(307)
(111)
Oswald wrote in the October 16 entry of his diary, referring to Rimma:
I explain to her I wish to apply for Rus.*
citizenship. She is flabbergassed but aggrees to help. She checks with
her boss, main office Intour, than helps me add a letter to Sup. Soviet asking
for citizenship, meanwhile boss telephones passport & visa office and
notifies them about me. (308)
Rimma
insisted they continue sightseeing the following day and asked Oswald himself
and his reasons for defecting. (309) Oswald believed his explanation concerning
his Communist beliefs makes Rimma uneasy. (310)
-------------------
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453
453
(112)
On October 20 Oswald was told by Rimma that the Passport & Visa
Department had requested to see him.(311) Oswald wrote in the October 21 entry
of his diary:
Meeting with a single official, balding stout, black suit, fairly good
English, asks what do I want? I say Soviet citizenship, he ask why I give vague
answers about "Great Soviet Union" He tells me "U.S.S.R. only
great in literature wants me to go back home"l am
stunned I reiterate he says
he shall check and let me know weather my visa will be (extended it exipires
today). (312)
Oswald
wrote that at 6 p.m. a police official informs him he must leave the Soviet
Union in 2 hours.
(313) At 7 p.m. he decided to commit suicide and wrote "when Rimma
comes at S p.m. to find me dead, it will be a great shock." (314) Oswald
stated that about 8 p.m. Rimma found him unconscious and he was taken to the
hospital in an ambulance for stitches. (315)
(113)
The Ministry of Health records supplied, reflect that Oswald was admitted
to "Botkin Hospital at 16:00 (4 p.m.) on October 21, 1959 upon request at
15h. 19."(316) He received an examination in the admission's department at
4:30 p.m. where a skin wound was found on the lower third of the left forearm.
(317) Oswald was given four stitches and an aseptic bandage for the iramediate
wound and kept in a psvchosomatic department"for observation. (318) The
report stated that 'Oswald's mind was c]ear his perception was correct and he
inflicted the injury upon himself in order to postpone his departure from the
Soviet Union. (319) Oswald was transferred to the somatic department on October
23. (320)
(114)
Oswald's hospital records stated that ha was visited by the head of the
Service Bureau and daily by an interpreter.(321) His place of employment was
listed "K-4-19-80 Service Bureau. Radio technician," which was the
only other mention of the Service Bureau. (322)
(115)
The authenticity of the hospital records can in no way be determined. One
indication that they may not be valid documents was the April 25, 1953 date that
appeared at the bottom of Oswald's blood analysis. (323)
(116)
Oswald wrote in his diary that while in the hospital he was visited daily
by Rimma and on October 23 by Rosa Agafonova, from the hotel tourist office.
(324)
(117)
Oswald's diary and the hospital reports reflected he was discharged from
the hospital on October 28. (325) He wrote in the diary that Rimma chauffeured
him from the hospital to the Hotel Berlin where he picked up his clothes and
money, $100, and moved to the Hotel Metropole.(326) Oswald stated he Was invited
to visit with Ludmilla Dimitrova, Inturist office head and Rosa. (327)
(118)
Oswald also wrote that on October 28 he visited the pass and registration
office with Rimma. (328) He stated there were four known officials that asked
questions about the last official he had met with and his desires for the
future.(329) Oswald requested Soviet citizenship again and provided his
discharge papers from the Marine Corps as identification.(330) Oswald described
this meeting in discouraging manner. (331)
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454
454
(119)
On October 31, Oswald visited the American Embassy in Moscow.(332) Consul
at the Embassy, Richard Snyder, informed the committee that he had no
information concerning Oswald before he walked into the Embassy. (333) Snyder
said:
He handed me a handwritten statement which stated, in effect, that he
renounced his American citizenship. I used the pretext that the Embassy was not
officially open that day and, therefore, I was not in a position to prepare the
required form to go through with the renunciation and invited him to come back
on the first business day of the Embassy if he so wished.
I retained his passport at that time.(334)
Snyder
recalled that Oswald had made some comment that "he had worked, or advised,
or something to that effect, what I would try to tell him and that he didn't
want to waste his time or mine."(335) Snyder was told by Oswald that he had
been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and that he intended to give
information he possessed to the Soviets. (336)
(120)
Oswald wrote in his diary that when he returned from the Embassy he was
contacted by two American reporters in Moscow, named Goldstein and Mosby. (337)
Although he did not grant interviews to either, he answered a few questions for
Mosby. (338)
(121)
Alice Mosby wrote an article, dateline November 14, containing Oswald's
statements to her.(339) It said that imperialism and lack of money while a child
were Oswald's main reasons for saving $1,600 and coming to the Soviet
Union.(340) "He had announced on October 31 that he renounced his U.S.
citizenship and was seeking Soviet citizenship for purely political
reasons."(341) Oswald was denied the Soviet citizenship he had requested
but was allowed to live freely in Russia. (342)
(122)
Among Oswald's belongings was a handwritten account of his "interview
November 14 with Miss Mosby."(343) Oswald wrote that Mosby agreed to let
him see the story before it was sent out. (344) He explained to her the
political reasons he went to the Soviet Union and applied for citizenship and
how he developed those political beliefs.(345) 'Oswald made no comment about his
present situation in the Soviet Union.
(123)
In Oswald's diary he stated that during December he stayed in the hotel
studying Russian, seeing no one except Rimma, who called the ministry for him.
(347) She had told the hotel he would be receiving a great deal of money from
the United States so he paid no bills that month. (348) Oswald recorded that he
only had $28 left. The passport office had met with Oswald again and he wrote
that the same questions were answered by three new officials.(350)
(124)
Oswald's application to the Visa and Registration Office, Interior Department,
Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council for the issuance of an identity
bore the date December 29, 1959. (351)
(125)
Oswald wrote that the passport office issued him a Soviet document "for
those without citizenship on January
4" '352 He stated he was
told that he would be sent to Minsk and that the Red Cross would provide him
with money. (353)
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455
455
(126)
The Soviet document that bore a January 5, 1960, date was Oswald's
receipt stating that the legal status of a person without citizenship has been
explained to him, and his receipt for an identity card Series P No. 31179 issued
by OVIRMoscow City Executive Committee on January 4, 1960, with expiration date
January 4, 1961. (354)
(127)
Oswald wrote that January 5 he was given 5,000 rubles by the Red Cross,
2,200 of which paid the hotel bill and 150 of which purchased the train ticket
to Minsk. (355)
(128)
In the January 7 entry, Oswald described being met at the train station
in Minsk by two Red Cross workers, then proceeding to the where he met two
Intourist representatives. (356)
(129)
An application and autobiographical sketch written by Oswald in
connection with his employment at the radio factory in Minsk bore the date
January 11, 1960.(357) Oswald also received the signature of the doctor and
trainer in safety and fire precautions of the Minsk radio plant. (358) On
January 13, he was hired in the experimental shop at the radio factory as a
checker. (359) Oswald stated that he received 700 rubles a month from his job
and another 700 rubles a month from the Soviet Red Cross. (360) He wrote
"therefore every month I make 1400 R, about the same as a director of the
factory."
(361)
(130)
In a March 16 entry Oswald wrote: "I received a small flat one-room
kitchen-bath near the factory (8 min. walk) with splendid view from 2 balconies
of the river. Almost rent free (60 Rub. a month) it a Russian dream." (362)
(131)
On January 4 1961. Oswald wrote that he was called into the passport
office and asked if he wanted Soviet citizenship. He said no, but requested his
residential passport be extended. (363) A document provided by the Soviet
Government reflected that an identity card a person without citizenship, Series
P No. 311479, belonging to Lee Harvey Oswald, was entered from January 4, 1961
to January 1962.(364)
(132)
Another document provided by the Soviets was a certificate from the Minsk Radio
Plant, Administration of Electrotechnical and Instrument Manufacturing Industry.
Council of the National Economy, U.S.S.R., bearing dates January 1, 1960, and
July 15, 1961, that Lee Harvey Oswald was employed as an assembler there. (365)
(133)
The American Embassy received an undated letter from Oswald on February
13. 1961. (366) He stated that he had not received a reply to a December 1960
letter he had written to the Embassy, so he was writing again. (367) Oswald
requested that his American passport be returned and suggested that some
agreement be reached concerning any legal action proceeding against him so he
could return to the United States. (368) He stated:"They have at no time
insisted that I take Russian Citizenship?' (369) "I am living here with
nonpermanent-type papers for a foreigner."(370) The return address listed
on
the envelope was Ulitsa Kalinina, House 4 Apartment 24, Minsk; and Oswald said
he could not leave without permission. (371)
(134)
In a letter dated February 28, 1961, Snyder requested that Oswald appear in
person at the Embassy to determine his citizenship status.(372) Snyder explained
that the December 1960 letter, which Oswald had mentioned, was never received.
(373)
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(135)
Oswald wrote the Embassy again in March 1961. He stated he could leave
Minsk without permission and would find it inconvenient to visit Moscow for an
interview.(374) He requested that preliminary inquiries be sent in questionnaire
form. (375)
(136)
Oswald artended a trade dance in Minsk on March 17 and described meeting
Marina N. Prusakova. (376) Records provided by Ministry of Health. U.S.S.R.,
reflected that on March 30 Oswald was admitted to a clinical hospital--ear,
nose, and throat division. (377) According to these records, he was discharged
on April 11, 1961, and he wrote in his diary that he proposed to Marina 4 days
later.
(137)
The date on a certificate of marriage for Marina and Lee Oswald from the
Minsk Civil Registrar Office of Leninsky District is April 30, 1961.(379) The
entry in Oswald's diary concerning his marriage also bears this date. (380)
(138)
In a letter dated May 1961. Oswald informed the Embassy he had married a
Russian-born woman who would travel to the, United States with him. (381) He
wrote that a marriage stamp was placed on his present passport for an individual
without citizenship.(382) Oswald said, "I am asking not only for the right
to return to the United States, but also for full guarantees that I shall not
under any circumstances, be persecuted for any act pertaining to this case
"(383)
(139)
The July 8 entry in Oswald's diary described an airplane trip
to
Moscow for his first interview at the Embassy since his attempt to denounce
American citizenship.(384) Oswald stated that he took no oath, affirmation, or
allegiance of any kind nor was he required to sign any kind of papers in
connection with his employment. (385) He denied being a member of the factory
trade union or ever having been asked to join. (386) Oswald gave his earnings as
90 new rubles per month.(387) This contradicted an earlier entry in his diary
that he made the equivalent of 70 new rubles as a salary and 70 new rubles
supplement per month. (388)
(140)
Oswald denied making statements of an exploitable nature concerning his
original decision to reside in the Soviet Union. (389) He remembered being
interviewed in his room at the Metropole Hotel by a reporter from Radio Moscow
concerning his impressions of Moscow as an American tourist. (390) He stated he
had never been asked to make any statements for radio, press or audiences since
his arrival. (391) This contradicts his first comment and what he wrote in
January 13--March 16, 1960 entries in his diary. "I meet many young Rus-
sian
workers my own age. * * * All wish to know about me even offer to hold a mass
meeting so I can say. I refuse politely." (392)
(141)
When asked if he had provided information he had acquired, as a radar
operator in the Marine Corps, Oswald stated "that he was never in fact
subjected to any questioning or briefing by the Soviet authorities concerning
his life or experiences prior to entering the Soviet Union and had never
provided information to any Soviet organ." (393)
(142)
Oswald stated he never applied for Soviet citizenship. (394) His original
application was for permission to remain in the Soviet Union and a temporary
extension of his tourist visa pending the outcome of his request. (395) Oswald
stated he had addressed this
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application
and mailed it to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet although it appeared to have been
delivered to the central office of the Moscow OVIR. (396) Apparently this was
the basis of a notification Oswald stated he received 3 days later that
permission had been granted for him to remain in the Soviet Union. (397)
Subsequently he was issued a "stateless" internal passport. (398)
(143)
The Embassy returned his passport to him after it was amended to be valid
only for direct return to the United States. (399) The passport expiration date
was September 10, 1961, but Oswald needed the passport to apply for exit visas
immediately in Minsk. Oswald wrote
"July 9 received passport. Call Marina to Moscow also" (401)
Oswald wrote after he and Marina returned to Minsk on July 14, that
meetings to persuade Marina not to go to the United States began. (402) Her
visit to the Embassy was known. (403)
(145)
The 20 or so papers, birth certificates, affidavits, photos, and so forth
needed to apply for exit visas were turned in by Oswald between July 15 and
August 20. (404) He writes in the diary that "they say it will be 3 1/2
months before we know whether (sic) they'll let us go or not. (405) The date on
Oswald's application to the OVIR Militia Department, Minsk City Executive
Committee for the issuance of an exit visa from the U.S.S.R. is July 15, 1961.
(406)
(146)
The application Marina had to sign to give permission for her husband to
leave the Soviet Union bears a July 19 date.
According to Marina's visa application she requests an exit visa to join
him on his departure from the Soviet Union, August 21, 1961.
(147)
The personnel department chief and plant director where Oswald worked, issued a
report to the Minsk City Militia Department in December 1961. (409) It stated
that Oswald:
(1) Takes no
part in the social life of the shop and keeps very much to himself.
(2) Reacts in an
oversensitive manner to remarks from the foreman.
(3) Is careless
in his work.
(4) Does not
perform satisfactory as a regulator, and
(5) Does not
display the initiative for increasing his skills as a regulator. (410)
(148)
Oswald wrote in his diary that on Christmas Day 1961 Marina was told at
the passport and visa office that she and Oswald were granted exit visas from
the Soviet Union. (411) Oswald's
application to the Minsk Militia Department for the extension of his identity
card bore it January 4, 1962, date. (412) He
wrote
in his diary he was granted a residence document for foreigners. (413) Identity
card for an alien series AA No. 5-19666, received by Lee Harvey Oswald was
issued January 4 and was valid until July 2, 1963: (414)
(149)
On February 15 Oswald wrote ,that, June Lee Oswald was born. (415) His
diary stated-that Marina formally quit her job March 24 and he received a letter
stating her entrance visa to the United States had been approved the following
day. (416)
Soviet
Citizenship
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XIII.
SOVIET CITIZENSHIP
(150)
Lee Harvey Oswald was not a Soviet citizen during his residence in the
Soviet Union. He requested Soviet citizenship by mail on October 16, 1959. On
October 21, a Soviet official interviewed Oswald and tried to dissuade him from
defecting to the Soviet Union. Later that night a police officer told him he
would have to leave the Soviet Union within 2 hours.
(151)
Oswald immediately attempted to commit suicide. His hospital
records reflected it was done in an effort to postpone his departure.
After a week in the hospital, Oswald applied at the pass and registration
office for ,Soviet citizenship. Three days later he orally denounced his
American citizenship at ,the Embassy. Although he did so in order to convince
the Soviets to grant him citizenship, he was granted a residence visa for
foreigners without citizenship. Oswald received this visa on January 4, 1960, 2
1/2 months after his original application. Oswald
told American reporters in November that the
Soviets would allow him to stay. The January 4 date appears in Oswald's
diary and on the residence document provided by Soviet authorities.
(152)
One year later the residence visa was extended after Oswald refused the
Soviet citizenship offered to him. When he wrote to the U.S. Embassy in February
1961 he stated the Soviets had not insisted on his acceptance of citizenship.
Oswald wrote that he had "nonpermanent type papers" for a foreigner.
In January 1960. the Embassy had reissued Oswald's American passport and the
Soviets issued him a residence visa for foreigners.
ANALYSIS
(153)
Oswald was not the only American who had difficulty obtaining citizenship while
residing in the Soviet Union. Ricciardelli repeatedly requested citizenship from
the Visa Department of the Intourist Service Bureau. He was told that he would
have to leave the Soviet Union on the expiration date that appeared on his visa.
Ricciardelli did not depart and was told he would be allowed to remain only
after being hospitalized for rheumatic fever. A Soviet passport was given to
Ricciardelli 7 months after he requested it. Although his wife refused a Soviet
passport his children were considered Soviet citizens.
(154)
Webster waited 2 months for
acceptance by the Soviets. He received Soviet citizenship only after altering
his stated reason for defection and assuring the Russians he could manufacture
the Rand spray gun he was exhibiting in the Soviet Union.
(155)
Soviet authorities did not grant citizenship to Dubinsky or Petrulli,
both of whom left the country. Davis was documented as "stateless
person" and allowed to reside in the Soviet Union.
(156)
Sloboda waited 1 month to be granted Soviet citizenship, did his oldest
and youngest child. His wife and middle child were issued internal passports for
foreigners.
(157)
The Soviets offered citizenship to the Blocks, but they received internal
passports for foreigners. After a number of years in the Soviet
Union
the Blocks were pressed to accept Soviet citizenship, which they would not do.
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(158)
In the case of Dutkanicz, the Supreme Soviet, by special decree, granted
him citizenship 1 month prior to his defection.
Propaganda
Use and Financial Arrangements
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XIV.
PROPAGANDA USE AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
(159)
Richard Snyder, the American consul at the Embassy in Moscow was asked
about the Soviet use of defectors for propaganda.
He said:
I think that if there is a
usual pattern--and, again, this is difficult to use words like 'usual' because
there are never two cases alike in this sort of thing---but if there is a usual
pattern, it is that there is some exploitation of the defector Soviet public
media, usually after the details of his defection have been settled,
particularly the detail as to whether the Soviet Union desires to have him. Up
to that point, publicity in the Soviet Press probably is not to be expected.
He
testified that in the Oswald case, there was no known Soviet press or propaganda
(418) Marina Oswald's testimony before the Warren Commission was to the
contrary. She said that "Lee took part in radio broadcasts, propaganda in
favor of the Soviet Union, which he felt helped him to stay in the Soviet Union.
(419)
(160)
Oswald wrote in his diary he had been asked to give a speech, which he
did not do. He also informed the American Embassy in Moscow that he had made
several statements to Lev Sefyayev on his impressions of Moscow as a tourist.
The committee found no information that any statements made by Lee Harvey Oswald
were used for Soviet propaganda purposes.
(161)
The committee also found no information that the Soviets had used
Citrynell, Dubinsky, Greendlinger, Petrulli, or Webster for propaganda purposes.
There was no apparent correlation between Soviet citizenship being granted to an
individual and subsequent propaganda exploitation as suggested by Snyder.
Dubinsky and Petrulli were not granted any type of residence visa and remained
the Soviet Union only a short time. Citrynell and Webster became
Soviet
citizens with relatively little difficulty. There was no information available
on Greendlinger's circumstances. Absence of data does not necessarily mean the
Soviets made no propaganda use of these five individuals or Oswald.
(162)
Three of the defectors that had anti-American propaganda statements
published--Ricciardelli, Slobode, and Dutkanicz--were Soviet citizens. Two other
defectors whose anti-American statements received Soviet press, the Blocks, had
residence visas for foreigners. They
were, however, frequently pressured to accept Soviet citizenship.
Davis was the only defector documented. as a "stateless
person," as was Oswald, who had anti-American statements published for
propaganda purposes.
(163)
Two defectors made the type of propaganda statements during radio broadcasts
that Marina Oswald Porter describes Oswald as making. Both these defectors,
Slobode and Dutkanicz, had contact with the KGB while stationed in West Germany
with the U.S. Army. They were still
serving in the Army when they entered the U.S.S.R.
Residence,
Employment, and Financial Arrangements
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XV.
RESIDENCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
(164)
All the individuals within this study, including Oswald, who received
permission to remain in the Soviet Union, were assigned reside in cities within
the western portion of the country. Oswald was asigned employment, as were the
others, with the exception of who was a student at the Kiev Institute. Slobode
also received rubles a month, although his employment is unknown.
(165)
Income comparison was difficult as the number of household members varied
over time. Income
of additional household members, an important variable, was usually
known. The devaluation of the ruble
in 1960 confused amounts in some cases. (420)
(166)
Salary was known for Oswald and five other defectors. Financial aid
received from organizations like the Soviet Red Cross was also known in most of
these cases. Oswald received the lowest salary among the defectors in this
study. 70 new rubles. Davis, a single male attending the Kiev Institute,
received the salary closest to that made by Oswald. He was paid 90 new rubles
and lived in a free dorm room. Oswald,
however, was the only individual known to receive a monthly stipend in addition
to his salary. He wrote that each month he received the equivalent of 70 new
rubles, technically from the Red Cross. It
was, in fact, probably arranged for by the M.V.D. (421) This would bring
Oswald's monthly income to 140 new rubles. The Blocks and Ricciardellis made
close to this amount, but had families to support in addition to themselves.
Sloboda and Webster both received over 250 new rub]es a month.
(167)
The defectors also received occasional financial aid. The amount varied
greatly from the 10,000 rubles (presumably old rubles, equaling 1,000 new
rubles) that Davis wrote a friend he had received and 50 rubles given to
SIoboda's wife to buy a present. Oswald received the equivalent of 500 new
rubles to pay hotel and transportation bills to Minsk. No defector received
payments above 100 new rubles except Oswald and Davis. The CIA 201 file on Davis
states that because sum Davis wrote he had received was so fantastically high it
was perhaps a mistake.
(168)
Although Oswald received more aid than most of the other in dividuals
studied, it is possible that it supplemented the low salary he received. Oswald
wrote "it was really payment for my denunciation of the United States in
Moscow * * * As soon as I * * * started negotiations with the American Embassy
in Moscow for my return to the United States my Red Cross allotment was cut
off?' (423)
Soviet
Relations and Exit Visas
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XVI.
SOVIET RELATIONS AND EXIT VISAS
(169)
Two American citizens married Soviet citizens while residing in the
U.S.S.R. Oswald had been in the Soviet Union 18 1/2 months when he married
Marina N. Prusakova. Two months prior to the marriage, Oswald wrote the American
Embassy concerning an agreement that might be made for his return to the United
States. A month the marriage he informed the Embassy his wife would be returning
to the United States with him. Marina applied for an exit visa to leave the
Soviet Union and waited 4 months for it to be granted. Oswald, who
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had
applied for a Soviet exit visa approximately 1 1/2 months earlier than Marina,
learned his had been granted with Marina's. He had waited 5 1/2 months for an
exit visa.
(170)
Greendlinger's second trip to Moscow in April 1958 resulted Iris marriage
to Yelena Ivanovaa Pyatnitskaya within the month.
He had been encouraged to believe her passport and Soviet exit visa would
be issued in 3 to 4 months by OVIR. After a year, the Soviet
authorities issued his wife an exit visa to depart the Soviet Union.
The U.S. Embassy refused to issue her an entrance visa due to her
membership in Komsomol and a trade union. Because Greendlinger left the Soviet
Union in July 1959, it took, at most, 16 months for the Soviets to grant
Greendlinger an exit visa. His wife's Soviet exit visa took approximately 12
months to obtain.
(171)
Webster did not marry the woman with whom he lived in the Soviet Union
and did not try to arrange for her departure from the U.S.S.R. He applied for a
Soviet exit visa for, himself and, after a 2-month wait, was refused and told he
could reapply in a year. Webster waited the year and reapplied for an exit visa.
The Soviet authorities granted it, and Webster departed for the United States
after 14 months.
(172)
Others living in the Soviet. Union were also refused immediate issuance
of exit visas. The Blocks had their requests denied or not acted upon for at
least 12 months until they were expelled for acts of hooliganism and handing out
anti-Soviet propaganda. Citrynell reported he was detained in the Soviet Union
involuntarily for 8 months.
(173)
It may be assumed Mary Dutkanicz obtained an exit visa because she was
allowed out of the Soviet Union on March 22, 1962.
Her husband made immediate efforts for his children and himself to depart
also. Sixteen months later his children were taken from their home. They spoke
to their father once and learned his fears that the Soviets would render him an
idiot. Three months after the children's removal, Dutkanicz was reported as dead
to Iris wife. The children were allowed to depart from the Soviet Union 6 months
after the reported death, or 25 months after their mother had left.
(174)
In this analysis, only one Soviet exit visa was granted in a shorter time
period than was Oswald's. Sloboda's wife received an exit visa within 3 months
of application. Nevertheless, this was the only case in which the visa was an
exit-reentry visa, and application procedures may have been different. Reasons
for Oswald's short wait obtaining an exit visa are unknown.
KGB
Contact
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XVII.
KGB CONTACT
(175)
During Oswald's efforts to regain his American passport, he was
questioned by Embassy personnel about his activities in the Soviet Union. He was
not candid in all of his responses. This places into doubt Oswald's statement
that he had never been subjected to any questioning of briefing by Soviet
authorities concerning his life prior to entering the, Soviet Union and that he
had never provided information to any Soviet organ. Oswald had previously
informed the Embassy that he would provide "information he learned as a
radar operator in the Marines.
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462
(176)
Other questions are raised about Oswald's. state. ment by an October 17,
1959, entry in his diary that his Intourist guide "asks me about myself and
my reason for doing this. The committee was informed by KGB officers who had
defected from the Soviet Union that Intourist guides were frequently used by the
KGB as agents or sources of information. Oswald's diary reflects he saw a great
deal of his Intourist guide.
(177)
Oswald's diary also described various meetings with Soviet officials to
discuss his desire to reside in the Soviet Union. He met with at least five
representatives of the pass and registration or visa department. Later Oswald
had a meeting with the Soviet Red Cross, and he is met in Minsk by two other Red
Cross employees and two Intourist representatives. Oswald wrote in his diary
that he kept contact with one of the Intourist representatives for 3% months,
and 6 months after that, she attended his 21st birthday party.
(178)
Oswald's diary also contained entries concerning his associates. (424)
Marina told the FBI that:
She believes he was observed and perhaps his neighbors and associates
were questioned concerning his beliefs and his activities * * * there is a
possibility that there will be speculators and espionage agents among tourists
and immigrants in Russia * * * for this reason * * * tourists and immigrants are
investigated to a degree in Russia." (425) Marina also informed the FBI
that she knew Oswald's contacts and knew of no contact by Russian intelligence
or government agencies. (426) Marina did not believe Oswald had been given any
assignment to perform, either in Russia or the United States. (427)
(179)
The committee requested permission of the Soviet Embassy to conduct
interviews of the Soviet citizens that were reported by Oswald to have had
contact with him. (428) This permission was refused, as was the committee's
request for additional Soviet documents concerning Oswald's surveillance. The
committee had no other available means to determine possible connections between
the described individuals and the KGB.
(180)
The committee interviewed Webster concerning any contact he may have had
with the KGB while in the Soviet Union. (429)
Webster
said the KGB had never contacted him, that there was no reason for them to do
so, as the government officials that had aided him in his defection had his
entire story. (430) He stated he had never been questioned relative to
intelligence matters. (431)
(181)
File reviews revealed that Mrs. Block thought they would have been of
interest to the KGB while in the Soviet Union, but that they had no knowing
contact with them. (432) She said that the Soviet representative who resettled
them asked a lot of questions. (433) She recalled his inquiries about how an
illegal U.S. passport, or one, with false identity, could be obtained. (434).
(182)
The committee found that Ricciardelli had contact with a representative
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Red Cross.
It was the Red Cross that relocated him to Kiev. He stated that visitors
to his apartment believed it to be bugged. File reviews produced no, information
concerning KGB contact with either Ricciardelli or Citrynell.
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Citrynell
was known to have had contact with the Office of Visa and Registration and the
Red Cross. The only defector requested not to make degoratory comments about the
Soviet Union after leaving was Citrynel. He
was asked for a signed statement concerning this by the Red Cross.
(183)
Apparently, Dubinsky and Pertrulli never met with any Soviet
authorities other than thier Intourist guides. They were refused
citizenship or any type of Soviet residence visa and remain in the Soviet Union
only for a short period. Dubinsky's treatment may characterize Soviet treatment
of foreigners they consider mentally unbalanced.
(184)
The committee found Dubinsky and Sloboda had contact with the KGB before
and after their defection to the Soviet Union.
Dutkanicz was recruited in a bar in West Germany by the KGB. Upon his
defection, his family was resettled in L'vov with KGB assistance.
The KGB watched over Dutkanicz closely and kept in daily telephone
contact with him.
(185)
Sloboda, a reported KGB agent before defection, was subjected to frequent
questioning by the KGB. His wife,
however, reported the only Russian Intelligence Service officer she knew was the
resettlement officer.
(186)
In reviewing the circumstance concerning KGB contact with these 12
defectors, it could be concluded that only those having had contact with the KGB
prior to their defection, had contact with Soviet intelligence afterward.
This conclusion, however, would be in direct conflict with the testimony
before the committee of experts in Soviet intelligence and officers who defected
from the KGB.
(187)
The committee received testimony that: (1) Americans entering the Soviet
Union were of intelligence interest to the KGB; (2) Americans offering to defect
to the Soviet Union were rare and paid particular attention to by the KGB; (3)
in any case similar to that of Lee Harvey Oswald, the defector would have been
debriefed for intelligence information.(435)
(188)
In the cases of these defectors, representatives from the Soviet Red Cross,
Intourist, the Office of Visa and Registration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the KGB fulfill overlapping roles. In addition, KGB officers use the
employees of the various other agencies as agents to gather information. It is
probable that KGB officers misrepresent their employment while debriefing
unknowledgeable defectors. It is also possible that the defectors misrepresented
any contact they may have with foreign intelligence agencies, thus files might
not accurately reflect experiences in the Soviet Union. Consequently, contact
between the KGB and Lee Harvey Oswald cannot be ruled out. In most cases, the
files reviewed in. the FBI and CIA did not in fact contain indications of
debriefing of, the defectors by either agency in the United States. Thus, most
in individuals were never asked if the KGB had made
contact
with them during their stay in the Soviet Union.
Addendum:
America Debriefing Practices
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ADDENDUM:
AMERICA DEBRIEFING PRACTICES
(189)
The committee conducted a review of defectors files in order to determine
whether defectors other than Oswald were routinely debriefed upon their return
to the United States. The committee
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requested
that the CIA provide a list of persons traveling to the Soviet Union during the
period from 1958 to 1963, including both visitors and those persons considered
by the agency to be defectors. (436) In response, the CIA provided a computer
listing of 380 individuals entitled "U.S. Persons Who Have or May Have
Defected to the U.S.S.R. Between 1958-1963."(437)
The Agency
stated that this listing represented U.S. persons including some non-U.S.
citizens who owed some measure of allegiance the United States, who either had
defected or had shown some intention of defecting to the U.S.S.R. within the
requested time period. (438)
(190)
As this list was compiled from a more detaled computer program on
American defectors, a more detailed description concerning these individuals was
requested and provided in an expanded version of the original list. This machine
listing included the following information where relevant or available for each
individual: name, date, and place of birth, 201 file number, arrival in Soviet
Union, departure from Soviet Union, employment in Soviet Union, most
current
address, and other miscellaneous information compiled from the individual's 201
file and citations for/or other agency documents regarding this individual.
(191)
The committee compiled a list of persons who appeared from the
information available in the Agency's expanded list, to be U.S. citizens born in
the United States, who defected or attempted to defect to the Soviet Union
between the years of 1958 and 1963 and who returned to the United States within
the same period of time. In addition, the committee included individuals from an
October State Department request for information from the CIA regarding these
persons whom they considered to be defectors to the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc
countries. (439)
(192)
The committee requested files or '29 individuals who fit the
above-described criteria and the CIA provided files on 28 individuals on whom
they maintained records. These 201 files were reviewed as well as any existing
Domestic Contact Division files regarding these persons. The committee's files
review revealed that, in the case of six of the individuals, there was no
indication that they ever returned to the United States.(440)In some of these
cases, the files contained a report from a source who observed or spoke with the
subject and then reported the contact to the CIA, but there was no indication of
direct contact with any of these persons on the part of the CIA.
(193)
In regard to the other 9:29 defectors, the file review showed there is no
record of CIA contact with 18 of them. Again, four of these files contain
reports by sources who advised the Agency of their contact. Included in this
group are Joseph Dutkanicz and Morris and Mollie Block. (441) One file regarding
a former military person, Bruce Frederick Davis, contained a report of a
debriefing.
(194)
The circumstances of the CIA's contact with the four remaining defectors
differed in each case. The file of Irving Amron reflected that he had actually
been living in the U.S.S.R. since 1933 and returned to the United States in
1962. He was debriefed in 1964 by a CIA officer after applying for employment in
response to a newspaper advertisement. (443) Another returning defector, Harold
Citrynell,
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was
unwittingly interviewed by a CIA officer abroad upon the official's departure
from the Soviet Union enroute to the United States.
(444)
While Citrynell's file indicated that the Agency considered it desirable that a
full and controlled debriefing by the CIA and FBI be conducted and CIA wrote to
the FBI suggesting a joint debriefing, there is no evidence in Citrynell's 201
file nor in any DCD documents that suggested further contact on the part of the
CIA. (445)
(195)
More extensive debriefings were conducted of the other two defectors. Robert E.
Webster, a plastics expert with the Rand Development Corp., whose defection to
the Soviet Union in 1959 was highly publicized, returned to the United States in
June of 1962 (446) Weber had been employed by the Soviet Union at the Leningrad
Scientific Institute of Polytechnic Plastics.(447) Shortly after his return to
the United States, Webster was debriefed in home, territory by CIA's
representatives in conjunction with representatives from the Air Force. (448) It
was decided that a more extensive debriefing was order and Webster was sub-equently
brought to the Washington, D.C. area where he was debriefed for a period of 2
weeks. (449) The debriefing reports included a chronology of Webster's life and
the CIA's assessment of him as well as a large body of information regarding
life in the Soviet Union, Webster's work there, and biographic information on
persons he had met during his residence there.(450)
(196)
Likewise, Libero Ricciardelli who had lived in the Soviet Union for
nearly 4 years was contacted for purposes of debriefing soon after his return to
the United States in late June of 1963.(451) His initial debriefing included
such subjects as the motivation to defect to the U.S.S.R. as well as activities
engaged in during his Moscow stay, relocation from Moscow to Kiev, and general
aspects of life such as residence controls and costs. (452) While the CIA
believed it was infeasible to debrief Ricciardelli more thoroughly due to his
current status of attempting to regain U.S. citizenship, the Agency expressed an
interest in eliciting more information on such topics as cost of living medical
care, consumer goods, highways, transportation, and restrictions upon travel
within Kiev. (453)
(197)
It becomes clear from the review of files on these defectors that
debriefing of defectors by the CIA was, in fact, somewhat of random occurrence.
Nonetheless, the instances in which
the Agency did choose to debrief returning American defectors, the Agency
appeared to be interested in topics of general interest regarding life in
certain areas of the Soviet Union. In this regard, the persons who were
debriefed were similar to Oswald in that they defected and returned within the
same general time period and each spent his time in the Soviet Union in areas of
interest to the CIA.
(198)
It appears from an examination of all available materials that Lee Harvey
Oswald was not interviewed by the CIA following his return to the United States
from the Soviet Union. Although, persons branch of the Soviet Russian division
expressed an interest in interviewing Oswald
they never followed up on this interest. There was also no indication that the
Office of Operations interviewed Oswald.
(199)
While the CIA did conduct interviews of some tourists who visited the
Soviet Union during the period 1959-63 as well as some American citizens who
defected to the Soviet Union and then returned
Page
466
466
to
the United States; there was no standard policy to interview all persons in
either category. Thus, the fact that Oswald was not interviewed was more the
rule than the exception according to procedures followed by the CIA at that
point in time.
Submitted by:
JOHANNA
SMITH,
Researcher.
FALSE DEFECTOR
The Kennedy Assassination and the Current Political Moment
"James Angleton was the mastermind not of the Bay of Pigs (that was Richard Bissell), but of a false defector program that sent spies into the Soviet Union. Among them was one Lee Harvey Oswald." - Joan Mellen
Transcript of a lecture given on January 28, 2007 at the 92nd Street Y in New York City
by Joan Mellen
5
It happened going on 44 years ago; yet, the murder of President Kennedy remains simultaneously a subject of fascination and taboo within mainstream discourse. You will not find a free exchange of views on the Kennedy assassination in the New York Times nor, to date, an acknowledgement of the unanswered questions arising from 9/11. This past November, I spoke at a Jewish Senior Center on the Upper West Side, where the director remarked that the Times had listed the lecture the week before and the week after. My talk on the Kennedy assassination had slipped down the memory hole.
I'm grateful to the 92nd Street Y for the liberalism of outlook and independence of mind that made this evening possible. The Kennedy assassination will not go away, and I'll try to explain why, heartened as I am by the fact that the former governor of Minnesota, Arne Carlson, gave a speech in November entitled “The JFK Assassination: Its Impact on America's History.” That's my subject as well: How the Kennedy assassination illuminates the present political moment.
James Jesus Angleton
The Kennedy assassination is present even in its absence in the recent film,
The Good Shepherd, a movie about the CIA. Its central character, played by
Matt Damon, is based largely on the late head of CIA Counter Intelligence, James
Jesus Angleton. The distortions of the film return us to the meaning of the
Kennedy assassination.
James Angleton in real life was the mastermind not, as the film suggests, of the Bay of Pigs (that was Richard Bissell), but of a false defector program that sent spies into the Soviet Union. Among them was one Lee Harvey Oswald. This talk is based on interviews I conducted for my book, A Farewell to Justice, as well as new interviews since its publication a year ago. I refer also to some of more than four million documents released under the JFK Records Collection Act at the National Archives.
An FBI document demonstrates that Oswald, who was indeed one of Angleton's assets in the Soviet Union, communicated back to the CIA through a CIA asset at American Express named Michael Jelisavcic. One of my discoveries for A Farewell to Justice was the original of a note that Oswald, arrested in New Orleans for a street fight, handed to police lieutenant, Francis Martello.
One CIA document refers to an FBI "65" file, an espionage file, for Jelisavic, a reference inadvertently unredacted when CIA declassified the document. This number clearly directs CIA to an espionage file. Oswald also had Jelisavcic's name and room number in his possession. Angleton's false defector program, not mentioned in The Good Shepherd, remains among the CIA's most closely guarded secrets; a secret necessary to preserve the fiction of the Warren Report.
Otto Otepka
The figure of Lee Harvey Oswald, and his peculiar biography
as a low-level intelligence agent, continues to haunt those whose paths he
crossed. After A Farewell to Justice was published, I drove down
Alligator Highway in Central Florida to interview a very interesting
nonagenarian named Otto Otepka. Mr. Otepka was high up in State Department
security under the Eisenhower administration and into the 1960s. Routinely, he
came upon the names of people who had defected, and whom it was his job to
investigate for security purposes.
Highly commended for his diligence, Mr. Otepka displayed to me a wall filled with a display of framed commendations, including one signed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on behalf of President Eisenhower. (In these times President Eisenhower seems to be a bonafide liberal, not only for his prescient remark about the military industrial complex, but for another of his observations, that most of America has accepted the idea of the New Deal, but for a few oil millionaires in Texas).
Otepka saw at once that there was something unusual about Lee Oswald, “tourist.” As he placed this list of defectors into his security safe, Mr. Otepka planned to request that the CIA look into this individual. A nighttime burglary, obviously an inside job, resulted in this file vanishing. Soon Otto Otepka was demoted to an inconsequential post, writing summaries of documents. Oswald's “defection” was not to be scrutinized.
This all took place in the early sixties. In the year 2006, The Good Shepherd still could not mention Angleton's false defector program, which would have driven the film to the door of the Kennedy assassination. Instead the film conveniently closes in 1961 during the Bay of Pigs.
Oswald CIA Courier
In A Farewell to Justice I demonstrate that Oswald was
an employee of the CIA; a fact recently re-confirmed by historian Michael Kurtz.
Professor Kurtz reports on an interview he did in 1981 with Hunter Leake, second
in command at the New Orleans field office. Leake admitted that the CIA used
Oswald as a courier, and that Oswald came to New Orleans in April 1963 because
the CIA office intended to use him for certain operations. Leake either was
disaffected from the Agency, or, perhaps, was just an honest man. He admitted
that he personally paid Oswald various sums of cash for his services. Oswald was
on the CIA payroll; Leake himself had paid Oswald's CIA salary.
Leake also explained in this telephone interview with Professor Kurtz why there was no documentation on Oswald's employment with CIA in New Orleans. After President Kennedy's assassination, he drove the files personally to Langley, Virginia. They were so voluminous that he had to rent a trailer to transport them. Shouldn't revelations from so credible a source have made the newspapers?
In A Farewell to Justice, I write for the first time that Oswald had also been enlisted by U.S. Customs in New Orleans—information I gleaned from the documents deposited at the National Archives by the Church Committee. Not a single newspaper or magazine or television program chose to notice this astonishing revelation. I show how the framing of Oswald in Louisiana by the CIA began even before the shooting in Dallas.
As you study the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination, you discover repeatedly that the press relinquished its freedom more than forty years ago. The latest document I was sent came from the LBJ library in Austin. Dated 1967, it was a telegram from the “Newsweek” columnist, Hugh Aynesworth, to George Christian, Lyndon Johnson's press secretary. Aynesworth was announcing that he was sending the President, in advance of publication, his latest attack on New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, the better for the President to take steps against Garrison's investigation.
CIA releases once marked “Secret” are filled with revelations of how reporters, such as Al Burt, the Latin America editor of the Miami Herald, visited the CIA to be instructed on what was and was not in the Agency's interest that he print. There are precedents for our present co-opted press, from FOX to CNN, its twin. Even Keith Olbermann on MSNBC seems unduly cautious.
E. Howard Hunt
In his memoir, American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA,
Watergate & Beyond, long-time CIA operative E. Howard Hunt suggests that
Lyndon Johnson should be viewed as the prime suspect in “having Kennedy
liquidated.” It seems clear that Hunt, age 88, was still engaged in the business
of drawing attention away from the massive evidence connecting CIA to the
assassination.1 Lyndon Johnson, the direct beneficiary of the
assassination, seemed to Hunt a likely target.
Hunt was far too clever to regurgitate J. Edgar Hoover's disinformation that the Mafia planned and then covered up this crime. His obvious intention was to provide a false sponsor, someone other than the Agency. Even Hunt didn't bother to revive the fantasy that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, or acted at all, in the assassination.
The Warren Commission lawyers could find no motive for Oswald's shooting of President Kennedy, even as they blamed him. You might well ask, what, then, was the CIA's motive? Return to 1963 and the pressure by both the CIA's clandestine service and the Pentagon for a full-scale invasion of Cuba. President Kennedy opposed an American invasion of Cuba as not in the national interest, just as he had no intention of embedding us in the quagmire of a ground war in Vietnam. The first Texas President profited from John F. Kennedy's murder, and did the bidding of those forces John Kennedy opposed.
Richard Reeves' 1994 biography, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, quotes President Kennedy's fury at the sabotage of his presidency by the CIA. In the one true political moment in The Good Shepherd, Kennedy threatens to splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and cast them to the winds. “I'll get those CIA bastards if it's the last thing I do,” Kennedy said, famously, underestimating his adversaries. The CIA's “Executive Action” ("murder") capability was in place by 1963; it had already been involved in the murder and/or attempted murders of various heads of state, efforts which are outlined in detail in the papers of the Church Committee.
Bobby Kennedy
Our mainstream press manages to avoid confronting the Church Committee
documents, writing about the CIA as if it had no history, but was born in the
aftermath of 9/11. They are particularly unwilling to connect our present
political morass to past events. Foreign reporters have not been similarly
restrained. On a magazine segment on BBC-2 which aired on November 20, 2006,
documentarian Shane O'Sullivan revealed an extraordinary photograph connecting
the assassination of John and Robert Kennedy. You won't find this information in
that other Kennedy movie of this season, Bobby.
The press photographs (shown on page __) were taken at the Ambassador Hotel on the evening of the assassination of Robert Kennedy, where a crowd had gathered to celebrate his victory in the California primary. Pictured standing together were three high level CIA operatives. One was Gordon Campbell, the second in command at JM-WAVE, the big CIA station in Miami, from which emanated plans for the sabotage of Cuba and the assassination of Fidel Castro.
With Campbell was a long-time CIA operative named David Sanchez Morales, who worked with CIA propaganda expert David Atlee Phillips, a figure I discuss at length in A Farewell To Justice. Morales had assisted Phillips in the 1954 coup against President Arbenz in Guatemala. Morales' lawyer, Robert J. Walton, had quoted his client to the government investigator in Miami, Gaeton Fonzi: “I was in Dallas when we got the son of a bitch, and I was in Los Angeles when we got the little bastard.”
Morales was also close to a CIA operative named Felix Rodriguez, famously present at the murder of Che Guevara in Bolivia. He came away with Guevara's wristwatch. Rodriguez was so close to George H. W. Bush that he included photographs with the Bushes in his autobiography. Present in Dallas that November morning of the 22nd were not only George H. W. Bush, shortly to depart for Tyler, then return that afternoon to Dallas, but also Richard Nixon. Neither Bush nor Nixon, of course, staged the shooting itself, but it does seem odd that they were in Dallas along with David Atlee Phillips.
The third unlikely well-wisher of Robert Kennedy in this trio was CIA psychological warfare specialist, George Joannides. Joannides was CIA handler in Miami for an anti-Castro group called DRE (Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil). Lee Oswald's adversary in his street scuffle in New Orleans was a man named Carlos Bringuier, who claimed to be the DRE representative in New Orleans. Both were arrested. All trails lead to Lee Harvey Oswald. That street fight was clearly staged, as I show in my book.
I also discovered what Oswald actually said to Lieutenant Francis Martello, which Martello chose not to share with the Warren Commission: “Call the FBI. Tell them you have Lee Oswald in custody.” Yet another recently declassified FBI document once marked “Secret” reveals information given to the Bureau by a CIA officer. Dated 11/23/63, it confirms that Oswald was indeed a shared agent of both agencies.
It may be (here I'll speculate), that the street fight on Canal Street that established Oswald as pro-Castro, purveyor of leaflets for “Fair Play For Cuba,” was a propaganda victory by Joannides, whose specialty was psychological warfare. Five years later, Joannides apparently stands awaiting the impending murder of Robert F. Kennedy. There was a complete blackout in the U.S. media of O'Sullivan's BBC segment, but on the website of the London Guardian, you can find a report entitled, “Did The CIA Kill Bobby Kennedy?”
George H.W. Bush
I'm sure many in this audience are aware of the third recent
moment at which the Kennedy assassination has surfaced. There are a few scant
degrees of separation between the two Bush presidents, the role of the CIA in
the Kennedy assassination, and Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA asset. This surprising
invocation of the Kennedy assassination occurred on January 2, 2007 at the
funeral of President Gerald Ford, the last surviving member of the Warren
Commission. I'll read this extraordinarily revealing paragraph from George H.W.
Bush's eulogy, for those who missed it:
After a deluded gunman assassinated President Kennedy, our nation turned to Gerald Ford and a select handful of others to make sense of that madness – and a conspiracy theorist can say what they will – but the Warren Commission report will always have the final definitive say on this matter. Why? Because Gerry Ford put his name on it and Gerry Ford's word was always good.
Allow me to add that when amendments were offered to the Freedom of Information Act, enlarging public access to affairs of state, Gerald Ford vetoed the bill; only to have Congress to override his veto. Ford was no more a supporter of the truth than Mr. Bush's son. George H. W. Bush's own word was not always so good either. There are powerful reasons why George H. W. Bush was motivated to invoke the Warren Report, even, amazingly, to refer to a “conspiracy theorist”—as if that designation would at once banish some truths he does not want available. There are only two degrees of separation between George H.W. Bush and Lee Harvey Oswald.
At his 1976 confirmation hearings for the post of Director of Central Intelligence, a post into which he was elevated by Gerald Ford, Bush denied that he had any prior connection to the CIA. This was a falsehood. A CIA document at the National Archives and posted on the Internet (Record Number 104-10310-10271) reveals that in 1953, when George H.W. Bush founded Zapata Oil, his partner was one Thomas J. Devine—an oil wildcatter and long-time CIA staff employee. Thomas Devine's name does not appear in the original papers of Zapata, but it does in the company Bush created shortly thereafter as “Zapata Offshore.”
This CIA document reveals that Thomas Devine had informed George Bush of a CIA project with the cryptonym, WUBRINY/LPDICTUM. It involved CIA proprietary commercial operations in foreign countries. By 1963, Devine had become not a former CIA employee, but "a cleared and witting contact" in the investment banking firm which managed the proprietary corporation WUSALINE. WUBRINY involved Haitian operations, in which, the documents reveal, a participant was George de Mohrenschildt, the Dallas CIA handler of Lee Oswald.
In late April 1963, in Haiti, de Mohrenschildt appeared to discuss investment possibilities. The CIA officer, the author of the document, named only as WUBRINY/1, had no idea of de Mohrenschildt's long-standing CIA connections, and in particular his role in shepherding Oswald in Dallas. De Mohrenschildt could safely pursue CIA interests in Haiti because in that month of April 1963 Lee Oswald (his charge) moved from Texas to New Orleans on the orders of the CIA, reporting to Hunter Leake.
A May 22, 1963 CIA document has de Mohrenschildt admitting he had “obtained some Texas financial backing” and had visited interested people in Washington regarding the candidacy of one M. Clemard Joseph Charles for President of Haiti, “as soon as Duvalier can be gotten out.” We are reminded of CIA's efforts to influence the political configurations of other countries. An obvious example is the CIA's obliging of British Petroleum—for a price—in the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, and his replacement by the Shah.
To summarize: George H.W. Bush is linked in April 1963, seven months before the Kennedy assassination, to a CIA project involving Lee Oswald's handler, Count Sergei Georges de Mohrenschildt, through his own CIA partner, Thomas Devine. Bush and Devine later traveled to Vietnam together, a trip for which the Department of Defense issued Devine an interim “Top Secret” clearance. No surprise there: Devine obviously had never left the Agency.
On the day Gaeton Fonzi was to interview de Mohrenschildt for the House Select Committee on Assassinations, de Mohrenschildt was shot, and his death ruled a suicide. Fonzi's card was in his pocket. Joseph McBride's Nation article ("The Man Who Wasn't There: George Bush, CIA Operative, July 16, 1988), exposed how George H.W. Bush was debriefed by the FBI about the Kennedy assassination on November 23rd . The inadvertently released document refers to “Mr. George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency.” Bush claimed it was a different George Bush, George William Bush, who worked for the Agency. But it wasn't so. George William came forward to say he was never debriefed by anyone.
Every road leads to the assassination of President Kennedy. What should also give us pause is that these documents about Zapata Offshore, which had offices on several continents but never did much business, were released under the JFK Act as Kennedy assassination documents. So it is the Agency itself, not the dreaded “conspiracy theorists,” that links George H.W. Bush with the Kennedy assassination. Or it's the government that is the ultimate “conspiracy theorist.”
A Farewell to Justice was published in November 2005. In the intervening time, new documents have emerged that corroborate my view that the Central Intelligence Agency planned, supervised and implemented the assassination of President Kennedy. Those who claim that we will never know what happened to President Kennedy would do well to spend some time at the National Archives. P
<![endif]>
©2007 Joan Mellen is the author of A Farewell to Justice: Jim Garrison, JFK's Assassination and the Case That Should Have Changed History (www.joanmellen.net), available from The Last Hurrah, 937 Memorial Ave, Williamsport, PA 17701 (570) 321-1150. She is also the author of Jim Garrison: His Life and Times, The Early Years, available at www.jfklancer.com. She is a professor of English and creative writing at Temple University in Philadelphia. She is the author of several books, ranging from film criticism to fiction, true crime and biography. <![endif]>
Endnotes
1. According to Hunt's son, Saint John, Hunt left a more specific two-page deathbed memorandum, explaining how Frank Sturges had attempted to enlist him in the Kennedy assassination, which, according to this fragment, was being masterminded by Lyndon Johnson. Involved also were CIA murder specialist William Harvey, CIA officer out of Counter Intelligence named Cord Meyer, David Atlee Phillips, against whom there is massive evidence indeed, and a few others. According to Saint, as he is called in Rolling Stone, Hunt said, no thanks. He didn't want to be involved in any operation with William Harvey. Instinct if nothing else suggests that Hunt was settling old scores with those in the Agency with whom he had issues. There is no way to corroborate any of these accusations made by Hunt, deathly ill and, as another of his children suggests, drifting in and out of clarity. If nothing else, this Hunt brouhaha suggests that "deathbed confessions," if that's what this is, are specious sources of historical information. ("The Last Confession of E. Howard Hunt," Rolling Stone, April 5, 2007)
<![endif]> ADDENDUM
Shane O'Sullivan's documentary "Who Shot Bobby Kennedy?," which aired in the UK on November 20, 2006, revealed photographic evidence that three senior CIA operatives were present at the scene of RFK's assassination. Present at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles on June 5, 1968 were David Morales (who was Chief of Operations), Gordon Campbell (who was Chief of Maritime Operations), and George Joannides (who was Chief of Psychological Warfare Operations). Although Sirhan Sirhan – a Palestinian – was arrested as the lone gunman, witnesses placed his gun several feet in front of Kennedy, while the autopsy showed the fatal shot came from one inch behind. Even under hypnosis Sirhan remembers nothing, and psychiatrists have stated Sirhan may have been in a hypnotic trance. (BBC Newsnight, 11/21/06; pics from Shane O'Sullivan's website: http://www.rfkmustdie.com/)
by
tomnln
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